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Chapter 1 
1    Introduction 
1.1   General Remarks 
The last two decades have been characterised by two major developments regard-
ing the regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the European Union (EU). First, 
regulations have proliferated in the member states’ spheres because national gov-
ernments made extensive use of important legal possibilities, which they re-ob-
tained from the EU (see, e.g. Tosun 2014; Tosun and Hartung 2018; Schenkelaars 
and Wesseler 2016). Moreover, in certain member states, subnational units have in-
creasingly become active and regulated the use of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) (Tosun and Hartung 2017; Seifert 2006c). These legislative activities plus 
the limited authorisation – only one genetically modified (GM) crop is currently 
approved for commercial cultivation – together resulted in the fact that GM crops 
have always remained insignificant in EU agricultural production (Herring and 
Paarlberg 2016: 407). 
Second, so-called new plant breeding technologies (NPBTs) have been developed 
during the 2010s, which are increasingly used for breeding ever more promising 
commercial crops (see, e.g. Waltz 2018). These new techniques, most important, 
CRISPR/Cas have enormous potentials for addressing current and future challenges 
of agricultural production, most important among them, food security, and climate 
change (see, e.g. Carroll and Charo 2015). However, following the EU’s decision to 
classify organisms produced by NPBTs as GMOs, biotechnology could remain neg-
ligible in EU agricultural production (CJEU 2018). Nevertheless, due to important 
scientific and industrial actors’ pressures on EU institutions, the EU might loosen 
its GMO regulatory framework (European Commission 2018b). Therefore, the 
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conditions for EU farmers to cultivate NPBT-modified crops could be much easier, 
possibly boosting thereby farming based on agricultural biotechnology for the first 
time throughout the EU. 
Against the background of these two developments, this thesis scrutinises the 
determinants of the multi-level regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the do-
mestic sphere and investigates the strategies of key actors in this field, focusing spe-
cifically on Germany. In this country, state actors operating on different political 
levels direct legal possibilities to regulate GMOs. In addition, Germany provides 
sweeping insights for learning about the multi-level regulation of agricultural bio-
technology because of several, and at first sight, contradictory facts. 
First, Germany banned GMO cultivation on its territory; however, federal gov-
ernments facilitate approvals of new GM products at supranational level. Secondly, 
citizens refuse to buy food containing GM ingredients; however, the German live-
stock production industry imports and processes millions of tons of GM feed, and 
most of the population consume resulting animal products. Finally, Germany rep-
resents a leading scientific and business location with a powerful biotechnology sec-
tor; however, all important corporations have relocated their plant biotechnology 
divisions to non-EU countries. Nevertheless, Germany-based Bayer AG has ac-
quired Monsanto, thereby forming the most potent venture that markets biotech-
nology products to farmers around the world.  
Agricultural biotechnology regulation in the EU represents an appealing re-
search subject because it is characterised by high degrees of salience, politicisation, 
and controversy. In addition, the issue has a strong multi-level nature, wherefore 
regulatory activities on the various political levels require vertical coordination. 
Furthermore, agricultural biotechnology is a matter of risk regulation, which means 
that it is marked by intricate and contentious decision-making over the inclusion of 
science and politics in dealing with associated risks. Finally, the issue has important 
multi-sectoral implications because regulations not only affect actors operating 
along the agriculture/food production chain; rather, these measures also impact 
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actors in adjacent policy fields, most important, environment, consumer protection, 
research and development, and international trade (Shaffer and Pollack 2004: 6–13). 
Due to these appealing features, GMO regulation in the EU has already attracted 
remarkable scientific attention. Most research concentrated on aspects related to the 
EU as the primary regulator of this field (see, e.g. Randour et al. 2014; Mühlböck and 
Tosun 2018; Drott et al. 2013; Geelhoed 2016; Burns 2012; Klika et al. 2013; Weimer 
2015). Also some scholars analysed regulatory action on national levels in particular 
member states, including Germany, among others (see, e.g. Seifert 2009; Kuntz 2014; 
Katzek 2014; Barcena 2005). However, the regulation of agricultural biotechnology 
in domestic multi-level/federal systems that are characterised by interdependencies 
between various levels of governance have not yet been deciphered sufficiently (To-
sun and Hartung 2018). In addition, research on how political parties – the central 
decision makers over regulations – deal with the specific topic exists (Bäck et al. 
2015; Cooper 2009; Katzek 2014; Tosun 2014; Tosun and Hartung 2017; 2018; Tosun 
and Schaub 2017). Nevertheless, more detailed knowledge is needed about the stra-
tegic nature of their position-taking regarding the controversial issue. Finally, the 
role of private interests on the EU regulatory decision-making process on NPBTs, 
which has been enclosed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2018, and specif-
ically the role of German authorities within this process – is yet to be investigated. 
To reduce these research gaps, and to expand the existing literature on the EU multi-
level regulation of agricultural biotechnology, three core research questions guide 
this thesis. 
How and why have regional and local entities regulated this policy field? How 
have political parties on the two major levels of Germany’s federal system posi-
tioned themselves on the GMO topic? Which role have private interests played 
in the EU regulatory decision-making processes on NPBTs? 
To assess these questions, this book presents four original studies. The first study 
explores the determinants of GMO regulatory action at the local level, and the sec-
ond study investigates the drivers of such action at the regional level. The third 
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study analyses the position-taking behaviour of German parties on agricultural bi-
otechnology, examining if and why these collective actors strategically desist from 
positioning themselves on this specific policy issue. Finally, the fourth paper exam-
ines the lobbying activities of the biotech company Cibus, which aimed at promot-
ing a deregulation NPBTs in the EU. This study analyses why this firm chose to 
lobby regulatory authorities in certain member states, focussing specifically on Ger-
many. 
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. Chapter 1.2 provides 
background information on the foundations, rules and implications of the EU reg-
ulatory framework on GMOs, which is fundamental both for the introduction of 
regulations at subnational levels and for the (strategic) activities of key actors in this 
policy field. Section 1.3 introduces the key concepts underlying this book. Section 
1.4 presents an overview of the most important theoretical and methodical ap-
proaches. Section 1.5 outlines each of the four original studies and summarises their 
findings. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes with avenues for future research. 
1.2   Background Information  
The EU regulatory framework on GMOs was established in 1990, when the first 
member states had transferred their legal competences to the supranational level, 
with the objective of harmonising their miscellaneous national rules regarding the 
usage of GM crops for importation, cultivation, feed, processing, food, and scientific 
purposes. The legal basis of the framework is currently defined in Directive 
2001/18/EC, which addresses the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment. 
This directive defines a GMO as ‘an organism, with the exception of human beings, 
in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally 
by mating and/or natural recombination’ (Art. 2 (2)). This definition includes crops, 
animals, and microorganisms and originally dates to the set-up of the framework in 
1990. The definition has not been revised even though the regulatory framework 
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has been altered several times. Moreover, NPBTs have been discovered and rapidly 
became the preferential tools in plant breeding, most importantly CRISPR.1 
The GMO definition has since been applied whenever the breeding technique of 
genetic engineering (transgenesis) has been employed to modify living organisms. 
Ever since the legal decision was made by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
2018, the GMO definition has also applied to products resulting from new (genome 
editing) breeding techniques (CJEU 2018). In contrast, ‘traditional’ breeding tech-
niques based on radiation or chemicals, such as mutagenesis, are considered as not 
resulting in organisms according to the GMO definition. 
Table 1. Differing Regulatory Implications for Breeding Techniques that Produce 
Commercial Crops with Similar Traits 
 Traditional 
breeding 
Genetic              
engineering 
Genome             
editing 
Trait Herbicide-tolerant 
crop variety 
Herbicide-tolerant 
crop variety 
Herbicide-tolerant 
crop variety 
Event example BASF maize or 
canola (Imidazoli-
none-tolerant) 
Monsanto maize 
(Glyphosate-toler-
ant) 
Cibus canola (Sul-
fonylurea- toler-
ant) 
GMO legislation  No Yes Yes 
Note: revised version based on Jones (2015a: 90); see also Jones (2015b: 229). 
Table 1 illustrates the implications of the EU regulatory approach, which is 
mainly oriented around the process of modifying a living organism (process-based 
regulation). The consequences of this process-based regulatory approach are far-
reaching: even though products resulting from the various breeding techniques – 
 
1 The term ‘New Plant Breeding Technology’ dates to a definition of the EU’s ‘New Techniques 
Working Group’ (2011), which designated the following eight breeding techniques: Oligonucleotide 
Directed Mutagenesis; Zinc Finger Nuclease Technology (ZFN) comprising ZFN-1, ZFN-2 and ZFN-
3; Cisgenesis and Intragenesis; Grafting Agro-infiltration; RNA-dependent DNA methylation; Re-
verse breeding and Synthetic genomics. The term has since been expanded and used in a broader 
sense, so that it includes newer genome-editing techniques such as CRISPR (Clustered Regularly 
Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats). 
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such as crops with herbicide tolerances (see Table 1) – are endowed with similar 
properties, they are regulated in fundamentally different ways. While crops that 
have been bred using ‘traditional’ methods are generally deregulated, organisms 
derived with the help of genetic engineering or new (genome editing) breeding 
techniques fall under the scope of the GMO legislation. 
The main objective of the EU regulatory framework is the protection of human 
and animals’ health and the environment from possible negative effects of GMOs. 
To this end, a complex regulatory system has been established, which includes a 
risk assessment and an approval system for GM products, prescribes detailed rules 
for their traceability and labelling, and governs the release of GM crops into the 
environment for commercial and scientific purposes. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the main directives and regulations underlying the 
EU regulatory framework in 2019. We can gather from the table that, in the EU, the 
use of GMOs is rigorously regulated in all relevant regards, from the production to 
their retail. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the EU has revised the legis-
lation several times during the last two decades. Generally, these amendments have 
made the framework even more restrictive and prohibitive than it was previously.  
Besides the central pieces of legislation displayed, several more specific imple-
mentation rules, recommendations and guidelines makes up the EU regulatory 
framework (see, European Commission 2019b). As most of the rules underlying this 
framework are designed in a restrictive way, it has been widely considered the most 
restrictive of its kind worldwide for some years now (Burns 2012: 342; Raybould 
and Poppy 2012: 9; Seifert 2011: 22). However, the framework has been further re-
vised, most importantly, through the introduction of Directive 2015/412 and Di-
rective 2018/350. Directive 2015/412 in particular made the EU regulatory frame-
work even more restrictive. 
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Table 2. The Foundations of the EU Regulatory Framework 
Piece of legislation Area of application 
Directive 2001/18/EC On the deliberate release of GMOs 
into the environment 
Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 On GM food and GM feed 
Directive (EU) 2015/412 
Amending Directive 2001/18/EC as 
regards the possibility for the Mem-
ber States to restrict or prohibit the 
cultivation of GMOs in their territory 
Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 
Concerning the traceability and label-
ling of GMOs and the traceability of 
food and feed products produced 
from GMOs 
Directive 2009/41/EC On contained use of GM micro-organ-
isms.  
Regulation (EC) 1946/2003 On transboundary movements of 
GMOs 
Note: all pieces of legislation have been accessed under European Commission (2019b). 
A significant consequence of the EU regulatory framework is that only one GM 
crop is currently authorised for commercial cultivation in the EU: MON810.2 This 
GM maize initially received approval in 1998; however, due to a so-called ‘de facto 
moratorium’, farmers in the EU have only been allowed to plant MON810 since 
2005 (see, e.g. Wesseler 2014: 190–194). MON810 has been developed and is mar-
keted by Monsanto, which, due to its market practices and power, is the most criti-
cised corporate actor in the global agricultural sector (see, e.g. Lamphere and East 
2017; Singh 2010). Even though MON810 was the only GM crop to gain EU 
 
2 Monsanto scientists derived this GM crop when they fortified maize using a repellent resistant to 
the European Corn Borer (ECB), which is the EU-wide most prevalent maize pest. More precisely, 
the company’s scientists used genetic engineering to transfer isolated protein genes formed by the 
soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) into maize crops. This targeted modification has enabled 
MON810 crops to self-produce the Bt-toxin, which is lethal for the ECB. By way of example, Degen-
hardt et al. (2003) estimated the ECB-infested maize areas in Germany to make up 21 percent of the 
country’s total maize cultivation area. Studies on Bt-maize found that adopting these crops can be 
beneficial for farmers as Bt-maize would combat pests, increase yields, and reduce unhealthy fungal 
toxins (see, e.g. Pellegrino et al. 2018). 
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authorisation for cultivation purposes, several GM products have received author-
isation for food and feed use in line with Regulation 1829/2003 (for details on the 
events, see European Commission 2019a). 
The three pieces of legislation, which provide the member states with the most 
far-reaching legal possibilities for regulating GMOs, are Directive 2001/18/EC, Di-
rective 2015/412, and the EU’s ‘coexistence’ policy. These pieces carry important im-
plications for regulatory activity at the subnational levels of the member states as 
well. Moreover, since 2018, these pieces of legislation also apply to products that 
have been derived with the help of NPBTs. 
Directive 2001/18/EC provides the member states with a ‘safeguard clause’ (Art. 
23), which proved extremely important for national governments regulating GMO 
cultivation on their territories during the 2000s. The clause enabled the member 
states to impose national cultivation bans on GM crops that were approved on the 
EU level, providing they could present new scientific evidence of their negative ef-
fects on human or animal health or on the environment. Most member states made 
use of the legal option and banned MON810 and other (unauthorised) GM crops on 
their territories (for an overview, see Tosun 2014: 370). Because MON810 is the only 
GM crop authorised for commercial cultivation in the EU, the national cultivation 
bans on this maize variety effectively prohibit all commercial GMO cultivation in 
the respective countries today. 
Directive 2015/412 extends beyond the ‘safeguard clause’ included in Directive 
2001/18/EC as it allows the member states to impose national cultivation bans on 
certain GM crops for non-scientific reasons as well, such as socio-economic con-
cerns. Moreover, the directive allows national – and in some countries, regional – 
governments to impose ex-ante cultivation bans on GM crops, i.e. prospective bans 
on GM crops that are still pending approval in the authorisation pipeline of the EU 
level and awaiting authorisation. Randour et al. (2014) argue that Directive 2015/412 
marks a peak in the transfer of decision-making powers over GMOs from the su-
pranational level back to the member states. Tosun and Hartung (2018) have shown 
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that most member states did indeed impose national cultivation bans in response to 
the directive, and that Germany banned every single GM crop pending EU approval 
before they were even authorised. 
Finally, the EU demanded in 2003 that the member states adopt regulatory 
measures in order to govern the ‘coexistence’ of GM crops with conventional and 
organic ones. In response, many countries in which GM crops had been cultivated 
by farmers enacted rules governing coexistence. Except for Spain, the member states 
demanded such large minimum distances between the organic/conventional and 
GM farming practices that GM farmers were exacerbated or de facto prohibited 
from cultivating GM crops (see, e.g. Schenkelaars and Wesseler 2016: 7). For in-
stance, the distance requirements prescribed in Germany – 150m for conventional 
maize and 300m for organic maize fields – are relatively restrictive and hinder GMO 
cultivation, particularly in regions with small-structured agriculture (Consmüller et 
al. 2011). However, the main reason why it would be economically too risky for 
German farmers to cultivate GM crops is that the liability regime makes it highly 
detrimental for farmers to cultivate these crops. 
The EU multi-level regulatory framework has had notable consequences for 
products modified by genetic engineering (transgenesis) in the past. One of these 
concerns ‘conventional’ genetic engineering: besides there currently being only one 
GM crop authorised for commercial cultivation, the framework limits the degree to 
which this crop, MON810, can be cultivated. The share of MON810 of the total 
maize area (conventional and organic) cultivated in the EU has never been more 
than 1,6 % (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2017: 10). This number illustrates 
the minor importance of GM agriculture in the EU and stands in sharp contrast to 
the earlier attempts of the European Commission to establish this farming practice 
in addition to conventional and organic farming (see, e.g. Weimer 2014; Weimer and 
Pisani 2016).  
Figure 1 shows the degrees to which farmers cultivated MON810 in the EU dis-
tinguishing between the major cultivating country, Spain, and all the other member 
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states, in which this maize variety has been cultivated for commercial purposes, in 
combination: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and 
Slovakia. Among other things because of its very liberal regulatory framework, 
Spain is the only member state where GM crops have been grown to significant 
extents. In contrast, Germany (2009), France (2007) and Poland (2013) made use of 
the ‘safeguard clause’ and banned MON810. With the bans, the countries stopped 
farmers who were willing to cultivate this GM crop. Since Romania stopped 
MON810 cultivation in 2016, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia did so also in 
2017, MON810 is cultivated currently only in Portugal and Spain (see, USDA For-
eign Agricultural Service 2018). 
Figure 1. Cultivation of MON810 in the European Union 
 
Source: data taken from USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2015a), USDA Foreign Agri-
cultural Service (2017), and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2018). 
The lack of GM crop approvals for commercial cultivation, in combination with 
the regulatory measures in place in most member states, has resulted in GMO cul-
tivation remaining of minor importance in the EU. This low relevance becomes es-
pecially apparent when considering the extents of GMO cultivation in main adopt-
ing countries, most notably the United States (US), Brazil, Argentina, India, and 
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Canada. In these countries, several important crops – maize, soybean, canola, and 
sugar beet replete with herbicide tolerances, insecticide resistances or combinations 
of both – have become major factors in agricultural production in the last few dec-
ades (Brookes and Barfoot 2017: 20–22). 
NPBTs, most importantly CRISPR, have experienced a rapid development dur-
ing the last decade. Because of their higher precision, lower costs and higher pace, 
these tools have major advantages over ‘conventional’ genetic engineering 
(transgenesis) and ‘traditional’ breeding techniques (see, e.g. Wolt et al. 2016). Plant 
scientists around the world therefore favour NPBTs, and together this results in a 
steadily increasing number of newly modified products reaching marketability 
(Waltz 2018). Nevertheless, products derived by NPBTs have not received approval 
in the EU yet. In addition, this status will continue in the near future because of the 
decision of the CJEU (2018), according to which these tools fall into the scope of the 
EU’s GMO legislation. 
As a result of this decision, the EU multi-level regulatory framework applies also 
to products derived with the help of NPBTs. Therefore, newly modified products 
must go through the same time-consuming, costly and uncertain authorisation pro-
cesses at the EU level as ‘conventional’ GMOs. Moreover, they are subjected to the 
same regulatory requirements anchored at the EU level and the member states. The 
consequences of the application of existing GMO legislation to the new methods of 
plant breeding are significant: the agricultural use of resulting products has not only 
slowed down but been made extremely difficult. Also, EU consumers will remain 
sceptical towards newly modified food products as these fall into the stringent la-
belling obligations prescribed by Regulation 1829/2003. 
Several non-EU countries have established more liberal regulatory approaches 
for governing NPBTs and their resulting products (Schuttelaar and Partner 2015). 
In these countries, regulatory frameworks are oriented around the final product, 
rather than around the process of plant modification (product-based regulation). As 
resulting products of new breeding techniques often cannot be distinguish from 
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traditionally bred ones, this approach allows businesses to exploit the potential of 
CRISPR and the other NPBTs. For instance, US authorities have approved several 
newly modified products for cultivation and retail without prescribing any regula-
tory or labelling obligations.3 
Whether and to what degree newly modified crops will be used in EU agriculture 
essentially depends on whether the EU regulatory framework on GMOs will be lib-
eralised. In many experts’ eyes, this is quite possible. These assessments are based 
on the fact that the ECJ’s decision has been broadly criticised as being against scien-
tific knowledge and facts. Moreover, it has mobilised a coalition of scientific organ-
isations and industry actors, who push for a revision of the EU regulatory frame-
work. For instance, the Commission’s Chief Scientific Advisors published a state-
ment on the regulation of these techniques, wherein they recommend the European 
Commission to adopt a more permissive regulatory approach towards new breed-
ing techniques including CRISPR (European Commission 2018b). 
Whether the EU regulatory framework will be liberalised or not, the EU needs to 
adapt its legislation to the increasing spread of newly modified crops around the 
world. At the present state of scientific knowledge, it is impossible to distinguish 
whether crops imported into the EU have been modified by NPBTs or if they repre-
sent natural or ‘traditionally’ bred crop products. As newly modified crops, in con-
trast to GMOs, often cannot be detected, the EU zero-tolerance policy for GM ingre-
dients that have not been authorised plunges the EU into a dilemma: either the EU 
tolerates the potential presence of newly modified products from non-EU countries 
that cultivate these crops, without considering them as GMOs, or the EU must stop 
 
3 The US regulatory approach towards NPBTs has largely crystallised in the past few years. For ex-
ample, US retailers started to sell a so-called ‘Arctic Apple’ in 2017. This apple has been modified by 
RNA-interference (RNAi) to wither considerably slower than its conventional counterparts (Waltz 
2016). Because of this new feature, the apple might please US consumers (Maxman 2017). Generally, 
since new breeding techniques can instil food products with desired traits, newly modified foods 
could find more public acceptance than former GM products, which had no significant benefits for 
consumers. Most such newly modified foods have not yet reached the US market, but more such 
crops than ever, including commercially important crops such as maize or soybeans, will be grown 
unregulated on fields in the US in the short term (Waltz 2018: 7; Wolt et al. 2016: 512). 
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all imports of respective crops from these countries, regardless of whether these im-
ports contain admixtures of newly modified crops (Jones 2015c: 3). 
1.3   Introducing the Key Concepts 
The first concept underlying this thesis relates to ‘regulation’. Levi-Faur (2010) 
stated that ‘the term is employed for a myriad of discursive, theoretical, and analyt-
ical purposes that cry out for clarification and mapping’. Since this concept is both 
hard to define and highly contested politically, it is essential to specify what it 
means. To disaggregate this encompassing concept, this thesis conceives of regula-
tion as being characterised by two main features. First, it corresponds with an in-
strumental understanding of the regulation of risks. Second, it relates to a state-cen-
tred conception of regulation (Black 2002: 16–19). 
From the instrumental perspective, the primary function and objective of regula-
tion is to reduce risks, such as social, ecological or economic ones, to a minimum. 
However, regulations do not necessarily aim to prohibit activities, such as research 
or economic ones, completely, i.e. bring their levels of risk down to zero. Rather, 
regulation represents a suitable means for balancing potentials and risks, thereby 
enabling private actors to capitalise economically on technological innovations 
while safeguarding society or the natural environment from negative effects (Wei-
mer and Marin 2016). In accordance with this instrumental understanding of regu-
lation, the present study conceives of regulation as a means of controlling and mon-
itoring the area of agricultural biotechnology for specific purposes; these may range 
from minimising risks to the various ways of balancing associated benefits and 
risks. 
The state-centred conception of regulation, which implies that state authorities 
have the ability to ‘command and control’, focuses on laws made by governmental 
authorities (Black 2002: 2). From this perspective, state authorities use legislation as 
a means of social and economic intervention in order to restrict or facilitate specific 
social, economic, research, or other activities in consistent and predictable ways 
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(Döhler and Wegrich 2010: 31). The state-centred conception implies that some 
forms of democratic processes preceded regulatory action, which is one major as-
pect that distinguishes this form of regulation from regulatory activities executed 
(jointly) by non-governmental actors. By adopting the state-centred concept of reg-
ulation, this book entirely shifts its focus away from alternative forms of regulation 
prevalent in global food and agricultural governance, such as self-regulation, co-
regulation, management-based regulation, or other private systems of governance 
(see, e.g. Fuchs et al. 2011). 
Conceptualising regulation in the dual way as functionalist and state-centred 
limits the number of empirical phenomena relevant to this work. In fact, it is essen-
tially this limitation, which fundamentally structures the investigation of agricul-
tural biotechnology in Germany by organising the various empirical phenomena 
and theoretical approaches into a manageable number. 
The second key concept requiring specification is ‘risk’. As indicated above, risk 
is closely associated with regulation because regulatory measures are widely con-
sidered to function as means of reducing potential risks, particularly those associ-
ated with the practical application of technology (see, e.g. Majone 2003; 2010; 2011; 
Black 2010). The well-established literature on risk essentially provides two pre-
dominant definitions of risk. According to the first one, ‘risk is a situation or event 
where something of human value (including humans themselves) is at stake and 
where the outcome is uncertain’. The second definition conceives of risk as an ‘un-
certain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something that hu-
mans value’ (Aven and Renn 2009: 1). Both definitions emphasise an element of risk 
that  strongly pertains to the (regulatory) controversies sparked by GMOs around 
the world, namely that uncertain consequences might arise from using technology, 
which then affects something of value to humans (Renn 1998: 51). 
While several types of risks have been differentiated, ‘certain’ and ‘uncertain’ 
risks represent the most important ones for policy studies (Tosun 2017: 564). In con-
trast to certain risks, such as car accidents or seasonal flooding, uncertain risks 
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cannot be assessed statistically for calculating the probabilities of the occurrence of 
certain hazards (Renn et al. 2011: 234). Agricultural biotechnology, animal cloning, 
nanotechnology, chemicals, and hydraulic fracturing all belong to the category of 
‘uncertain risks’ (van Asselt et al. 2013). The very notion of risks being uncertain has 
implications for the field of agricultural biotechnology, for it means that, even 
though scientific risk assessment has not found GM crops to have harmful effects, 
possible hazardous effects cannot be precluded completely (van Asselt and Vos 
2008: 281). Despite the possibility of integrating scientific knowledge and expertise 
into regulatory decision-making processes on technologies that involve such risks, 
the ultimate regulatory decisions made on these issues are still done so under con-
ditions of uncertainty (Florin 2014). 
The two types of risks involve differing implications for policymakers, at least 
theoretically. While ‘certain’ risks are usually addressed with preventive policies, 
policymakers in the EU tend to adopt precautionary policies for the management of 
‘uncertain’ risks (see, e.g. Tosun 2013a; 2013b) The legal basis for policymakers to 
cope with ‘uncertain’ risks refers to the ‘precautionary principle’ – a principle that 
enables them to take regulatory action on risky technologies, even when scientific 
evidence has suggested the technologies or their resulting products are safe (Di 
Salvo and Raymond 2010). As policymakers have increasingly invoked the precau-
tionary principle for justifying restrictive policies on agricultural biotechnology and 
other policy domains, the principle became controversial by itself (see, e.g. Levidow 
et al. 2005: 261; Löfstedt 2014). 
Regarding the concept of risk, this thesis further adopts the widely acknowl-
edged assumption that risks represent the results of mental constructions, i.e. they 
are influenced by the perceptions and/or interpretations of human beings and not 
real, existing phenomena (see, e.g. Klinke and Renn 2010: 15). The term ‘risk per-
ception’, which refers to the central aspect of mental construction, emerged from 
the observation that individuals tend to make subjective judgements on the danger-
ousness of risks and dates to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). The notion that risks 
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are merely perceived (and not real, existing phenomena) has far-reaching implica-
tions for how individuals evaluate risk technologies such as agricultural biotechnol-
ogy. This in turn can influence policymakers’ regulatory decision-making on tech-
nological risks. For instance, the widespread anti-GMO sentiment in the EU, which 
has influenced regulatory activities on various political levels, resulted from the fact 
that EU citizens tend to believe that GMOs are harmful for their health and/or the 
natural environment (see, e.g. Durant and Legge 2005; Frewer et al. 2002; Gaskell et 
al. 2004). 
The third essential theoretical concept that underlies this thesis and that requires 
specification refers to ‘multi-level systems’. The multi-level perspective pertains to 
polities, in which political levels are neither organised strictly hierarchically nor 
governed autonomously. Rather, it pertains to policy-making in multi-layered sys-
tems that are characterised by high degrees of coordination between political levels 
(see, e.g. Benz 2009; Biela et al. 2013). Seifert (2006a: 11) stated that GMO policy-
making in the EU ‘entails all levels of political decision-making, from the interplay 
of international bodies and agreements to supranational, national and, […] regional 
polities.’ Correspondingly, the multi-level perspective is essential for this thesis, 
which investigates the regulation of agricultural biotechnology in Germany, a coun-
try that has a federally structured system and that is embedded in the EU’s multi-
level polity (Benz 2009). Due to the high relevance of interplay between various po-
litical levels, including the local level, regarding the regulation of agricultural bio-
technology in Germany, the multi-level perspective is fundamental for both the the-
oretical work as well as the empirical research underlying this thesis. 
The multi-level perspective has been frequently interlinked with the ‘govern-
ance’ perspective to the widely used concept of ‘multi-level governance’ (see, e.g. 
Chowdhury and Wessels 2012; Piattoni 2010; Benz et al. 2007). The term ‘govern-
ance’ refers to the interaction of vertical and horizontal interdependencies between 
state actors and non-governmental actors (Benz et al. 2007: 16). Besides governments 
operating at the various levels, many other actors within these levels thus influence 
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and function as policy-making actors. From the governance perspective, govern-
ance is not executed in a hierarchical manner from the political centre, nor do polit-
ical entities deal with certain tasks or issues by themselves. Rather, government is 
based on the interaction of inter- and intragovernmental structures and processes 
(Benz et al. 2007: 15) 
The term ‘governance’ implies a shift from hierarchical policymaking made by 
governments to more horizontal modes of negotiation or cooperation with private 
and other non-state actors for the implementation of binding rules (Chowdhury and 
Wessel 2012: 345). Accordingly, the term ‘multi-level governance’ has been used 
frequently in studies on agricultural biotechnology regulation in the EU context 
(see, e.g. Dobbs 2016; Lee 2010). However, since the state-centred concept of regu-
lation underlies this thesis, the term ‘multi-level governance’ appears less suitable 
for accommodating the empirical phenomenon of interest. Rather, the term ‘multi-
level regulation’ appears more appropriate in this regard because, from this per-
spective, state actors represent the key regulatory bodies – or ‘risk managers’ 
(Beisheim et al. 2012: 7). Nevertheless, it should be noted that some definitions of 
multi-level regulation include non-state actors as well (Chowdhury and Wessels 
2012: 346). 
Taking together these three core concepts, this thesis is based on a conceptual 
foundation that can be denominated as ‘multi-level risk regulation’. This approach 
should be suitable to account for the various peculiarities of the empirical research 
field, and therefore offers a sound basis for investigating regulatory action on agri-
cultural biotechnology in Germany. 
1.4    Overview of Approaches 
To investigate GMO regulation at German subnational levels and to analyse the 
strategies of two important actors in the area of agricultural biotechnology, namely 
political parties and private corporations, the individual studies employ and com-
bine various theoretical and methodical approaches. Each of these approaches was 
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selected for their strengths in assessing their respective empirical research interests, 
though naturally, every approach comes with certain limitations. 
1.4.1    Theoretical Approach 
In theoretical terms, this thesis belongs to the field of (comparative) policy research, 
a research tradition that seeks to explain the emergence of policy outputs (Schneider 
and Janning 2006; Fischer et al. 2007; Knill and Tosun 2012; Wenzelburger and 
Zohlnhöfer 2015). In addition to analyzing the influence of certain factors on policy 
outputs, this thesis contributes to the current literature since it considers policymak-
ing to be processual in nature – a notion which is of central importance to (compar-
ative) policy research (see, e.g. Schneider and Janning 2006: 48–64; Jann and 
Wegrich 2014). Several phases of policy-making can be differentiated: from perceiv-
ing and defining a problem and setting an agenda, to the formulation of rivaling 
policy options and the decision made regarding these options, to the implementa-
tion of the final decision and its evaluation (Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2015: 
16). Within each of these phases, institutional settings as well as actor constellations 
can vary, influencing the results of policy-making processes. This thesis examines 
the processual nature of policy-making, focusing on factors that seem particularly 
conducive to explaining regulative policy-making on agricultural biotechnology in 
Germany’s multi-level system. 
The first theoretical approach this thesis applies in this regard refers to the frame-
work of ‘comparative policy analysis’ (see, e.g. Schmidt et al. 2007; Busch 2013; 
Zohlnhöfer 2009; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2015). This framework provides a 
theoretical toolbox, which comprises of six well-established theoretical strands for 
explaining governmental policy-making: socioeconomic theory, party difference 
theory, power resources theory, institutional theory, international hypothesis, and 
theories of path dependence (Zohlnhöfer 2009: 157–164). Generally, these theoreti-
cal strands offer explanations of how policy decisions come about and to what ex-
tent polities, i.e. political institutions and structures, and politics, i.e. political 
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processes, influence policy outputs. Moreover, in two regards, the framework of 
comparative policy analysis is flexible and can be adjusted for the investigation of 
particular empirical research interests. 
First, the most appropriate strands can be selected from the toolbox, depending 
on the respective policy area and the empirical phenomenon of interest. Second, the 
given determinants can be complemented by certain policy-specific determinants, 
which appear particularly influential in explaining policy-making in certain policy 
fields (Zohlnhöfer 2013: 377). The six determinants given by the comparative policy 
analysis framework will be used to varying extents, with some being more im-
portant than others in certain studies. Moreover, determinants from previous disci-
plinary GMO research are used, e.g. ‘diffusion’ between subnational entities (see, 
e.g. Tosun and Shikano 2016). Similarly, determinants from interdisciplinary GMO 
research are employed, e.g. ‘tourism’ from the literature on agroeconomics (see, e.g. 
Consmüller et al. 2010; 2011). 
The state-centred conception of regulation makes the motivations and the behav-
iour of political parties to a central focus of this book, for in liberal democracies such 
as Germany, parties with governmental responsibilities usually represent the criti-
cal policymaking actors (Müller and Strøm 1999). Therefore, the ‘party difference 
theory’, which often seeks to explain governmental actions with the partisan com-
position of governments, is of major importance for this thesis (Zohlnhöfer 2009: 
159–160). However, government parties’ internal motivations, which fundamen-
tally determine how policies will be designed, represent a black box for the compar-
ative policy analysis framework, which is mainly accompanied with quantitative 
methods (Zohlnhöfer 2013). However, since investigating parties’ underlying moti-
vations for their behaviour in the agricultural biotechnology field represents one of 
the research interests of this thesis argues that political parties can generally be pre-
sumed as being motivated by three major aspirations: vote-seeking, policy-seeking, 
and office-seeking (Strøm 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999). This widely acknowledged 
conjecture is crucial for this piece as it not only allows for in-depth theorisation but 
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also the systematic assessment of how parties prefer to position themselves on con-
troversial issues and what legislative actions they take on agricultural biotechnol-
ogy. The second approach to party-internal motivations deems parties’ behaviour 
to be influenced by their respective ‘partisan ideologies’ (Budge 1994). This theoret-
ical concept provides a promising tool for the present thesis as ideologies largely 
determine whether parties consider certain policy issues salient. 
This is of major importance, for it closely accompanies their policy-making when 
in government (Budge 2015). Moreover, in the course of ascribing parties certain 
ideological foundations, these actors have been assigned to different ‘party families’ 
(Budge 1994). This approach, which, inter alia distinguishes Christian Conservative 
from Social Democratic or Green party families, provides a helpful theoretical basis 
for theorising how certain parties might behave in terms of position-taking or reg-
ulatory action on agricultural biotechnology (see, Bäck et al. 2015; Tosun 2014). The 
party difference theory, as well as the approaches to parties’ internal motivations, 
can be applied to parties operating on all political levels without many complica-
tions. Therefore, the approaches adopted appear appropriate for investigating 
GMO regulatory action in Germany’s multi-level system as well as for the investi-
gation how parties position themselves on the GMO issue.  
Another analytical approach is used to investigate the lobbying activities per-
formed by the private company Cibus, which pushed for the deregulation of NPBTs 
in the EU. To explain its actions, the thesis employs the concept of ‘venue shopping’ 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009). The term ‘venue shopping’ was originally coined in 
relation to advocates who face obstacles in certain decision-settings, and therefore 
look out for alternative ones that they consider more promising for promoting their 
policy objectives (Baumgartner and Jones 2009: 36). However, besides the analytical 
focus on such shifts between certain decision-making arenas, this approach also sen-
sitises for the factors which determine which venues advocates select and which 
they choose to reject – an empirical procedure denominated as ‘venue choice’ (Ley 
2016; Ley and Weber 2015; Marshall and Bernhagen 2017; Huwyler et al. 2018). The 
 21 
 
lens of the venue choice concept is thus well suited to analysing Cibus’ lobbying 
behaviour, which required decentralised authorities in particular member states to 
voice opinions on whether NPBTs should be regulated in the same manner as ge-
netic engineering (transgenesis) or whether they should be deregulated like ‘tradi-
tional’ breeding techniques. 
1.4.2    Methodological Approach 
The thesis investigates the regulation of agricultural biotechnology at German sub-
national levels. In addition, it analyses parties’ position-taking behaviour as well as 
private companies’ lobbying activities in this policy field. The respective studies ad-
dress these empirical phenomena in different investigation periods. While one 
study has a short-term investigation period from 2010–2015, another study covers a 
long-term period of nearly three decades from 1990–2017. The periods were chosen 
according to the specific research interests of each study and have implications for 
the detailedness of their respective empirical analyses. 
The thesis employs qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods techniques. The 
qualitative methods comprise ‘qualitative content analysis’ and ‘process tracing’. 
Process tracing means that, based on the respective theoretical approach, possible 
causal processes between certain variables and mechanisms are identified (Starke 
2015). Qualitative content analysis employs a rigorous qualitative procedure for an-
alysing the contents of textual documents (Mayring 2000). For some studies one of 
these two approaches is used, whereas others benefit from the combination of both, 
since this enables certain theoretical assumptions to be checked on a case-by-case 
basis, thereby ensuring high degrees of reliability. 
In addition, this thesis employs the mixed approach of ‘fuzzy-set qualitative com-
parative analysis’, a method that combines the strength of qualitative and quantita-
tive research strategies (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Finally, the thesis uses 
‘multi-dimensional-scaling technique’, a quantitative method that is used in net-
work analysis for assigning locations to nodes in multi-dimensional spaces, so that 
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nodes that are ‘more similar’ can be placed closer together (Hannemann and Riddle 
2005). Generally, the studies benefit from the combination of different methodical 
approaches, as this allows for in-depth insights as well as higher degrees of gener-
alisability. 
This thesis has various dependent variables, which correspond to its differing 
empirical interests. The central dependent variable of the studies, which investigate 
regulatory action at the subnational levels in Germany, represent concrete regula-
tory policies. The latter refer to legal regulations that have been implemented by 
governmental authorities in order to restrict the application of GMOs. At the Ger-
man local level, the dependent variable refers to local cultivation bans. These bans 
come into force when a specific legal clause has been included in local lease con-
tracts. Afterwards, farmers are legally prohibited from growing GM crops on mu-
nicipal land. The study on the regional level distinguishes between two dependent 
variables. The first refers to a composite index which, for each regional state, com-
prises of various regulations and GMO-related policies. The second identifies 
whether regional states have become official members of the European GMO-Free 
Regions Network – a transnational network of EU regions, which together mobilise 
against GMO farming in the EU. The third dependent variable measures whether 
German parties who operate at the regional and the national levels strategically 
forgo from positioning themselves on the contested GMO topic in their election 
manifestos. The final dependent variable refers to Cibus’ venue choices. The com-
pany requested competent authorities in specific member states to voice their opin-
ions on the regulation of NPBTs, hoping to exert positive bottom-up pressure on the 
European Commission to deregulate the new techniques. 
The original data sets employed for the studies were compiled by collecting pri-
mary and secondary data from various sources. Many of these sources were ac-
cessed via the websites of the various actors of interest, including state actors and 
the numerous important non-state actors. In addition, various (scientific) online da-
tabases were used, which provided specific systematised empirical data on both 
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independent and dependent variables. Data that were important and could not be 
accessed electronically were obtained through other means; the most important of 
these were expert interviews and the study of existing scientific publications from 
various research disciplines. 
1.5    Outline and Findings 
The thesis consists of four independent studies, each contributing to the study of 
the regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the EU multi-level system and Ger-
many specifically. Chapter 2 investigates regulatory activities at the local level 
focussing on German cities’ and municipalities’ reasons to forbid GMO cultivation 
on their land. Chapter 3 analyses whether the German federal states introduced 
hard GMO regulations and why, or if they used symbolic policy-making to 
maximise their electoral success. Chapter 4 examines whether German parties op-
erating at the regional and the national level strategically forewent from positioning 
themselves on the widely unpopular GMO issue and why. Finally, Chapter 5 anal-
yses the determinants underlying the venue choices made by the biotech company 
Cibus, which strived for the deregulation of NPBTs in the EU in order to sell its 
newly modified seeds to EU farmers. The following sections provide brief descrip-
tions of the particular research interests and outlines of each of these chapters. 
1.5.1    The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms on a Lo-
cal Level: Exploring the Determinants of Cultivation Bans 
Authors: Ulrich Hartung | Simon Schaub 
Other version published in Sustainability (2018) 
In the first chapter, we investigate local units’ regulatory activities on GMOs in Ger-
many as, in this country, local entities have legal possibilities to impose local culti-
vation bans on GM crops. Which factors induced cities and municipalities to become 
active and prohibit GMO crops on their lands, adding thereby another regulatory 
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layer to the EU multi-level regulatory system? Previous research has investigated 
local conflicts sparked by the GMO topic so far; however, it has not been analysed 
why local units act as regulators in this policy field. 
We used qualitative data from resolutions published by local councils and avail-
able online to produce insights regarding the drivers of regulatory action. In our 
eyes, this was the best suitable method of data collection because some cultivation 
bans dated back two decades. Many of the documents analysed provided data that 
informs us about the reasons for local units to impose such bans. We used a combi-
nation of qualitative and quantitative content analysis to produce various insights. 
The study reveals that functional motivations to prevent negative socio-economic 
effects or impacts on the environment or human health are decisive for local units’ 
decisions to ban GMO cultivation on their land. Furthermore, the results of the 
quantitative analysis unveil that municipalities often refer to both socio-economic 
reasons as well as to risks for the natural environment and human health for justi-
fying their regulatory activities. Furthermore, the results indicate that local policy-
makers impose popular cultivation bans to promote their own political success. Fi-
nally, horizontal diffusion of GMO cultivation bans between local entities, but also 
vertical diffusion from higher political levels to the local level can be observed. 
Overall, the results show that in most cases no single, but a variety of factors lead 
to regulatory activity. Moreover, it further emphasises the importance of analysing 
the interdependencies between agroecosystems and socio-economic systems in 
their full complexity.  
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1.5.2 Regulation vs Symbolic Policy-Making: Genetically Modi-
fied Organisms in the German States 
Authors: Ulrich Hartung | Felix Hörisch 
Other version published in German Politics (2018) 
In the second chapter, we focus the regional level in Germany, as in this country, 
the federal states can enforce stricter GMO regulations than defined on a national 
level. We investigate whether and to what extent the 16 states stipulate concrete 
GMO regulations and whether symbolic policy-making is used for reasons of vote-
maximization. The starting point for this chapter was the observation that only a 
few studies have dealt with regulatory action at the regional level, which was amaz-
ing to us because GMO regulation can have far-reaching implications at this level. 
Therefore, the basic idea of this study is to provide a first comparative analysis 
that systematically investigates GMO regulation at the regional level. We collated 
the states’ GMO-related policies using desktop research and expert interviews and 
constructed a composite index which, for each state, besides regulations, comprises 
of GMO-policies. We used this index as well as the membership in the GMO-free 
Regions Network as two separate outcomes to explore the conditions for both out-
comes in a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). We selected these 
conditions mainly based on previous research concerned with the political drivers 
for the adoption of GMO regulations and the underlying factors for the adoption or 
refusal of GM crops by farmers. 
The study shows that the Green Party, as well as affiliated ministers, do not rep-
resent predominant conditions for whether or not a state adopts GMO-related pol-
icies or regulations. However, Green ministers were leading drivers for states’ ac-
cessions to the GMO-free Network, thus signalling a GMO-adverse stance to the 
electorate. Moreover, we reveal differing regulatory action of CDU and CSU in the 
Western and Eastern states – an observation that we explain with the diverging in-
terests of farmers. Furthermore, we find that SPD ministers regulated much like the 
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other parties, but presumably for alternate reasons such as coalition internal pres-
sure. Finally, strong environmental interest groups were found to have positively 
conditioned symbolic policy-making, but with seemingly no effect on the adoption 
of concrete GMO regulations. 
1.5.3 Why Parties take Neutral Positions on Policy Issues: In-
sights from the German Christian Democratic Union 
Author: Ulrich Hartung 
Other version published in German Politics (2019) 
The interest of the fourth chapter is whether political parties forego from position-
taking on the unpopular GMO issue for strategic reasons, and if so, for which. 
Therefore, I focus specifically on the CDU’s position-taking behaviour towards ag-
ricultural biotechnology at the national and the regional level. The jumping-off 
point of this study was the observation that the federal CDU has continuously po-
sitioned itself on the topic in its election manifestos since the 1990s, however, sud-
denly no longer did so in 2017. My interest was to investigate whether this repre-
sents a simple non-positioning, i.e. accidental in nature or whether it represents the 
result of the parties’ strategic considerations; a position-taking behaviour denomi-
nated as ‘neutral’ position-taking in Chapter 4. 
The objective of this study is to expand literature on policy positions in the re-
spect that supposed non-positions could actually represent neutral stances, i.e. stra-
tegic responses made by parties to reconcile several conflicting political objectives 
simultaneously. This difference is extremely significant as simple non-positions are 
entirely unintentional, while neutral positions can inform us about the deeper, stra-
tegic motivations for why parties position themselves (no longer) on (controversial) 
policy issues. 
Based on qualitative content analysis, I hand-coded the election manifestos pub-
lished by German parties at the regional and federal levels prior to elections that 
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took place from 1990–2017. Those without any relevant statements regarding the 
issue of agricultural biotechnology were the most important, as these possibly in-
clude neutral policy stances. However, to distinguish neutral policy stances from 
simple non-positions I considered two key facets of contextual information: first, 
the programmatic development of the relevant parties on the GMO topic over ex-
tended time periods; second, (political) incentives that might have induced them to 
take neutral positions in certain situations. Due to the analytical depth needed for 
this investigation, the empirical focus lies on two cases, the federal CDU and the 
especially insightful case of the regional CDU branch of the state of Thuringia. 
The results obtained by the study show that parties take neutral positions and do 
this for various reasons. The federal CDU took a neutral position in 2017 in order to 
reconcile its moderate GMO agenda with its objective of forming a coalition with 
the Greens and to respond to the increasingly diverging policy preferences of its 
regional branches. The Thuringian CDU took neutral positions from 1999–2009 in 
order to reconcile its pro-GMO agenda with its aspirations for forming coalitions 
with the SPD and to reduce electoral losses that might result from anti-GMO senti-
ment. In sum, the paper shows that neutral position-taking represents a real phe-
nomenon of partisan activity. Hence, rather than ignoring supposed non-positions, 
scholars should consider the possibility that these may actually represent neutral 
stances. 
1.5.4 Inside-Lobbying on the Regulation of New Plant Breeding 
Techniques in the European Union: Determinants of Venue 
Choices 
Author: Ulrich Hartung 
Other version published in Review of Policy Research (2019) 
The fifth chapter investigates the lobbying activities of Cibus, a US-based biotech 
company that advocated the deregulation of NPBTs within the EU and hoped 
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thereby to market its newly modified seeds to EU farmers. Agribiotech companies 
and the associations representing them are frequently presumed to pursue their in-
terests by means of inside-lobbying tactics, that is, through personal contacts with 
politicians or high-ranking bureaucrats behind closed doors. However, so far, re-
search has provided limited empirical insights into such activities. Drawing on the 
concept of venue-shopping, this study addresses this research lacunae by investi-
gating the venue choices made by Cibus in the EU multi-level system; a polity struc-
ture that provides advocates numerous channels and venues to pursue their policy 
goals. 
The results obtained by the study show that Cibus bypassed the EU level and 
that the firm strategically chose national competent authorities (CAs) for its lobby-
ing because their institutional ‘closedness’ reduced the risk of the debate over the 
deregulation of NPBTs becoming public. However, the CA’s specific competences 
and their influence on EU decision-making were of likewise importance. The firm 
lobbied CAs, which were embedded in national contexts favorable to agribiotech, 
based in Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK).  
Two factors appear to have influenced Cibus’ choices for these countries: high-
level political support for agribiotech and high relevance of biotech sectors. In con-
trast, public support for GMOs turned out scarcely influential, and virtually no as-
sociation could be observed for the agricultural application of biotechnology in the 
past and the weakness of domestic anti-GMO lobby groups. Finally, the in-depth 
study on Germany affirms that ‘closedness’ was important for Cibus’ choices and it 
reveals that technical information served as venue-internal factor that influenced 
the firm’s choices. 
1.6    Avenues for Future Research 
Agricultural biotechnology regulation in the EU has received extensive scientific 
attention since the 1990s. Nonetheless, several research gaps still exist, especially 
regarding the domestic levels of the EU multi-level regulatory system as well as 
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regarding NPBT regulation generally. This thesis examines Germany in order to re-
duce four specific research lacunae in this area of study. Although the correspond-
ing studies contribute to the existing literature, some space remains for future re-
search into the regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the EU multi-level sys-
tem. 
The first avenue for future research refers to studies investigating GMO regula-
tory action at national levels in those member states, which have not yet been inves-
tigated in this regard. Research on Austria, France, Germany, Spain or the UK pro-
vides detailed information on the determinants of regulatory action at national lev-
els (see, e.g. Seifert 2009; Kuntz 2014; Katzek 2014; Barcena 2005). However, these 
studies have shown that GMO regulatory action in national spheres is highly coun-
try-specific, meaning few generalised conclusions can be drawn. Both the design of 
national regulatory frameworks as well as their underlying determinants vary con-
siderably between the countries. 
For instance, farmers’ opposition explains the enactment of the national ban on 
the GM crop MON810 in France whereas in Austria the same regulatory outcome 
resulted from the pressure of a broad political consensus together with an anti-GMO 
public (Seifert 2009). Hence, future studies could explore the determinants of regu-
latory action in member states, which have not yet received scientific attention to 
check the robustness of previous findings and contribute to more generalisable re-
sults. 
The pro-GMO countries of Finland and the Netherlands would represent prom-
ising member states in this regard. Moreover, national GMO policy-making could 
be analysed in Greece or Italy, which both fall into the group of anti-GMO countries. 
Finally, Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland or Lithuania could be investigated because agri-
cultural biotechnology is contested in these countries, both socially and politically 
(see, e.g. Lucht 2015: 4265). For instance, one could analyse which actors succeed in 
influencing national GMO policy-making and why. Further studies could also im-
prove our understanding of political parties’ behaviour regarding the topic of 
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GMOs. How do competing parties position themselves on this disputed issue? 
What is their regulatory action when in (coalition) government(s)? To address such 
research questions, the party families concept provides an excellent tool as it can be 
used for theorisation as well as for producing comparable empirical results across 
various countries (Budge 1994). 
A second avenue for future research could be to investigate how and why re-
gional entities decide to regulate GMOs, while other units resign from doing so. 
Promising member states for such research inquiries represent countries in which 
regional entities enjoy high levels of authority (Hooghe et al. 2016). Accordingly, 
regional entities in Belgium, Italy, Spain or the UK could provide interesting in-
sights into agricultural biotechnology regulation. However, whether regions actu-
ally possess such regulatory possibilities must be explored individually for each 
country (Seifert 2006b: 426). Literature has shown that both comparative analysis as 
well as case studies have revealed impressive insights into regional units’ (regula-
tory) activities regarding agricultural biotechnology (see, e.g. Tosun and Shikano 
2016; Tosun and Hartung 2017). Accordingly, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, 
for instance, could be selected for further investigation, be it case studies or system-
atic-comparative analysis. In response to Directive 2015/412, these regions, among 
others, filed opt-out requests via the UK national government to ban GMO cultiva-
tion in their territories (Tosun and Hartung 2018). 
Besides anti-GMO regions, regions in which farmers cultivate(d) GM crops to 
remarkable extents could be particularly interesting because in these regions, poli-
cymakers should face pressures from both pro-GMO and anti-GMO groups. Which 
factors impede policymakers from restricting farmers to cultivate GM crops in these 
regions? Have pro-GMO actors succeeded over anti-GMO actors in influencing po-
litical decision-making? Although GMO cultivation is limited in the EU, suitable 
cases exist for such investigations, such as the Spanish regions of Aragon or Catalo-
nia (see, Binimelis 2008; Binimelis et al. 2009). 
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The third possible avenue for future research refers to political entities that oper-
ate on the local level in the member states and have regulatory options for shaping 
the use of GMOs in their spheres. For instance, investigating the effects of the par-
tisan affiliation of mayors or the composition of local councils on the establishment 
of regulations could prove enlightening. 
Moreover, as with the regional level, promising research might not only focus on 
local entities in which GMO farming has sparked conflicts and/or regulations have 
been implemented, but also investigate local units in which farmers could cultivate 
GM crops (Friedrich 2017). In those local entities especially, policymakers – like 
their regional counterparts – should be confronted with the diverging interests of at 
least two groups with diverging interests. Studies thus far have dealt with the con-
flicts that have been sparked by field trials and commercial GMO cultivation at the 
German local level. Therefore, future research should examine the other member 
states, which have attracted less attention in this regard: Czech Republic, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, and Spain. Generally, the local level provides fruitful ground 
for both case studies and comparative analyses. The latter could investigate hori-
zontal effects between local units as, usually, the higher number of cases given at 
this level makes such an investigation possible. 
Because of the multi-level system of regulating GMOs in the EU, often interplays 
or interdependencies between various levels of governance influence regulatory de-
cisions. The studies presented in this thesis take these effects into account. Never-
theless, future research could further examine specific aspects of interaction, coor-
dination, and interdependence between the various actors as well as the political 
processes at the various political levels. For instance, the homo-/heterogeneity of 
parties’ position-taking on agricultural biotechnology could be explored in more 
detail. Do their positions differ horizontally between local and regional entities, and 
vertically between the local, regional, and national levels? How can the diverging 
positions of parties on particular political levels be explained? Furthermore, one 
could analyse, for instance, how regional units (in second chambers) participate in 
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regulatory decision-making processes regarding the implementation of national 
provisions or EU directives (Tosun and Hartung 2018). 
The fifth possible avenue for future research refers more generally to NPBTs. 
These new tools might further increase the relevance of research in the field of ag-
ricultural biotechnology as they have the potential to become more significant in 
EU farming than genetic engineering (transgenesis) has been heretofore. However, 
liberalisation of the current EU regulatory framework is an essential precondition 
therefor. In this regard, learning more about how central actors, such as relevant EU 
institutions and the individual member states, position themselves on such a loos-
ening could prove enlightening. Which regulatory approach is favoured/rejected by 
whom and why? Which strategies use actors in pushing for a preservation/amend-
ment of the regulatory status quo? Can coalition-building be observed? To investi-
gate these or similar research questions, the GMO research conducted in the last 
three decades provides numerous promising starting points for future studies. 
Moreover, should EU institutions leave the regulatory decision on NPBTs to the 
individual countries, research that focusses on selected member states could prove 
promising. How do political parties and major interest groups position themselves 
on these tools? Can coalition-building be observed? Which lobbying strategies are 
employed for advocating certain regulatory approaches? Is there a public discourse 
about CRISPR and other NPBTs or is it a pure expert issue? Considering the mem-
ber states’ stances on agricultural biotechnology diverge fundamentally, it appears 
likely that they would implement different national regulatory frameworks for gov-
erning NPBTs and products thereof. The resulting regulatory fragmentation would 
have far-reaching implications for EU-internal trade relations as well as for the trade 
of agriculture products between single member states and non-EU countries. 
Finally, researchers in this field should be aware of the increasing relevance of 
modified animals for livestock production. Until now, genetic engineering 
(transgenesis) has been scarcely applied to animals for food production purposes 
(Vàzquez-Salat et al. 2012). Worldwide, only one single GM animal has received 
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authorisation for human consumption: ‘AquAdvantage’ – a salmon with acceler-
ated growth features, which was approved by the United States (2015) and Canada 
(2016). In the EU, no GM animals have been authorised so far; however, animals 
modified using NPBTs are expected to spread rapidly around the world; commer-
cially interesting examples include especially muscular beagles and virus-resistant 
pigs (Laible et al. 2015). This potential spread could become pressing for the EU in 
its role as an international trade partner, as these animals – similarly to most genome 
edited crops – often do not contain foreign DNA, meaning they cannot be distin-
guished from their conventional counterparts (Travis 2015). 
 34 
Chapter 2 
2    The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organ-
isms on a Local Level: Exploring the Determi-
nants of Cultivation Bans 
2.1    Introduction 
Farmers started planting the first GM crops for commercial purposes in the mid-
1990s. Since then, the cultivation of these crops has sparked controversies in almost 
every adopting country worldwide (Brookes and Barfoot 2017). In the EU, much 
criticism centred on the agri-industrial farming practices that are often associated 
with GM crop cultivation, which, among others, is said to contest and endanger 
‘traditional’ food production systems (see, e.g. Levidow and Boschert 2008; Zilber-
man et al. 2018). The deprecatory views on biotechnology in agricultural production 
led to regulatory activity on all levels of governance: in order to defuse the conflicts 
between the two contending agri-food systems, policymakers introduced more and 
more regulations, which were partially detrimental to farming based on GMOs (see, 
e.g. Potrykus 2013; Tosun 2014; Dobbs 2016). 
Research has concentrated on GMO regulatory activities on supranational, na-
tional, and regional levels, as well as on the interdependencies between these levels 
(see, e.g. Levidow and Boschert 2008; Tosun 2014; Bodiguel et al. 2010; Hartung and 
Hörisch 2018; Hristova 2013; Katzek 2014; Seifert 2006c; Tosun and Hartung 2018). 
This study complements previous research by investigating regulatory action on a 
level of GMO governance that has been scarcely analysed in this regard yet: the local 
level. 
This study is not the first one investigating local implications of the use of bio-
technology in agriculture. This has been done by several studies from various 
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disciplinary perspectives, including political science, sociology, and economics (see, 
e.g. Friedrich 2017; Wagner 2007; Hoppichler and Schermer 2007; Nischwitz et al. 
2005; Schermer and Hoppichler 2004). Friedrich (2017), for instance, examined local 
conflicts that were sparked by the GMO issue in several municipalities in Germany. 
Her study provides detailed information on the actors involved, the various conflict 
actions and the (political) conflict settlement attempts. However, despite such in-
sights, it remains to be analysed whether municipalities introduce hard GMO reg-
ulations, and if so, why they do it. To address this research lacuna, the research 
question guiding this study is as follows: How can GMO regulatory activity on the 
local level be explained? 
Basically, whether a municipality adopts a GMO regulation can be influenced by 
a multitude of factors. Despite the explorative nature of this study, three theoretical 
arguments are proposed to explain such action. First, we argue that municipalities 
regulate due to functional motivations of safeguarding certain valuable goods such 
as the environment. Second, we argue that political aspirations of local policymak-
ers seeking credit for positive policy outputs lead to regulatory action. Third, we 
argue that municipalities anchor regulations in reaction to similar policy measures 
adopted beforehand by other units. 
Germany was selected for this study, as in this EU member state municipalities 
possess legal means to prohibit GMO cultivation in their regions. More precisely, 
German municipalities can commit themselves to forbid farmers to plant GM crops 
on their leased agricultural land (self-regulation). To accomplish this, a city or com-
mune must include a specific clause in its lease contracts for agricultural land, which 
then explicitly prohibits cultivating GM crops on the commune’s land. To include 
this clause, a municipality must enact a corresponding resolution in its local council, 
the main legislative body of a commune representing its local citizens. The GMO 
cultivation ban does not need renewal and it can only be abolished by a new reso-
lution (GMO-free Regions in Germany 2019b). 
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The study reveals that various factors drive GMO regulatory activity on the local 
level. First, municipalities regulate due to functional motivations stemming from 
socio-economic concerns or perceived risks for the environment or human health. 
Second, they regulate due to political aspirations of local policymakers, who use 
popular GMO regulations symbolically to increase their political success. Third, 
municipalities take regulatory action because of horizontal diffusion between mu-
nicipalities based on learning as well as due to vertical diffusion from higher polit-
ical levels based on hierarchic coordination. Finally, the analysis of combinations of 
reasons for regulating GMO farming reveals, among others, that municipalities not 
only mention socio-economic concerns and risks for the environment or human 
health most frequently, but that they also do so prevalently in combination. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. It first describes the devel-
opment of the regulatory context of local GMO cultivation bans in Germany, 
thereby putting emphasis on regulatory activity on the EU level and the German 
national level. The theoretical section then focuses on three explanations for why 
municipalities regulate GMOs: functional motivations, political aspirations of local 
policymakers and policy diffusion. The subsequent section provides details on the 
methodology and data generation before the exploratory findings are presented and 
discussed in two steps. First, single frequencies of municipalities’ statements are 
discussed and second, interdependencies between the reasons are investigated. The 
study ends with a summary of the main findings and some concluding remarks. 
2.2    The Regulatory Context 
Regulation of GMO cultivation in Germany is characterised by a complex multi-
level governance structure with some regulatory flexibility on the subnational lev-
els. Authorization of GMOs for cultivation is located at the EU level, originally cov-
ered by Council Directive 90/220/EEC and by Directive 2001/18/EC. A national safe-
guard clause that is included in both directives has enabled EU member states to 
ban cultivation of GMOs on their territory, even after their authorization. These 
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bans had to be based on new findings on risks for human health or the environment. 
Only since 2015, member states may also enact cultivation bans on socio-economic 
or other grounds (see, e.g. Tosun and Hartung 2018; Salvi 2016). In Germany, the 
main competencies for regulating GMO cultivation are located at the federal level. 
Most importantly, the federal government enacted restrictive rules for governing 
the co-existence between conventional, organic, and GMO farming in 2005 
(Consmüller et al. 2009). 
Figure 2. Municipalities with Cultivation Bans across Germany. 
Source: own figure based on data provided by GMO-free Regions in Germany (2019). 
In addition, it may impose nationwide cultivation bans, such as the ban on the 
GM maize MON810 in 2009, which de facto prohibited GMO farming in Germany 
as a result (Cooper 2009). Despite the prohibitive regulatory framework in place at 
the national level, German states have used legal possibilities and imposed 
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additional cultivation bans for GM crops on their land by including specific clauses 
in lease contracts (see, Chapter 3). Municipalities or communes are political juris-
dictions located at the lowest administrative level and range from small villages to 
large cities. Concerning GMO cultivation, municipalities can prohibit the cultiva-
tion of GM crops on their leased land as well. German municipalities introduced 
GMO cultivation bans over a period of 16 years, from 1999 to 2014. A list of all mu-
nicipalities can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The distribution of these mu-
nicipalities across Germany is illustrated in Figure 2. 
In the following, this section situates the development of municipalities’ regula-
tory activity in its overall regulatory context. When considering this context, the 
development of regulatory practice on the local level can be divided into four 
phases. The first phase refers to the years of the EU ‘moratorium’ from 1999 to 2004. 
The second phase comprises the years of strictly regulated GMO cultivation in Ger-
many from 2005 to 2008. The third phase relates to the period after the national cul-
tivation ban on MON810 from 2009 to 2014. Finally, the fourth phase is about the 
years after Germany made use of a new legal opportunity, and, by way of precau-
tion, banned all GM crops pending approval on EU level. This phase covers the 
years from 2015 to 2017. To make this clear, this section only situates the regulatory 
activity of German municipalities within the development of the overall regulatory 
context. It does not attempt to analyse the possible causal effects of changes in the 
regulatory context on the adoption of local GMO cultivation bans. Whether a mu-
nicipality takes such action can be influenced by several factors, which will be 
analysed and discussed in Section 5. 
2.2.1    Phase 1: The ‘moratorium’ years, 1999–2004 
The initial set-up of the EU regulatory framework on GMOs dates to 1990 when the 
European Council adopted Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release of GMOs 
into the environment, and Directive 90/219/EEC on the contained use of GM micro-
organisms. Based on this newly established framework, the EU, from 1995 to 1996, 
authorised several GM crops both for food use and commercial cultivation. This 
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‘wave of authorisations’ together with a ‘public outcry’ induced several national 
governments to oppose further approvals (Tosun 2014: 364). Due to a blocking mi-
nority of only five anti-GMO member states, the Council of Environment Ministers 
stopped all GMO approvals for commercial purposes in June 1999. This so-called 
de facto ‘moratorium’ on all new approvals of GM crops for commercial cultivation 
lasted for five years until 2004 (see, e.g. Lieberman and Gray 2006). 
Figure 3 shows that only a few communes took regulatory action during the 
‘moratorium’ years from 1999 to 2004. On the one hand, it is remarkable that the 
municipalities adopted these measures. That is to say, not a single GM crop had 
been cultivated for commercial purposes in Germany by 2004. Until this year, uni-
versities, other public research institutions, and companies conducted several sci-
entific field trials, the number of these plots, however, decreased significantly since 
2005 (Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety 2019). Although pub-
lic and private plant research holds a long tradition in Germany, GM crops have not 
been planted for scientific purposes in the country since 2013. One major reason for 
this is that vandals, informed on the exact locations by a public GMO location reg-
ister (see, phase 2 below), frequently destroyed the costly field trials (Kuntz 2012). 
Moreover, the communes, in principle, did not have to fear the possible cultivations 
of new GM crops on their land, as the required authorisations on the EU level were 
blocked by the ‘moratorium’ at that time. 
On the other hand, the communes may have been sceptical about – or did not 
want to wait for – the European or the national legislator to establish regulations 
that prevent farmers from growing GM crops in a municipality after a possible end 
of the ‘moratorium’. The few communes might have imposed cultivation bans in-
stead of waiting for regulations on higher political levels. Remarkably, during the 
‘moratorium’ years, the number of cultivation bans reached its peak in 2004. This 
could be due to the looming end of the ‘moratorium’, which local policymakers 
might have expected to result in possible approvals of new GM crops. 
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Figure 3. Number of Local Council Resolutions, 1999–2017. 
 
Turning back to the regulatory context in more detail, two particularly relevant 
processes took place during the turbulent ‘moratorium’ years. First, several member 
states provisionally banned the cultivation of specific GM crops in their territories 
that had been authorised for commercial cultivation in the EU (Tosun 2014: 370). To 
achieve this, they made use of a ‘safeguard clause’ that was included in Article 16 
of Directive 90/220/EEC. According to this clause, the member states were obliged 
to justify national cultivation bans with new scientific evidence about risks for the 
environment or human health that have not yet been considered in the prior risk 
assessment led by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The German gov-
ernment also made use of this legal option and imposed a cultivation ban on an EU 
authorised GM crop. In January 2000, Germany banned Bt176 maize (Syngenta), 
because of rather dubious new safety concerns (Boschert and Gill 2005: 291). The 
European Commission approved this biotech crop in 1997. However, it has never 
been cultivated by farmers in Germany. 
In a second important process during the ‘moratorium’ years, the European 
Commission replaced Directive 90/220/EEC with Directive 2001/18/EC, with the 
Source: Based on data taken from GMO-free Regions in Germany (2019b). 
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latter prescribing much stricter rules for the EU approval process of GM products 
and the cultivation of GM crops (Hristova 2013: 115–117). The directive obligated 
the member states to adopt national ‘co-existence’ measures, which should guaran-
tee farmers the freedom to choose between the different agriculture production 
types, conventional, organic, and GMO farming. Moreover, Regulation 1830/2003 
supposed consumers to have the ‘freedom of choice’ between products resulting 
from the different farming practices. Practically, safeguarding ‘co-existence’ repre-
sents a highly complex task as it must secure segregation between the different ag-
riculture production channels along the entire food production supply chain: from 
the seed supplier to farmers, wholesale dealers, processors, and retailers. 
The EU provided guidance to the member states in establishing appropriate rules 
for ‘co-existence’ management. The European Commission published ‘recommen-
dations’ for the development of national ‘co-existence’ measures first in 2003, and 
additional ones in 2010, which, however, had no obligatory character (European 
Commission 2003; 2010a). Nevertheless, the European Commission stipulated a 
specific approach to ‘co-existence’ management. This must be performed at farm-
level and be based on a crop-by-crop approach; the European Commission has been 
criticized for these ‘soft power’ recommendations as being ‘top-down and authori-
tative’ (Weimer 2014: 29). Moreover, the ‘European Coexistence Bureau’ provides 
the member states with several crop-specific guidelines to support the countries in 
establishing appropriate ‘co-existence’ measures (Joint Research Centre 2019). 
2.2.2    Phase 2: The years of strictly regulated GMO cultivation, 2005–2008 
In 2005, Germany implemented legally binding rules for safeguarding ‘co-existence’ 
into its national law. In the same year, farmers were allowed to cultivate GM crops 
on the country’s territory for the first time. From 2005 to 2008, they cultivated 
MON810 (Monsanto), which is an insect-resistant GM maize, on increasing, but 
overall relatively small areas (Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food 
Safety 2019). MON810 received EU approval for commercial cultivation already in 
1998 and is currently the only biotech crop that is authorised for this purpose in the 
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EU. The ‘co-existence’ regulations under which farmers cultivated this biotech crop 
in Germany for four years were extremely strict. The three most important rules are 
considered here, briefly: isolation distances requirements for GM crops to conven-
tional and organic fields, the public GMO location register, and the ex-post liability 
rules (German Genetic Engineering Act 2019). It should be noted that these rules are 
complemented in German law by ‘best practice’ measures for GMO cultivation and 
detailed provisions for technical segregation (Best practice regulation 2008), as well 
as by Regulation 1830/2003 on the implementation of the EU regulation on labelling 
and application of GMOs. 
First, German law demands minimum isolation distances for GM maize. It re-
quires 150 m to adjacent conventional maize fields and 300 m to organic maize 
fields. These rules are much stricter than the seed industry advocated for, which, 
based on field trials on pollen drift, suggested the German government to imple-
ment 20 m distances from GM maize fields to conventional and organic maize fields 
(Venus et al. 2013: 3). With its isolation distance requirements, Germany holds a 
midfield position among the 16 member states that have implemented such require-
ments. Most member states demand such large minimum distances that GM farm-
ers are exacerbated or even de facto prohibited from cultivating GM crops. Only in 
Spain, the main producer of GM crops in the EU, minimum distances (20 m for GM 
maize) are required, thus governing, but not severely hampering, the cultivation of 
GM crops (Schenkelaars and Wesseler 2016: 7). 
Second, the GMO location register, in its publicly accessible part, provides infor-
mation on field locations and the types of GM crops planted. In this register, farm-
ers, as well as plant scientists, are legally obliged to disclose the exact sites where 
they cultivate GM crops. The register functioned as a significant barrier for both 
actor groups to carry out their work because the via Internet freely accessible regis-
ter allows for anti-GMO activists to easily ascertain where GM crops are planted. 
As a result, activists occupied or destroyed many of the few GMO plantings causing 
pecuniary losses of both farmers and scientists (Schier 2007). The federal state 
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Saxony-Anhalt objected the GMO location register at the German Supreme Court 
in 2005, which decided five years later that this rule was in line with the German 
Constitution (Katzek 2014: 180). 
Third, the German liability rules address the EU’s requirement to enforce ex-post 
measures that determine who must cover the costs of possible economic damages 
that are caused by GM agriculture on fields where the two other farming practices 
are applied. According to these rules, GM farmers are strictly liable for damages 
caused, for instance, by the ‘contamination’ of non-GM crops due to pollen wafting 
from their GM fields. The maximum liability of GM farmers amounting to € 85 mil-
lion is extraordinarily high. It is remarkable that even if GM farmers have met all 
requirements and adjacent properties are polluted accidentally, they are not exempt 
from possible liability claims of conventional or organic farmers. Moreover, if GM 
fields are possible sources of damage, the respective GM farmers are jointly liable 
(Consmüller et al. 2009: 49). Particularly, this liability regime made it an existential 
risk for farmers to cultivate GM crops in Germany (Katzek 2014: 178). 
Altogether, the German ‘co-existence’ regulations comprise strict ex-ante regula-
tions and strict ex-post liability rules. Thus, the regulatory framework on GMOs in 
place in Germany is more prohibitive when compared to most other member states 
(see, e.g. Bodiguel et al. 2010; Consmüller et al. 2009). Together, the three policy in-
struments were intended to guarantee ‘peaceful co-existence’ in Germany. How-
ever, these rules de facto ‘postponed’ the conflicts over GMO cultivation from the 
supranational and the national level to the local level. The ‘co-existence rules’ al-
lowed farmers to cultivate GM crops for commercial purposes for the first time in 
Germany. Subsequently, some farmers started cultivating the GM crops despite the 
very strict regulation in place (Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food 
Safety 2019). 
Small-scale and organic farmers, however, perceived the incipient GMO cultiva-
tion as a threat. Together with environmental NGOs, they advocated against the 
idea of ‘co-existence’ in principle and demanded very strict ‘co-existence’ measures 
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at the least. These actors considered ‘co-existence’ not primarily as an economic is-
sue, but an ethical, environmental, and socio-economic one (Boschert and Gill 2005: 
289–90). On the other hand, the German farmer union and the agribiotech industry 
attacked the ‘co-existence’ provisions in Germany for the unduly high barriers to 
GMO cultivation. Thereby, the rules ‘intensified domestic conflicts between advo-
cates of [the] contending agri-paradigms’ (Levidow and Boschert 2008: 183). 
Turning now back to Figure 3, we can see that multiple communes introduced 
cultivation bans in the period of strictly regulated GMO cultivation from 2005 to 
2008. The peak of the annual growth rate is in 2007 with 54 new local council reso-
lutions. One plausible way of interpreting this high number of cultivation bans is 
that intensified domestic conflicts, along with the new possibility of farmers to grow 
GM crops on their agricultural land, motivated local policymakers to introduce 
these bans. Moreover, these actors could have perceived the existing ‘co-existence’ 
regulations as being insufficient and therefore seized cultivation bans additionally. 
2.2.3    Phase 3: The years after the national cultivation ban on MON810, 2009–
2014 
On the grounds of the ‘safeguard clause’ included in Directive 2001/18/EC, the Ger-
man government imposed a cultivation ban on MON810 in 2009. Thereby, the leg-
islator stopped farmers after a period of four years from further cultivating this bi-
otech crop. Similar as in the case of Bt176, the MON810-ban is considered as being 
based on scientifically questionable reasons and as being, in fact, motivated by the 
political considerations of the German government (Wickson and Wynne 2012). 
Several leading German and European authorities—the Federal Office for Risk As-
sessment, the Julius Kühn Institute, the Robert Koch Institute, the Federal Agency 
for Agriculture and Forestry (since 2008), the Central Commission for Biosafety, and 
EFSA—had considered MON810 to be safe (Ober 2012: 275). Since the ban, the ‘co-
existence’ rules are, in fact, rather theoretical, as no other GM maize varieties—and 
in general no other GM crop—is authorised for commercial cultivation in the EU. 
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Figure 3 shows a mixed picture for the years after the national cultivation ban on 
MON810. At first glance, it may surprise that the regulatory activity varies consid-
erably between 2009, 2010, and 2011, and the subsequent years. While considering 
that the MON810-ban de facto prohibits commercial GMO cultivation in Germany, 
the relatively high number of local cultivation bans taken by the communes in 2009 
seems astonishing. However, this number might be explained by the fact that cor-
responding council resolutions had been initiated and prepared before the federal 
government imposed the ban in April 2009. The strikingly low number of cultiva-
tion bans in 2010 may be interpreted as a reaction of local policymakers, who, due 
to the national ban, might not have seen any more need to regulate. While many 
municipalities adopted local cultivation bans in the period of ‘co-existence’ regula-
tions from 2005 to 2008, only the national MON810-ban in 2009 appears as having 
satisfied the regulatory needs of the communes, as indicated by the low number in 
2010. 
In addition, Figure 3 indicates that significantly more communes established cul-
tivation bans only one year later in 2011. A probable explanation for this increase is 
that GM potato EH92-527-1, better known as ‘Amflora’ (BASF), gained 
authorisation for commercial cultivation in 2010. After a marathon authorization 
procedure of 13 years, the modified starch potato was the third—and to date last—
GM crop that received approval for commercial cultivation. What might have mo-
tivated the communes to impose cultivation bans in 2011 was not only the fact that 
this GM crop gained approval. Rather, farmers immediately started planting ‘Am-
flora’ already in the approval year, but on overall very limited areas (a total of 17 
hectares, and only for two years from 2010 to 2011) (Federal Office of Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety 2019). The reason for the short period of cultivation was 
that BASF suspended the marketing of ‘Amflora’ in the EU when it shifted its plant 
biotechnology division to the United States in 2012 (Salz 2012). In addition, after a 
lawsuit by Hungary, the General Court of the European Union, overturned the ap-
proval of ‘Amflora’ in 2013 because of procedural errors that were made by the 
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European Commission in the approval process (Paskalev 2012: 195–9). Besides 
BASF, other leading agri-biotech companies – Bayer (in 2004) and KWS (in 2015) 
relocated their plant biotechnology divisions from Germany to the United States 
(US) (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2016). 
In the years from 2012 to 2014, only a few communes took regulatory action to 
impose local cultivation bans (Figure 3). This limited number of local cultivation 
bans can be interpreted as the result of the fact that local policymakers did not have 
to fear that farmers could possibly cultivate biotech crops on their agricultural land 
due to the MON810-ban and to terminating the cultivation of ‘Amflora’. Only very 
few communes might have feared potential new authorisations of new GM crops 
for commercial purposes, and therefore implemented cultivation bans. 
2.2.4    Phase 4: The years after the national ex-ante bans on GM crops, 2015–2017 
When inspecting Figure 3 again, we can see that not a single commune imposed a 
cultivation ban during the three-year period from 2015 to 2017. This development 
might be related to Directive 2015/412. This directive was adopted in March 2015 
and it gives the member states the possibility to institute restrictions or bans during 
the approval process for a given GM product (ex-ante), and to restrict or prohibit 
the cultivation of specific GM crops in the aftermath of granting an authorisation on 
the EU level (ex-post). Germany used the ex-ante option and demanded restrictions 
of geographical scopes of all GM crops pending approval in the authorisation pipe-
line at EU level. It was not the only country doing so: 16 other member states and 
four regions made varying use of this new legal possibility (Tosun and Hartung 
2018: 810). The German government reasoned the exclusion of its territory from the 
future authorisations of six GM maize varieties (Syngenta withdrew two varieties) 
with the incompatibility of GM maize with ‘usual agriculture land use in Germany. 
It would have negative effects on the cultivation of conventional and organic maize’ 
(Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2015: 2). 
With increasing numbers of municipalities having implemented cultivation bans, 
the potential number of future cultivation bans automatically decreased. It seems, 
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however, plausible to interpret the regulatory inaction of German communes from 
2015 to 2017 as a result of the regulatory proceedings that took place at the EU level. 
As a reminder: in Germany, more than 11.000 communes exist, which, in principle, 
could adopt GMO cultivation bans. However, after the national ex-ante bans on all 
the GM crops pending approval, the communes might not have viewed it necessary 
to regulate GMOs themselves anymore. These ex-ante bans might have signaled to 
local policymakers that farmers, at least in the medium term, would not be given 
the possibility to grow GM crops in their territories. 
2.3    Theoretical Considerations 
What motivates municipalities to become active and pass GMO cultivation bans? 
Research indicated that multiple factors can explain policy-making at the local level 
including actor-specific factors, such as the party-affiliation of mayors or structural 
factors, like, for instance, the size of a commune (see, e.g. Wehling and Kost 2010; 
Holtkamp 2008). Theorizing all the possible factors would contradict the explora-
tory logic of this study as well as overstretch this piece of research. Therefore, this 
study focuses on three arguments why municipalities might be motivated to ban 
the cultivation of GM crops in their territories: functional motivations, political as-
pirations of local policymakers, and policy diffusion. 
Due to the high level of risk that is often attributed to GMOs (Herrick 2005), sev-
eral possible functional motivations exist, which might induce local policymakers 
to advocate cultivation bans. At their core, these motivations are shaped by norma-
tive, cultural, religious, and other beliefs, and aim at preserving or protecting certain 
valuable goods inferred from these beliefs. For instance, environmentalists tend to 
consider GM crops as dangerous to natural biodiversity. Similarly, consumers often 
regard GM foods as being a potential risk to their health. Most risk assessment stud-
ies conclude that GM crops have no significant adverse effects on the environment 
or human health (see, e.g. Herring and Paarlberg 2016; Klümper and Qaim 2014). 
Nevertheless, local policymakers might be motivated to protect certain valuable 
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goods, such as biodiversity or citizens’ health, and therefore aim at preventing the 
cultivation of GM crops on communal territories. 
Another important functional incitement for a local unit to impose a cultivation 
ban might be the preservation of conventional and organic farming. It is believed 
that their existence can be better secured if the area that is owned by a commune is 
covered by rules that prevent farmers from cultivating GM crops. Cultivation bans 
might be viewed a means to guarantee the labelling threshold of 0.9% set for adven-
titious and/or technically unavoidable GMO ingredients, which applies to conven-
tional as well as to organic products in the EU (Regulation 1830/2003; Regulation 
1829/2003). This aspect is even more relevant for organic farming as many organic 
companies have voluntarily prescribed a more restrictive labelling threshold of 
0.1% for GMO ingredients. Further monitoring measures to meet these thresholds 
would entail additional financial costs, particularly for organic farmers – a scenario 
that comes into relevance when GM crops are planted near organic cultivations  
(Consmüller et al. 2009). 
Local policymakers might also be motivated to ban GMO cultivation due to so-
cio-economic concerns that are related to GMO farming (see, e.g. Catacora-Vargas 
et al. 2018; Oehen and Quiédeville 2017). The industrial farming practices that are 
often associated with GMO agriculture are frequently considered to threaten tradi-
tional small-scale agriculture in rural spheres. Therefore, GMO cultivation might be 
considered a direct threat to small farmers, existing upstream and downstream in-
dustries, and consumers of food from traditional food-production systems (Kathage 
et al. 2016). However, by implementing cultivation bans, municipalities can protect 
and support traditional food-production systems. So, they can contribute to 
avoiding possible shifts in the socio-economic status triggered by GMO farming 
from which mainly agri-biotech companies and large-scale farmers would benefit, 
but actors operating in traditional agri-food systems would suffer. 
Several other functional reasons that are motivated by religious, ethical, moral, 
or globalization-critical beliefs might motivate policymakers to take regulatory 
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action. When local policymakers consider certain values as not being sufficiently 
protected by the regulatory status quo, they may become active and try to do so 
themselves. 
The second argument that we propose in this study is that municipalities impose 
cultivation bans due to political aspirations of local policymakers seeking credit for 
positive policy outcomes. The central objective of political parties and individual 
policymakers is the maximization of their vote share at upcoming elections as this 
increases their chances of becoming (re-)elected, which, in turn, allows for them to 
implement certain policies (Strøm 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999). Skjæveland et al. 
(2007) have shown that this idea also applies to the local level. Due to their vote-
seeking aspirations, policymakers are responsive to public opinion: for the GMO 
case, several studies have shown that negative public opinion functioned as a major 
driver for several EU member states to impose national cultivation bans (see, e.g. 
Malyska et al. 2016; Kurzer and Cooper 2007; Legge and Durant 2010; Durant and 
Legge 2005). 
Accordingly, policymakers operating at the local level might also have strong 
incentives to respond to the public rejection of GMOs – or at least to distance them-
selves from unpopular GMO farming (Wenzelburger and Hörisch 2016). Hence, 
they might regard cultivation bans as a suitable means to increase their political 
success. As the GMO issue has proved to predominate several local agendas and 
sparked intense conflicts at this level (see, e.g. Friedrich 2017; Wagner 2007; Gupta 
2018), the topic should attract the attention of vote-seeking local policymakers who 
might hope for electoral benefits from politically exploiting the issue. 
The third argument refers to policy diffusion, that is, the notion that policy deci-
sions adopted by a political unit are affected by policies that are adopted beforehand 
by other political units (see, e.g. Shipan and Volden 2008; Gilardi 2016; 2012; Gra-
ham et al. 2013). A key mechanism underlying policy diffusion among political units 
operating at the same level is learning (Shipan and Volden 2008: 840). Learning can 
be understood as a process by which policymakers employ the experiences of other 
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political units to estimate the likely consequences of policy change (Gilardi 2012: 
470). According to Bednar (2011: 273), the chances that policies diffuse increases in 
constellations when other political units are characterised by similar preferences 
and problems and consider a certain policy at stake as ‘successful’. Why should local 
policymakers consider a GMO cultivation ban as successful? 
Drawing on the considerations above, policymakers might consider a ban that is 
adopted by another commune as a suitable instrument to prevent the population 
from environmental or health risks potentially emanating from GMOs. Moreover, 
these actors might consider it to be necessary to harmonize their regulations, which 
might foster the diffusion of these policy measures, especially among adjacent mu-
nicipalities. Finally, these bans might diffuse due to the political aspirations of pol-
icymakers in recipient municipalities. If these actors observe politicians in other 
communes as having benefited from adopting the regulatory measure in electoral 
terms, this could induce them to advocate the measure with the goal of increasing 
their political success as well. 
2.4   Methodological Clarifications 
To explore the determinants of GMO regulatory action on the local level, this study 
employs 131 local council resolutions taken by German cities and communes from 
1999 to 2017. In Germany, overall 307 communes made use of the legal possibility 
to include a specific clause in their lease contracts for agricultural land that forbids 
farmers to cultivate GM crops on communal land. As only 131 council resolutions 
contain relevant information on why a commune implemented these local GMO 
cultivation bans, the analysis of the determinants thereof will be limited to this set 
of communes. 
Most documents inspected are freely accessible on the internet homepage 
http://www.gentechnikfreie-regionen.de/regionen-gemeinden/gentechnikfreie-
kommunen.html. Some missing information could be found searching the internet 
and by contacting the municipalities. The free accessibility of the documents enables 
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the reader of this study to check and replicate the results provided. The homepage 
that is cited above is operated by ‘Friends of the Earth Germany’ (Bund für Umwelt 
und Naturschutz Deutschland, BUND, Berlin, Germany) with the support of the 
‘Working group peasant agriculture’ (Aktionsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Land-
wirtschaft, AbL, Hamm, Germany). The BUND advocates environmental protection 
issues, whereas the AbL aims at preserving traditional (organic and conventional) 
farming practices. Based on these aspirations, the two associations work closely to-
gether in advocating the strictest GMO regulations as possible. One of their lobby-
ing strategies to accomplish this goal is their support for municipalities to ban GMO 
cultivation on their land. 
The basic assumption underlying the use of local council resolutions is that these 
documents often develop from political debates between local policymakers, who 
are, in the first place, local councillors, and mayors (with or without party affilia-
tion) representing the various interests of local citizens. Therefore, the documents 
can be considered as reflecting important parts of the societal and political debates 
in the respective municipalities. As indicated, many of the documents do not in-
clude relevant information regarding cultivation bans have been introduced – in-
stead, they only inform about whether proposals for these measures have been 
adopted, and sometimes on the voting behaviour of the members of local councils. 
The varying provision of information in the council resolutions seems to be due to 
some formal nature of how these documents are written in the municipalities across 
Germany. Nevertheless, 131 documents provide multifarious information on why 
municipalities have imposed cultivation bans, thereby reflecting the debates that 
are sparked by the GMO issue in the local spheres. 
From the method of document analysis, one possible limitation of this study 
might emerge, as it might be that this study does not encompass all the relevant 
reasons for regulatory action. The practical reason for this is that some arguments 
for banning GMO cultivation, which might have been relevant in a commune, are 
possibly not written down in the council resolutions, which represent our exclusive 
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data source. For instance, mayors hoping to generate public benevolence might 
have implemented a cultivation ban in their communes. However, when analysing 
the corresponding council resolutions, it could happen that this motive for taking 
regulatory action cannot be identified as no statement – implicitly or explicitly – 
refers to this aspect. 
The study seeks to identify the drivers of GMO regulatory activity at the local 
level by analysing the statements included in local council resolutions. For this un-
dertaking, qualitative content analysis appears as the most suitable method (Mayr-
ing 2000). The manual coding of the statements was started by using a coding 
scheme that we sketched based on the theoretical considerations. Based on an in-
ductive procedure, we successively modified the coding scheme during the further 
coding process. The coding categories were revised and reduced several times until 
a coding scheme was derived that ensured that all the relevant empirical infor-
mation contained in the documents was captured. Finally, all 131 documents were 
inspected again to make sure that all relevant data were included and that the as-
signments of the statements to the categories fulfilled the requirements of reliability. 
This coding procedure resulted in various main and sub-categories, which can 
be inspected in Table 3 below. The five main categories the data were assigned to 
are the following: 
- Socio-economic aspects 
- Environmental and health risks 
- Imminent GMO cultivation 
- Local Resistance 
- Diffusion 
The statements that were assigned to the categories provide information on how 
significant certain factors are for the GMO regulatory activity of German munici-
palities that published corresponding information. Finally, qualitative content anal-
ysis was complemented by a quantitative content analysis that looked specifically 
at the frequencies of combinations of sub-categories within council resolutions that 
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were proposed by communes in order to identify patterns of reasons for prohibiting 
GMO cultivation at the local level. 
Table 3. Overview of the Exploratory Findings 
Category Number Mentioned Frequency Mentioned (%) 
Socio-economic aspects 61 46.56 
Impact on conventional agriculture 50 38.17 
Impact on organic agriculture 25 19.08 
Dependency on multinationals 21 16.03 
No economic benefit 7 5.34 
Low consumer demand 4 3.05 
Surveillance costs 2 1.53 
Land value conservation 7 5.34 
Environmental and health risks 55 41.98 
Risk for the environment 46 35.11 
Risk for human health 36 27.48 
Imminent GMO cultivation 12 9.16 
Planned cultivation for scientific or 
commercial purposes 
5 3.82 
Potential cultivation due to new au-
thorizations or changes in EU rules 9 6.87 
Local Resistance 44 33.59 
Rejection by the population 39 29.77 
Rejection by farmers 15 11.45 
Character of provision 42 32.06 
Complementary to regulations on 
higher levels 
25 19.08 
Preventive 7 5.34 
Symbolic 19 14.50 
Diffusion 47 35.88 
Neighboring municipalities adopted 
identical or similar regulations 
34 25.95 
Higher administrative units (coun-
ties) adopted identical or similar reg-
ulations 
16 12.21 
Note: the numbers backgrounded grey indicate how many municipalities (or which share 
of municipalities respectively) mentioned any of the subcategories below. For example, 
61 municipalities mentioned at least one of the seven socio-economic aspects. Source: 
Based on data taken from GMO-free Regions in Germany (2019b). 
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2.5    Presentation and Discussion of the Empirical Findings 
Functional considerations played a key role for municipalities when introducing 
GMO cultivation bans; socio-economic aspects and perceived risks for the environ-
ment or human health were mentioned most often. Sixty-one municipalities justi-
fied their cultivation bans referring to socio-economic aspects, such as negative im-
pacts on the conventional or organic agricultural sector, which amounts to about 
47%. Around 42% of the municipalities referred to risks for the environment or hu-
man health in their explanatory statements. Imminent GMO cultivation, either in 
the form of planned cultivation on a municipality’s territory or due to new author-
izations on the EU level, seemed to be less central, however (9%). 
Turning to political aspirations, rejection by local farmers and by the local public 
appear to be important aspects. Around 34% of the communes mentioned any of 
the two aspects of local resistance. Finally, the documents provide evidence for pol-
icy diffusion processes. About 36% of the communes referred to cultivation bans of 
neighboring municipalities or higher administrative units as a reason for imple-
menting cultivation bans. Of course, cultivation bans could diffuse due to functional 
considerations of recipient policymakers; policy diffusion will be examined in more 
detail below. 
2.5.1    Functional Reasons for Banning GMO Cultivation 
By exploring the council resolutions, socio-economic reasons turned out to be deci-
sive for the communes’ decisions to ban GMOs. The councils mentioned the follow-
ing aspects: endangerment of conventional or organic agriculture, dependency on 
multinationals, the absence of economic benefits, low consumer demand, surveil-
lance costs, and conservation of land value. 
Potential detrimental effects of GMO cultivation on the conventional and/or or-
ganic agricultural sector is one of the dominant reasoning in municipalities’ explan-
atory statements. When inspecting Table 3, which gives an overview over all state-
ments coded, we can see that about 38% of the communes referred to negative 
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effects on conventional agriculture and about 19% explicitly mentioned harmful 
consequences for organic farmers. Most of these communes issued serious doubts 
on the feasibility of coexistence in Germany. For instance, the council of Metzingen 
noted, ‘biologists are convinced that coexistence is only feasible if bigger contiguous 
areas without GMO cultivation are created. However, a simple separation between 
GMO and GMO-free cultivation is impossible because gavelkind in Baden Würt-
temberg led to mostly small plots of land lying closely together’. Instead of coexist-
ence, ‘inevitable creeping contamination will threaten conventional and organic 
farmers’ livelihood’. Consequences for organic farmers resulting from contamina-
tion would be particularly severe, as they would not be able to follow the guidelines 
of organic farming anymore, as noted by the city council of Bamberg for instance. 
Apart from the threat of contamination for conventional and organic agriculture, 
municipalities referred to other potential problems of GMO cultivation for local 
farmers. One of these issues was a possible dependency of farmers on multination-
als; mentioned by 16% of the communes. The municipality Brück, for example, 
noted, ‘[the seed trading company] Märkische Kraftfutter (Märka) is the main 
distributor of GMOs [in Brandenburg]. Their interest lies in the use of GMOs be-
cause selling genetically modified seeds would lead to an dependency on their cus-
tomers’. The council of Munich stated, ‘there is a threat that increasing market con-
centration will make farmers and consumers dependent only on a few globally op-
erating multinationals in a few years’. Furthermore, the council of Leipzig argued 
that potential future market pressures could force conventional farmers to adapt to 
GMO cultivation. Due to the German liability rules, ‘farmers will then face a high 
risk of heavy claims for compensation in case of contamination or negative health 
impacts. Most of them would not be able to afford an appropriate liability insur-
ance’. 
In addition to the potential problems of GMO cultivation, a few municipalities 
cast doubts on the economic benefit of GMO cultivation and pointed to the low con-
sumer demand for GMOs in Germany. Some municipalities also worried about 
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potential surveillance costs resulting from measures to guarantee coexistence. Loss 
of land value seemed to be of some concern as well. For instance, the council of 
Dortmund noted, ‘acreage that was contaminated by the use of genetically modified 
plants is limited in its usability as it cannot be used for conventional cultivation 
anymore. In addition, its use as compensation area is limited. Therefore, this acreage 
has reduced economic and ecological value’. 
Interestingly, many municipalities emphasized the need to strengthen the local 
economy instead of preparing the ground for multinationals and called on local 
people to purchase local products. A councillor in Hofstetten stated, ‘it is a great 
thing if domestic farmers are supported and people purchase products produced in 
the Ortenau area [the largest district in Baden-Württemberg located in the direct 
neighbourhood to the French border]’. The council of Neufraunhofen pointed out 
that ‘small peasant farming characterizes most parts of Bavaria. To preserve this 
agricultural structure, it is of particular importance to sustain and improve the 
living and working conditions of the population enrooted in agriculture’. Some mu-
nicipalities even took the opportunity to support local farmers directly. For instance, 
the council of Strausberg decided that ‘the use of local organic foodstuffs in cafete-
rias of community facilities and at public events shall be increased’. From these find-
ings follows that the municipalities’ interests in preserving existent agricultural 
structures and supporting their own local economy have served as a crucial reason 
for banning GMOs. 
Regarding the second type of functional considerations, it was argued that local 
policymakers might consider cultivation bans as a functional means to protect the 
environment and human health from uncertain risks emanating from GM crops. 
The study shows that, to varying degrees, municipalities referred to these two po-
tentially affected areas when justifying their cultivation bans. 
Perceived risks for the environment were mentioned most often: about 35% of 
the communes stated that GM crops could be harmful to the environment. Most 
statements explicitly referred to the danger of a loss of biodiversity due to 
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outcrossing or expanding industrialized agriculture. The council of the community 
Metzingen stated, ‘the outcrossing of genetically modified organisms in the envi-
ronment emerges as a great threat for biodiversity for years to come. Genetically 
modified organisms spread through wind and bees that transfer pollen, through 
humans, animals or machines that carry seeds over long distances accidentally’. 
The council of Dortmund further emphasized the problem of irreversibility of 
outcrossing by emphasizing that ‘cultivation of GMOs comes with a serious inter-
vention into […] biodiversity in the ecosystem whose consequences are difficult to 
foresee. However, a complex process is set in train, which can neither be stopped 
nor be undone, even if it turns out that the use of biotechnology was a wrong deci-
sion’. The council of Munich explicitly mentioned a possible relationship between 
GMO cultivation, industrialized agriculture, and the loss of biodiversity: ‘[the use 
of biotechnology] would lead to an increase in agricultural production, a further 
intensification of the already drastic structural change [in agriculture], […], and a 
loss of genetic and regional diversity’. 
Risks for human health were mentioned less frequently than risks for the envi-
ronment. About 27% of the municipalities referred to potential negative impacts on 
local people’s health as a reason for banning GMO cultivation. Most municipalities 
referred to risks for human health in general and emphasized the problem of the 
uncertainty that is inherent in this risk. For instance, the local council of Hüttisheim 
stated, ‘the main reason [for implementing GMO cultivation bans] is local citizens’ 
health as subsequent damages of genetically modified plants are not foreseeable’. 
The third set of reasons given by the communes for adopting bans relates to their 
fear of ‘imminent GMO cultivation’. This category includes communes that per-
ceived the likelihood that GM crops will be planted on their territories as particu-
larly high—either due to planned cultivations on their own land or in their 
neighbourhood or due to possible new GM crop authorizations or the liberalization 
of appropriate regulations at EU level. In other words, specific (anticipated) events 
were given as reasons for banning GMOs. Altogether, 9.1% of the communes made 
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statements in these two regards, wherefore it seems worthwhile to investigate and 
differentiate the two sub-categories and analyse them in further detail. 
Only a small share of 3% of all municipalities justified cultivation bans with 
planned cultivations of GM crops for scientific or commercial purposes in their ter-
ritories or in those of neighbouring municipalities. For instance, the commune of 
Leingarten banned GMO cultivation in response to a planned cultivation of GM 
maize on its territory in February 2006. Moreover, a planned release by Monsanto 
in another commune, Grünsfeld, led the adjacent city of Lauda-Königshofen to ban 
GM crops on its own territory to take a clear stance against the planned release in 
their neighbourhood in March 2007. 
As opposed to the above, the fear of GMO cultivation on municipalities’ land due 
to new authorizations of GM crops or the liberalization of regulations at EU level 
seems to be more relevant (6.9%). For instance, the council of Metzingen justified 
their cultivation ban in May 2004 with the end of the EU ‘moratorium’, because it 
increased the likelihood of new authorizations, and, as a result, made extensive 
commercial cultivation of GMOs on German acreage more likely. Likewise, the au-
thorization of the GM potato ‘Amflora’ in 2010 was mentioned as a reason for the 
cultivation ban adopted by the city of Magdeburg in August 2010. In this case, only 
three weeks passed between the EU approval and a regulatory response at the local 
level. The new ‘co-existence’ rules, implemented in 2005, under which GMO culti-
vation was allowed in Germany for the first time, induced the community of Lahr 
to put the topic of biotechnology on its agenda and to eventually ban GMO farming 
on its territory in August 2006. 
Altogether, the number of municipalities that explicitly refer to imminent GMO 
cultivation on their arable land is rather small. One reason for the small number of 
references to planned cultivations of GM crops in municipalities’ explanatory state-
ments could be the rare overall incidence of GMO farming in Germany, as pointed 
out in Section 2. However, this also supports our approach to investigate the 
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multiple possible reasons in order to answer the question of what moved the other 
91% of municipalities to ban GMO cultivation. 
2.5.2    Policymakers’ Reasons for Adopting GMO Cultivation Bans 
Some municipalities could have banned GMO cultivation due to political aspira-
tions of local policymakers—our second theoretical explanation. According to this 
theoretical argument, local policymakers could attempt to increase their political 
success by implementing popular regulatory measures. About 33.4% of the munic-
ipalities explicitly referred to local resistance in their explanatory statements. Based 
on the explorative findings, one can differentiate between two actor groups: rejec-
tion by the broader local citizenship, which was mentioned by about 29.8%, and 
rejection by local farmers, mentioned by about 11.5% of the communes. 
The documents indicate that resistance by local citizens ranges between widely 
diffuse rejection of GMOs and concrete resistance actions, such as petitions or citi-
zens’ consultations. For instance, the community of Ainring noted in general that it 
shared its populations’ concerns about the consequences of GMO cultivation. On 
the other hand, the council of Schwäbisch Gmünd specifically describes the evolu-
tion of an action alliance that collected signatures against the cultivation of GMOs 
in the area. Resistance by farmers is described in a similar way. Some municipalities 
just mentioned their farmers’ general rejection of GMOs. Others described in detail 
how local farmers associated to gain influence or how regional farmers’ federations 
started to intervene. 
These observations indicate that some local policymakers reacted to specific 
forms of local resistance and to the local public opinion in general. The findings can 
be interpreted against the background of our theoretical reasoning according to 
which local policymakers might use cultivation bans for credit-claiming reasons. As 
already pointed out in Section 2, municipalities de facto cannot ban GMO cultiva-
tion on their territory completely. However, some still react and prohibit GM crops 
on municipally owned land only. If, as a matter of fact, municipalities cannot com-
pletely ban the cultivation of biotech crops on their land, why then would they still 
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adopt corresponding council resolutions? Interestingly, some municipalities pro-
vided information on the genuine functions of their local cultivation bans, which 
can be differentiated into three sub-categories: complementary, preventive, and 
symbolic functions. 
About 19% of the communes adopted cultivation bans with the aim of comple-
menting regulations in place at higher levels—the regional and the federal level par-
ticularly. For instance, the documents from Rednitzhembach (2007) and Kammer-
stein (2007) state that there do not exist sufficient binding rules at higher political 
levels, wherefore cultivation bans should be adopted. The two communes’ initia-
tives date back to 2007 when the national cultivation ban on MON810 had not been 
in place yet and the ‘co-existence’ rules already applied. Although the latter regula-
tions are widely considered as being very strict, these rules appear as having disap-
pointed municipalities as well as conventional and organic farmers, as these provi-
sions de facto permitted farmers to cultivate GM crops. 
Accordingly, the ‘co-existence’ rules were neither satisfactory for the anti-GMO 
actors nor for those farmers who wanted to grow GM crops for economic reasons 
(see Section 2, Phase 2). In February 2008—about one year before the introduction 
of the national cultivation ban on MON810—Weiler-Simmerberg was rather clear 
in this regard stating that ‘while in countries such as Austria or Poland the state 
decided to become GMO-free, only in Germany bottom-up pressure would be 
needed’. This reinforces the argument that municipalities themselves become active 
and regulate if, from their point of view, sufficient regulatory measures have not 
been anchored on higher levels. 
A few communities (about 5%) underlined the preventive character of their coun-
cil resolutions. Although none of the farmers operating in these communes culti-
vated GM crops or intended to do so, these municipalities decided to take precau-
tions to assure that these crops would not be cultivated in their territories in the 
future. Although a local cultivation ban did not prohibit possible future GM crop 
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plantings completely, it would send a clear message that GMO farming was not 
welcome in their municipalities. 
About 14.5% of the communes emphasized the symbolic character of banning 
GMO cultivation in their areas. Instead of conceiving this provision as an actual 
opportunity to close a gap in current regulatory frameworks, they declared it as a 
political act and hoped for a signaling effect of this policy measure. For instance, the 
council of Breitenbach am Herzberg declared the commune ‘as a symbolically 
GMO-free commune’ and added, ‘the political commune supports its citizens polit-
ically […] to prevent the establishment of biotechnology in agriculture’. 
Although the proportion of municipalities that made corresponding statements 
in their resolutions is not particularly high, general empirical support can be found 
for the second theoretical explanation. Especially, the comparatively high number 
of municipalities mentioning local resistance in their explanatory statements indi-
cates that local policymakers are responsive to their citizens. Apparently, local pol-
icymakers attempt to claim credit by adopting the popular ban of GMO cultivation. 
2.5.3    Diffusion of GMO Cultivation Bans 
Finally, we are going to deal with policy diffusion, the notion that policy decisions 
that are adopted by a given political unit are affected by policies adopted before-
hand by other political units. Almost 36% of the communes made statements in their 
resolutions suggesting that diffusion somehow took place. Interestingly, the infor-
mation obtained from these documents refers to two differing sources of such dif-
fusion effects. 
First, about 26% of the communes stated that they imposed cultivation bans due 
to regulatory action taken by other municipalities before. For example, the com-
mune of Zell am Main banned GMO cultivation in May 2013 while referring explic-
itly to their neighbour community Rottendorf which had adopted the same provi-
sion three months before. Moreover, geographic proximity between municipalities 
does not seem to be a necessary condition for intercommunal effects. The city coun-
cil of Creglingen, for example, argued against a planned field trial by Monsanto in 
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another commune (Grünsfeld) which is about 40 km away. Instead, several other 
factors, such as personal acquaintances between local farmers, mayors, councillors, 
or activists might positively condition such intercommunal effects. Hence, these 
findings correspond with the theoretical argument of horizontal diffusion effects 
between municipalities. Obviously, many communes are characterized by similar 
preferences and problems, and therefore consider the cultivation bans that were 
adopted by other communes as promising, which induces them to adopt this meas-
ure, too. 
Second, the documents provide evidence for diffusion effects stemming from the 
county-level—and especially in those districts, where the respective county councils 
have declared the districts as ‘GMO-free zones’. About 12.2% of the municipalities 
referred to decisions taken in the county councils when justifying their own provi-
sion. In some cases, the county councils, after declaring themselves as ‘GMO-free’, 
explicitly called on all communes in their district to take complementary measures 
and to declare themselves as free of GMOs as well. To give one example, the Bavar-
ian commune Thurmansbang stated that ‘the council of the county of Freyung-Graf-
enau […] adopted the basic decision to designate the district as a ‘GMO-free zone. 
This decision should also be endorsed by the county-based cities, markets, and mu-
nicipalities’. In contrast to horizontal diffusion, vertical diffusion effects, which in 
these cases, stem from the county level, had not been expected. 
All in all, there is sufficient empirical evidence that policy diffusion played a role 
in spreading cultivation bans at the local level in Germany. Not only did these bans 
diffuse horizontally from one local unit to another, as we assumed theoretically. 
While vertical diffusion might be due to hierarchic coordination by respective coun-
ties, learning is probably more important in the case of the horizontal diffusion of 
cultivation bans. Nevertheless, as this holds true for all factors that were analysed 
here, it is difficult to assess how significant these diffusion effects were for cultiva-
tion bans in individual municipalities as in almost all cases various reasons were 
mentioned in the council resolutions. 
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2.5.4    The Interdependencies between the Reasons for Banning GMO Cultiva-
tion 
The first part of the empirical analysis focused on the single frequencies of the state-
ments given by municipalities. The second part considers the interdependencies be-
tween the reasons noted in the local council resolutions. Which combinations of rea-
sons appear most frequently in these documents? Are there any patterns in the com-
binations of reasons why GMO cultivation in local spheres should be prohibited? 
Figure 4 displays the interdependencies between the various statements made by 
the 131 municipalities that have been investigated. We excluded the category ‘Char-
acter of provision’ as it rather describes the nature of the policy measure than the 
reasons why certain policy measures are taken. The different categories of reasons 
are depicted as nodes. The bigger the size of the nodes, the more frequently munic-
ipalities mentioned the respective categories. The different categories are linked by 
edges. The darker the colour and the bigger the size of an edge, the more frequently 
the two categories that are linked by the edge were mentioned together. In more 
detail, each edge represents the sum of joint mentions of two categories divided by 
the maximum number of theoretically possible joint mentions of the same two cat-
egories. For example, ‘risks for the environment’ was named by 46 municipalities 
and ‘risks for human health’ was named by 36 municipalities. Therefore, the num-
ber of cases where both categories could have been mentioned together is limited to 
36 times. In fact, both of the categories were jointly named 27 times. Therefore, the 
ratio of both categories is 27 divided by 36, equalling 0.75 or 75%. The number of 
joint mentions is divided by the maximum number of theoretically possible joint 
mentions in order to control the different frequencies of mentioned categories. 
Computation of Cramer’s V for the interdependencies between any two of the 
categories delivered similar results. We decided to use the method, as described 
above, for the reason of easier interpretation. All of the ratios can be found in Table 
A2 in the appendix. NetDraw (Borgatti 2002) was used to create the graph. When 
looking at the graph, it can be observed that a wide variety of combinations of dif-
ferent reasons for prohibiting GMO cultivation exists in communities’ explanatory 
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statements. Most of the nodes are linked by many other nodes. However, some rea-
sons were combined many times, whereas others only occasionally or not at all. 
Turning to socio-economic reasons, we can see that these reasons are in general 
highly interconnected, which means that they are often mentioned together in one 
document. Most municipalities that referred to a negative impact on organic agri-
culture also mentioned a negative impact on conventional agriculture (24 of 25 pos-
sible combinations equalling 96%). Communes worrying about a looming depend-
ency of their farmers on multinationals referred to a negative impact of GMO culti-
vation on conventional agriculture in 13 of 21 cases (71%). 
Figure 4. Interdependencies between Reasons for Banning GMO Cultivation 
 
The strongest interdependence can be observed between surveillance costs and 
the impact of GMOs on organic agriculture. In fact, communes mentioning the prob-
lem of surveillance costs always referred to the negative impacts on organic 
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agriculture as well. However, only two communes mentioned surveillance costs, 
resulting in 100% of possible combinations. Therefore, this finding cannot be seen 
as representative. Finally, the potential problems of land value conservation were 
often mentioned in combination with a negative impact on conventional agriculture 
or organic agriculture (five of seven possible combinations equalling 71% in both 
cases). 
The strong correlation between different sub-categories of socio-economic rea-
sons is not surprising. It is indeed more interesting that these socio-economic rea-
sons are very often stated in combination with the risks for human health or risks 
for the environment. Municipalities referring to a risk for the environment were also 
mentioning a negative impact on conventional agriculture in 31 of 46 cases (67%). 
Similarly, communes referring to a negative impact on organic agriculture brought 
up risks for the environment in 16 of 25 cases (64%). The same pattern can be ob-
served for socio-economic reasons and risks for human health: 26 of 36 municipali-
ties mentioning risks for human health also referred to a negative impact on con-
ventional agriculture (72%) and 15 of 25 communes referring to organic agriculture 
also mentioned risks for human health (60%). 
When looking at the graph, it can be observed that these four categories are also 
located quite close to each other, forming a cluster of nodes. The position of nodes 
within the graph is determined by using a multi-dimensional-scaling technique 
(MDS). Multi-dimensional-scaling is a technique that is used (in network analysis) 
to assign locations to nodes in multi-dimensional spaces – in this case in a two-di-
mensional space – so that nodes that are ‘more similar’ are closer together. In this 
case, two nodes are ‘similar’ to the extent that they have similar shortest paths (ge-
odesic distances) to all the other nodes (Hannemann and Riddle 2005). 
Absolute distances between nodes cannot be interpreted meaningfully (a shorter 
distance between node A and B than between node A and C does not necessarily 
mean that there is a stronger interdependence between node A and B than between 
node A and C). However, clusters of nodes can be interpreted. The four categories 
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forming a cluster in this graph are interrelated to a higher degree than, for example, 
the categories environmental risk, horizontal diffusion, and vertical diffusion. Con-
sequently, socio-economic aspects and environmental and health risks were not 
only mentioned most frequently, but they were also often mentioned in combina-
tion with each other. Finally, potential GMO cultivation was also combined fre-
quently with a negative impact on conventional agriculture (66.6%; 6 out of 9) or on 
organic agriculture (56%; 5 out of 9). 
Examining political aspirations, there is some overlap between the rejection of 
GMOs by farmers and the rejection by the local population. Especially communes 
referring to farmers refusing GMOs often stated a negative stance of their general 
local population towards GMOs (10 of 15 communities). Contrary to the patterns 
that were observed before, rejection by farmers and negative impacts on organic or 
conventional agriculture were combined less frequently (29% and 20%, respec-
tively). However, rejection by local citizens was more frequently mentioned in com-
bination with a negative impact on organic agriculture (56%) or with the depend-
ency on multinationals (57%). In general, the rejection by local citizens was men-
tioned in combination with most of the other reasons. 
Regarding diffusion effects, horizontal and vertical diffusion processes seem to 
be mostly independent of each other (19%). Horizontal diffusion is combined with 
many other categories. However, these combinations occurred rarely. Interestingly, 
eight of the sixteen municipalities referring to vertical diffusion also mentioned a 
negative impact through GMOs on conventional agriculture or risks for the envi-
ronment (50%). Possibly, these considerations might have played a central role on 
the county-level as well. 
To conclude, the reasons for prohibiting GMO cultivation were combined in a 
wide variety. Nevertheless, some patterns in the combination of reasons can be ob-
served. Most prominently, the two aspects socio-economic reasons and risks for the 
environment and human health were not only mentioned most frequently by 
communes but also oftentimes in combination. 
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2.6    Concluding Remarks and Implications 
With this study, we examined patterns of GMO regulation on the local level, an 
issue that has received only scant attention in hitherto research yet. The study fo-
cused on three theoretical arguments to explain why municipalities might ban GMO 
cultivation in their territories and found general support for each of them when 
analysing 131 German municipalities that took measures to prohibit the cultivation 
of GM crops on their arable land on a legal basis. 
Functional motivations, especially socio-economic reasons and perceived risks 
for the environment or human health, turned out to be decisive for municipalities’ 
decisions to impose cultivation bans. Although on the national level, Germany im-
plemented strict rules for safeguarding ‘co-existence’ between GMO farming and 
conventional and organic agriculture, many municipalities had serious doubts 
about the feasibility of ‘co-existence’ and perceived possible ‘contaminations’ as se-
vere threats, especially to organic farmers. Furthermore, communes feared that once 
GMOs were cultivated on a large scale, other farmers would have to adapt to GMO 
farming leading to a dependency on multinationals, an enhancement of industrial 
agriculture, and a replacement of traditional agricultural practice characterised by 
small-scale farming. 
Municipalities also referred to risks for the environment and human health as 
reasons why GMO cultivation should be prohibited on their land. However, we 
could show that these risks are often mentioned in combination with socio-eco-
nomic reasons. The impression prevails that mostly socio-economic aspects rather 
than perceived risks for the environment or local people’s health induced munici-
palities to become active and impose cultivation bans. This observation corresponds 
with previous studies, which identified socio-economic concerns as well as per-
ceived risks as key drivers of the low public and political support for GMOs in the 
EU (see, e.g. Catacora-Vargas et al. 2018; Kathage et al. 2016; Durant and Legge 2005; 
Frewer et al. 2002). 
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Moreover, the results of this study support the argument that local policymakers 
seek credit for popular cultivation bans, and, therefore, respond to the resistance of 
local farmers or the local population against GMO cultivation due to their own po-
litical aspirations. This observation corresponds with findings of the study pre-
sented in Chapter 3 where it is revealed that, on the German regional level, political 
parties as a whole, as well as politicians, recognize the credit-claiming possibilities 
due to the GMO issue, and, therefore, introduce popular regulations to boost their 
electoral success. However, policymakers might not only respond to their elec-
torates; ideologic and ethical motives, concerns over socio-economic consequences, 
as well as over environmental or health risks, all represent possible personal rea-
sons, which might motivate them to promote regulatory action. 
Finally, municipalities implemented cultivation bans as a reaction to similar pol-
icies adopted beforehand by other municipalities or by units on higher political lev-
els. While horizontal diffusion between municipalities can be explained by learning 
processes of actors in the recipient communes, vertical diffusion from higher polit-
ical levels can be explained by hierarchic coordination. 
The elaborate analysis of local council resolutions underpinned these conclusions 
with a number of reasons released by the municipalities to justify regulatory action. 
Overall, the study provides valuable insights into the various reasons as to why 
municipalities become active and impose bans on GMO cultivation in their respec-
tive areas. Motta (2014: 1370) stated that ‘the social and environmental effects of the 
global expansion of biotechnology are mostly concentrated at the local level, in the 
rural and suburban communities that surround GM fields’. The study at hand 
demonstrated that GMO farming is a multi-dimensional issue at the local level: in 
local councils across Germany, disparate, but almost exclusively negatively biased 
views dominated on the (potential) effects of this farming practice, which in turn 
often triggered political decisions against GMO cultivation. 
Municipalities’ possibility to prohibit agricultural technologies on their leased 
land in combination with negatively biased views towards new technologies will 
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possibly have negative implications for future agricultural innovations. Municipal-
ities are free to include any exclusion clause in their lease contracts. Accordingly, 
municipalities can prohibit farmers from using any new technology on their leased 
land. The new breeding technique Crispr/Cas represents a current case. On 25 July 
2018, the European Court of Justice ruled that new breeding techniques, such as 
Crispr/Cas, would fall into the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC, which defines a GMO 
(CJEU 2018). Consequently, this means that the local cultivation bans already in 
place, which apply to GM crops of all varieties, also apply to these newly modified 
crops. One has to bear in mind, however, that municipalities in most cases only own 
a share of the land on their territory. 
The results of this study further emphasize the importance of examining the full 
complexity of agri-food systems (see, e.g. Giampietro 2004). German municipalities’ 
rejection of GMOs reveals the problems of looking only at single effects, such as the 
increase of net income gains of farmers adopting GM crops. Instead, it is important 
to take a holistic view and analyse the interdependencies between agroecosystems 
and socio-economic systems in their full complexity in order to understand whether 
the introduction of a new technology, GMOs in this case, will be compatible with 
existing socio-economic systems, accepted by society, and de facto improve the agri-
food systems’ sustainability in the end. 
The method of document analysis comes with the possible limitation that we do 
not encompass all the relevant reasons for regulatory action on GMOs on a local 
level because arguments for banning GMO cultivation might not have been written 
down in the council resolutions. Thus, the results of this study might leave some 
space for possible variations in the relative significance of the factors underlying 
local cultivation bans. One possibility for future research is to examine a small num-
ber of particularly interesting communes in case studies. In addition, an analysis of 
municipalities in which farmers grew GM crops or where a ban was proposed, but 
not implemented, would be insightful. Further studies could also build on this 
study and focus on the role of increasing local resilience or the importance of 
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symbolism. By using expert interviews or surveys, more fine-grained data could be 
derived, which, in turn, could allow for producing more detailed knowledge about 
the relative significance of the various determinants of local GMO cultivation bans 
in specific cases. However, many local debates about GMOs took place more than a 
decade ago, making it thereby difficult to collect reliable data. Using these methods, 
therefore, comes with some problems. 
Finally, the analysis of GMO regulatory activity at the local level could be ex-
panded to other countries, where municipalities have possibilities to regulate this 
policy field. In this context further, interesting questions could be addressed as for 
example which legal possibilities municipalities have for doing so, to what extent 
they make use of these, whether units use informal arrangements to restrict GMO 
cultivation, and which factors trigger local regulatory action in these countries. 
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Chapter 3 
3    Regulation vs Symbolic Policy-Making: Genet-
ically Modified Organisms in the German States 
3.1    Introduction 
In the European Union, agricultural biotechnology policy represents a case of highly 
controversial, multi-level governance (see, e.g. Dobbs 2016). Within this multi-lay-
ered structure, regional entities evolved as weighty counterparts of the European 
Commission’s (henceforth: Commission) attempts to relax the market restrictions 
on introduction, and the regulation, of GMOs (see, e.g. Tosun and Shikano 2016; 
Hunt 2012). Furthermore, the regional level plays an increasingly important role in 
the creation and implementation of EU law and policies (see, e.g. Panara 2015; Bor-
ghetto and Franchino 2010), and – in at least some member states, where regional 
entities possess appropriate legal competences – has instituted stricter GMO regu-
lations than deﬁned at the national level (Seifert 2006b: 426). 
Once adopted, such regulations can entail far-reaching implications for regional 
actors along the entire food production chain.4 Moreover, such regulations may re-
quire further policy adjustments in adjacent policy ﬁelds such as the environment 
or climate (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2012: 263–264). However, despite these impli-
cations, regional units’ GMO policy-making has achieved only scant attention. To 
reduce this research gap, we investigate the underlying conditions needed for the 
German federal states (Länder) to adopt GMO-related policies and regulations. 
In principle, there should be little need for the German states to adopt GMO reg-
ulations. The EU’s GMO legislation is considered the most restrictive worldwide 
 
4 These actors include farmers cultivating GM crops, conventional and organic farmers, processors, 
the feed industry, livestock producers, the food industry, retailers and consumers (Joint Research 
Centre 2016: 20). 
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(Seifert 2011: 21), and German federal governments have enacted several regula-
tions – for instance, a 2009 cultivation ban on MON810 (Katzek 2014). The latter has 
since ended up commercial GM crop cultivations on German territory. Therefore, 
we argue that state governments, instead of rigid regulations, employ symbolic pol-
icy-making to signal their GMO-adverse stances to the electorate; thereby respond-
ing to the German population’s broad rejection of GMOs in food and agriculture 
(see, e.g. European Commission 2010b). 
The most important possibility to apply symbolic policy-making with respect to 
GMOs for a regional unit in the EU is to become a member of the European GMO-
Free Regions Network. This is a transnational network of subnational units oppos-
ing the Commission’s attempts to liberalise the market’s introduction, and the reg-
ulation, of GMOs in the EU (Tosun and Shikano 2016: 744). Membership in the net-
work appears largely symbolic, as it does not bring about material regulations per 
se. Rather, accession to the network is highly visible in the media and therefore 
could be used by regional governments to signal GMO-adverse stances to the elec-
torate. Currently 11 of the 16 German states have joined the network, while ﬁve 
states have not. Considering these facts, our ﬁrst research question is as follows: 
What conditions German states’ accessions to the GMO-free network? 
Some states have instituted additional GMO regulations – which we refer to here 
in a very broad sense as governmental interventions seeking to inﬂuence the behav-
iour of societal actors (see, Levi-Faur 2010). More precisely, the states have estab-
lished largely varying regulations, which in most cases are stricter than the rules in 
place on a national level. Given that the German states are diverse in many respects, 
the second research question aims at identifying the crucial conditions for this reg-
ulatory variety: What conditions German states’ adoption of GMO regulations? 
To assess these questions, we ﬁrst collated the states’ GMO-related policies using 
desk research and expert interviews.5 
 
5 We conducted expert interviews with representatives of the GMO-competent ministries of the fol-
lowing states: Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and 
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In a second step, we constructed a composite index which, besides regulations, 
comprises policies related to GMOs for each state in the period from 2010 to 2015. 
Using this index and membership in the European GMO-Free Regions Network as 
two separate outcomes in a fuzzy set of qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), 
we investigated the conditions for both outcomes. For explaining the two outcomes, 
we analysed whether several conditions were necessary and/or sufﬁcient for the 
outcomes (for an overview, see Table 4 below). We selected these conditions based 
on previous research concerned with political drivers for the adoption of GMO reg-
ulations (Mühlböck and Tosun 2018; Bäck et al. 2015; Tosun and Shikano 2016; To-
sun 2014), and the underlying factors for the adoption or rejection of GM crops by 
farmers (Consmüller et al. 2010; 2011; Consmüller et al. 2009). 
One ﬁnding of the study is that the Green Party, as well as afﬁliated ministers, 
does not represent the predominant condition for a state’s adoption of GMO-related 
policies or regulations. However, Green ministers were leading drivers for states’ 
accession to the GMO-free network, thus signalling a GMO-adverse stance to the 
electorate. More-over, we reveal the differing regulatory action of CDU/CSU in the 
western and eastern states, which can be explained by farmers’ differing interests. 
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that SPD ministers regulated GMOs much like the other par-
ties, but presumably for other reasons such as coalition internal pressure. Finally, 
strong environmental interest groups were found to have positively conditioned 
symbolic policy-making, but with seemingly no effect on the adoption of concrete 
GMO regulations. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: In the ﬁrst section, we out-
line the regulatory background on the German national and EU level. After intro-
ducing the German state’s various GMO policies in section two, we continue by 
presenting our theoretical reasoning, the hypotheses and the control variables in 
section three. In section four we clarify the methodology employed, before we turn 
 
Thuringia. The ministries from the other states were not willing to participate in such interviews. All 
interviews can be requested from the author. 
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to the results of the fsQCA in section ﬁve. The paper ends with a discussion of the 
empirical ﬁndings and some concluding remarks. 
3.2    The Regulatory Context 
The most important regulation in place in Germany is the cultivation ban on Mon-
santo’s GM maize MON810 imposed by the federal government in 2009.6 German 
farmers had cultivated the crop on relatively small areas from 2005 to 2009 until the 
ban denoted the end of commercial GM crop cultivations in Germany (see, Federal 
Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety 2019). The reason for this is that 
MON810 was – and still is – the only GMO authorised for commercial cultivation 
in the EU. Moreover, in comparison to the other member states, the German coex-
istence regulations comprise strict ex post liability rules and moderate ex ante reg-
ulations (Consmüller et al. 2009: 49). 
Besides commercial cultivation, the number of scientiﬁc ﬁeld plots conducted by 
universities, other public research institutions and companies, decreased 
signiﬁcantly from 2000. Since 2014 ﬁeld trials have no longer been conducted on 
German territory (see, Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety 2019). 
One important reason for this was that the ﬁeld trials have often been accompanied 
by riots occupying the land and destroying the plantings (Kuntz 2012). German fed-
eral governments introduced two further GMO-related policies: First a national pro-
tein strategy fostering the production of domestic protein crops for feed use, thereby 
reducing the high dependency on imports of GM soy products, was adopted in 2014 
(Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2019). Second, a GMO-free food label 
(‘Ohne Gentechnik’) was established, which is supposed to keep consumers better 
informed about food products that do not contain and were not produced using 
GMOs (see, European Commission 2013). 
 
6 The section is limited to the most prominent regulatory aspects in Germany. For more comprehen-
sive investigations, see Katzek (2014), Cooper (2009) and Boschert and Gill (2005). 
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Moreover, the federal government made use of Directive 2015/412 and banned 
all eight GM maize varieties pending approval on an EU level before they were au-
thorised for commercial cultivation.7 Besides, the directive provides the member 
states the possibility to restrict or prohibit the cultivation in the aftermath of grant-
ing authorisation at the EU level. The federal government is willing to make use of 
this option, but until now it has been unclear whether such cultivation bans should 
be imposed by the federal government, the individual states or both combined. 
Altogether German federal governments have implemented regulations which 
vastly delimit (and will further constrain) the application of GMOs in food and ag-
riculture. These national regulations add to a regulatory regime in place at EU level, 
which is regarded as one of the most restrictive worldwide due to its weighty risk 
assessment and approval system, the relevance of the precautionary principle and 
the traceability and labelling regime (Seifert 2011: 22). Despite these regulations, 
several German states have imposed additional regulations and GMO-related poli-
cies, to which we will turn to in the following section. 
3.3    The Variety of GMO Policies existing at State Level 
The various GMO-related policy measures adopted by the German states are dis-
played in Table 4. Most of the states became ofﬁcial members of the European GMO-
Free Regions Network by signing the Florence Charter; an ofﬁcial document which 
obligates its members – currently 64 European regions – to protect GM-free agricul-
ture on their territories. As indicated above, the network has functioned as a coun-
terpart of the Commission’s attempts to liberalise GMO legislation, but for its mem-
bers, it does not bring about any material regulations. Rather, becoming a member 
of the network offers regional governments the possibility to ofﬁcially signal GMO-
adverse positions to the public via highly visible media. 
 
7 The requests submitted to the Commission, among others, referred to the GM maize varieties 
MON810 (Monsanto) (re-authorisation), TC 1507 (Pioneer Hi-Bred/Mycogen Seeds) and 1507×59122 
(Dow AgroSciences) (European Commission 2019c). 
 76 
 
The ﬁrst regulation included in the index refers to a general ban on GM crops on 
agriculture areas owned by a state. This measure is enabled by inserting a certain 
clause into a state’s leasing contracts, which forbids farmers to cultivate any GM 
crops on areas leased from the respective state. This regulation refers only to new 
lease contracts but does not touch pre-existing lease contracts (GMO-free Regions 
in Germany 2019a). The second regulation refers to cultivation bans on GM crops 
around nature reserves. This provision can be effectuated by an amendment of a 
state’s nature protection act and has been imposed by four states. These states, how-
ever, have prescribed varying distances for GM plantings to these areas; for in-
stance, Baden-Wuerttemberg prohibited GM crops in a radius of 3000 metres to the 
borders of protected areas (MLR 2014), while in Brandenburg 800 metres are re-
quired (Venus et al. 2017: 410).8 
Several states have introduced regional quality labels, which are supposed to 
guide consumers to identify regional, high quality and GMO-free food products. 
The integrity of these GMO-free labels is a major concern, as they comprise the 
‘GMO-free’ (‘Ohne Gentechnik’) standard introduced on a national level in 2009. 
EU Regulation 1829/2003 requires food and feed containing GMOs to be labelled. 
However, products originating from animals fed with GM feed are exempt from the 
labelling obligations, and therefore many foods in retail are produced with GMOs 
but cannot be identiﬁed as such by the consumer (Venus et al. 2012). Due to in-
creased consumer demands for GMO-free food, German retailers have considerably 
expanded their GMO-free labelled food products (see, European Commission 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
8 We did not take the varying distances into further account for the indexing. Rather, we calibrated 
according to the mere absence or presence of such bans around nature reserves. 
 77 
 
Table 4. Overview over the Outcomes in the German Federal States 
Federal state Signalling Regulations Associated 
measures 
Index 
score 
 GMO-
Free 
Net-
work 
Ban on 
state-
owned 
ground 
Ban 
around 
nature 
reserves 
Regional 
quality 
label 
Protein 
strategy 
Baden-Wuerttemberg X X X X X 1 
Bavaria X  X X X 1 
Berlin      0 
Brandenburg   X   0,6 
Bremen X X  X  0,8 
Hamburg X X    0,6 
Hesse X X  X  0,8 
Lower Saxony X     0 
Mecklenburg-West P.    X X 0,8 
North Rhine-W. X X   X 0,8 
Rhineland-Palatine X     0 
Saarland X     0 
Saxony      0 
Saxony-Anhalt      0 
Schleswig-Holstein X  X   0,6   
Thuringia X X   X 0,8 
Source: GMO-free Regions in Germany (2019a), expert interviews, desktop research.  
Notes: “x” refers to the presence of the respective policy measure; the index score represents the 
calibrated value. 
Finally, some states have adopted regional protein strategies, fostering the culti-
vation of protein crops for feed use. These policies do not aim at restricting the use 
of GMOs directly. Rather, these policies aim at substituting feed products contain-
ing GM ingredients with non-GM feed. The background for the adoption of these 
policies is that consumers increasingly demand GM-free animal products, but Ger-
many’s animal-based food industry is highly dependent on imported GM feed 
products (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2015b: 10–11). Based on whether the 
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German states have adopted the policies outlined above, we constructed an index 
score, which we employ as the second outcome in the fsQCA. 
3.4    Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses 
The adoption of GMO regulations has been studied from various research perspec-
tives. Although we attempt to identify the crucial factors for such regulations, the-
orising all possible conditions would overstretch this piece of research. Hence, we 
follow a theoretical approach, which puts its emphasis on actors which should be 
especially decisive for the adoption of GMO regulations. For this reason, we focus 
on the role of two actor groups. First, political parties in state governments and 
GMO-competent ministers afﬁliated to these parties. Second, regionally organised 
environmental interest groups. Due to this actor-centred approach, many other the-
oretical factors are not speciﬁed here but are summarised as control variables in the 
following section. 
3.4.1    Political Parties 
Why should political parties establish GMO regulations? To address this question 
theoretically, we depart from the basic assumption that political parties are gener-
ally driven by three political objectives: vote-seeking, policy-seeking and ofﬁce-
seeking (see, e.g. Strøm 1990).9 As vote-seeking and policy-seeking seem more im-
portant for a party’s policy-making, we subsequently focus on these two aspects. 
In principle, the GMO issue should provide political parties an opportune policy 
ﬁeld for vote-seeking activities, as due to the perceived risks for human health and 
the environment, many citizens in multiple member states reject GMOs. In Ger-
many, polls show consistently low public support for GMOs (European Commis-
sion 2010b; see, also Federal Ministry for the Environment and Federal Agency for 
Nature Conservation 2015: 38). Hence, political parties oriented to the average voter 
 
9 Strøm (1990) emphasised the uncertainty about which of the three factors is predominant for polit-
ical parties’ positioning and policy-making on certain issues. 
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could adopt GMO-adverse positions and communicate these publicly to increase 
the vote share in upcoming elections. In contrast, the vote-seeking potentials for 
parties in favour of GMOs are currently rather low, especially if a party is oriented 
to the average voter and not a speciﬁc electorate which might advocate GM agricul-
ture. From this perspective, parties could be expected to align their policy-making 
to public opinion. In the case of Germany, this would mean that political parties 
would offer GMO restrictive policies to the electorate. However, Tosun (2014: 367) 
argues convincingly that GMOs represent a very speciﬁc issue and thus cannot be 
expected to be predominant in inﬂuencing voting decisions. 
Particularly during the 1990s and 2000s, political parties in Germany advocated 
GMOs for policy-seeking reasons, the most important being the increased produc-
tivity of agriculture (Boschert and Gill 2005). Still, some parties might hold positive 
stances on GMOs due to genuine policy-seeking considerations. Although GMOs 
have not (yet) proven beneﬁcial for Western consumers, research has emphasised 
several beneﬁts provided by GMOs, such as decreasing pesticide use and climate 
emissions or increasing biodiversity (see, Venus et al. 2012: 94). These examples 
show that political parties might not only have reasons for refusing (vote-seeking), 
but also reasons for supporting GM technology (policy-seeking). 
Certainly, vote-seeking and policy-seeking inﬂuence whether and how political 
parties in government or certain ministers regulate GMOs. Particularly, research 
could conﬁrm that the GMO issue mobilises citizens in the EU, and that public opin-
ion is a major factor determining how parties and governments position themselves 
on the issue (see, e.g. Mühlböck and Tosun 2018; Katzek 2014; Cooper 2009; Seifert 
2009; Tiberghien 2009). Seifert (2009), for instance, found a strong relationship be-
tween a GMO-hostile public and the introduction of strict GMO regulations in Aus-
tria. 
However, deriving hypotheses from party-internal vote-seeking and/or policy-
seeking calculations is extremely difﬁcult, as these are rather hard to theorise. Hence 
several studies indicate that the most reasonable basis for deriving theoretically 
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well-informed hypotheses for whether political parties adopt GMO regulations is 
to depart from their speciﬁc partisan ideologies (see, e.g. Tosun and Shikano 2016; 
Tosun 2014) – a theoretical approach, which we adopt in the following section while 
also including vote- and policy-seeking considerations. 
Partisan ideologies – and the electorate’s identiﬁcation with these – are critical 
for whether or how a political party will consider a certain issue as politically salient 
and bring about certain policy offers, which ultimately materialise, for instance, in 
regulations. Budge (1994) argued that political parties confronted with a lack of in-
formation – scientiﬁc uncertainty over risks – tend to base policy decisions fre-
quently on their partisan ideology. This argument is applicable to GMOs since GM 
agriculture is characterised by high levels of scientiﬁc uncertainty with regard to 
potential side effects on human health and the environment. 
In the following, we develop various hypotheses regarding the three most im-
portant political parties at the state level in Germany: the Greens, CDU/CSU and 
the SPD.10 While the CDU/CSU traditionally represent agricultural interests (see, 
e.g. Linhart 2010), the Greens have more recently developed as a competing party 
with distinct interests in the ﬁeld of agriculture. In contrast, (GM) agriculture is not 
considered a major issue for the SPD. At state level in Germany, individual minis-
ters are rather autonomous and may use this leeway to draft and implement certain 
policies which fall within their department’s competences. Therefore, besides the 
partisan composition of governments, we also analyse the effects of ministers in 
charge of GMOs. These ministers can be ministers of agriculture and/or the envi-
ronment. 
At the federal level, the Greens have proven to be a leading party advocating 
strict GMO regulations since the early 1990s (Katzek 2014; Cooper 2009). The Greens 
advocate for, inter alia, the protection of the environment and animals and an eco-
logically sustainable agriculture (Probst 2013: 174–175). Therefore, the party 
 
10 We also included the Liberal Party (FDP) and The Left (Die Linke) in the data set, however, these 
parties are not theorised here, as both are electorally less relevant compared to the other three parties. 
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emphasises the relevance of the precautionary principle to avoid irreversible risks 
stemming from practices of modern agriculture. From this position, the Greens con-
sider GMOs to endanger their environmental protection goals. GMOs are seen to 
come along with risks for the environment, respectively biodiversity, animals and 
human health. More-over, since the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, 
the Greens increasingly advocate consumer protection and oppose GM feed and 
food accordingly. Hence, the ﬁrst hypothesis is very straightforward: 
H1 The Greens in government and GMO-competent ministers afﬁliated 
to this party lead to strict regulations. 
The CDU and its Bavarian sister-party CSU both belong to the family of Christian 
Democratic parties. However, the parties have liberalised their religious and ethi-
cal-moral stances considerably since 1982 and positioned themselves more liberally 
on economic and social issues (Bösch 2013: 211–213). Especially the CDU along with 
their Christian orientation stresses liberal and conservative aspects to attract 
Protestant voters. However, the CDU’s basic party programme from 2009 still 
states, for instance, a ‘responsibility in front of God’ and the ‘Christian idea of man’ 
(Bösch 2013: 213). Due to their religious and ethical values, both parties can be ex-
pected to increase the chances of restrictive GMO policies as these might be consid-
ered to contradict their religious values. From this position, GMOs could be consid-
ered as ‘unnatural’ interventions into creation, that should be further regulated. 
However, the parties’ positions towards GMOs is less clear, as both are leading 
supporters of a highly competitive and modern agriculture in economic terms. The 
CDU and CSU parties speak out for a realistic agricultural policy, stressing the 
efﬁciency and affordability of food. Hence, from this position, the parties could be 
expected to advocate GM agriculture. Due to this discrepancy, we draw on previous 
research presented by Bäck et al. (2015) and Tosun (2014), who found an increased 
probability of the adoption of cultivation bans if Christian Democratic parties par-
ticipate in national governments. From this we infer the following hypothesis: 
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H2 CDU/CSU in government and GMO-competent ministers afﬁliated to 
these parties lead to strict regulations. 
The SPD is characterised by a socialist partisan ideology wherefore the party is 
primarily oriented towards social justice and employment-related issues. Accord-
ingly, the party focusses on policy ﬁelds such as social policy and economic policy. 
Moreover, the party has developed interests in environmental and climate policy 
due to changes in its electorate (Jun 2013: 396–398). However, agriculture is not a 
major ﬁeld of action for the SPD. Accordingly, the SPD seems to have a less clear-
cut position with regard to GMOs. Additionally, as its electorate may not be highly 
interested in the issue, we do not expect the party (and ministers afﬁliated to it) to 
advocate GM agriculture, or to adopt further regulations. 
H3 The SPD in government and GMO-competent ministers afﬁliated to 
this party have no effect on GMO regulation. 
3.4.2    Environmental Interest Groups 
The GMO issue has provoked mobilisation and polarisation among various actor 
groups in Germany, whereupon GMO-adverse actors have increasingly overcome 
the inﬂuence of agribiotech-friendly actors. Environmental interest groups have 
proven as highly inﬂuential in framing the regulatory discourse, mobilising the 
public against GMOs and inﬂuencing regulatory decision-making at a national level 
in Germany (see, e.g. Paarlberg 2014; Kurzer and Cooper 2007; Schurman and 
Munro 2006). Therefore, besides political parties, we also focus theoretically on the 
role of these anti-GMO groups in the adoption of restrictive GMO policies.11 
Environmental interest groups are intrinsically tied to issues such as environ-
mental protection, sustainability, and biodiversity. As GMOs are considered to en-
danger these objectives, GM technology and the resulting products are rejected 
principally. However, these groups might have another motivation to deal with the 
 
11 As no appropriate data exists for GMO-friendly actor groups, we could not include these in the 
fsQCA. 
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GMO issue: to address the contested issue in such a way that mobilises the public 
to become members of these organisations. A substantial number of members is 
critical for these organisations, as this determines the manpower and ﬁnancial re-
sources required for successful campaigning. High membership numbers allow 
them, for instance, to exert direct inﬂuence on vote-maximising political parties, as 
members are also voters. 
Although environmental interest groups use various means in lobbying for their 
objectives, the extent of membership seems to be an appropriate measure for their 
inﬂuence on discourses, public mobilisation and regulatory decision-making in re-
gional spheres. Accordingly, we have included ofﬁcial membership data for two 
important environmental interest groups in our dataset: Friends of the Earth 
(BUND) and the Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU).12 Consmül-
ler et al. (2010), for instance, found a negative effect of the number of BUND mem-
bers on farmers’ adoption of MON810 across the German states. We argue that the 
resources of these organisations have positive effects on the adoption of GMO-re-
lated policies: 
H4 Powerful environmental interest groups lead to strict GMO regula-
tions on a regional level. 
3.5    Control Variables 
The dataset comprises of several control variables, which were partially adopted 
from previous studies interested in GMO regulation. The ﬁrst condition we control 
refers to the divide between the eastern and the western states, which stems from 
the period of Soviet reign in eastern German states (Dalton and Weldon 2010). The 
second condition controls post-materialist values, which are regarded as crucial for 
the persistent controversies over GMOs. Inglehart (1971) stated that countries tend 
to be characterised by more post-materialist values as their gross domestic product 
 
12 We also asked Greenpeace for membership data, however they were not willing to provide such 
data. 
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(GDP) per capita increases. Accordingly, we use GDP as the indicator for post-ma-
terialist values in the states. Thirdly, we control political participation, measured by 
the voter turnout, to take into account the pressure regional citizens might exert on 
political actors. The fourth control variable refers to socio-economic pressures stem-
ming from GM crop plantings on a state’s territory, measured by the proportional 
areas on which GM crops have been cultivated and ﬁeld trials were conducted.13 
The ﬁfth control relates to the cultivation of conventional maize, as such plantings 
might function as substantial equivalents to MON810 on the one side and, on the 
other side, could be affected by MON810 plantings in the vicinity due to pollen out-
crossing. 
The sixth condition controls organic farming measured as the share of organic 
agri-culture from total agricultural areas. Seventh, we included a control for large-
scale farming, as previous research indicated that the preservation of coexistence 
between organic, conventional and GM agriculture is difﬁcult to achieve, especially 
in small structured areas where the risk of cross-pollination from GM crops grown 
near conventional or organic crops is higher than in large-scale agriculture. Eighth, 
as GM agriculture might reduce the attractiveness of a region for tourists, we in-
cluded tourism measured by the relative number of overnight stays per state. As 
GM agriculture may affect tourism especially in rural areas, we further control rural 
tourism measured by the relative number of farmers offering holiday stays. Finally, 
it should be noted that some studies have emphasised the high relevance of public 
opinion for the adoption of GMO regulations (see, e.g. Legge and Durant 2010; Ber-
nauer and Meins 2003). However, unfortunately, we could not include a control for 
public opinion as the required data is not available at a state level in Germany. 
 
13 Such plantings might have contradictory effects on regulations: On the one hand, they might pro-
voke resistance by regional publics and various other actors. On the other hand, agbiotech compa-
nies, farmers and other food chain actors might advocate for a preservation of the regulatory status 
quo or for more permissive regulations. For these actors, regulations would mean considerable costs 
in respect of losses, whereas they would further beneﬁt from the status quo or beneﬁt even more 
from cut-backs on existing regulations (see, e.g. Venus et al. 2017). 
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3.6    Methodological Approach: Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis 
To explain the different positioning of the Länder regarding GMO regulation we 
apply fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, a method based on Boolean alge-
bra. The goal of the method is to identify necessary and/or sufﬁcient conditions for 
a speciﬁc outcome (see, e.g. Ragin 2006; 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). From 
our point of view, fsQCA is suitable for the analysis of the research question for at 
least three reasons. 
Firstly, it seems reasonable to assume that the conjunction of various conditions 
might cause the positioning of the German states on GMO regulation issues rather 
than individual independent factors. Accordingly, it is assumed that explanatory 
factors may interactively cause speciﬁc policy outcomes. Furthermore, the concept 
of equiﬁnality is one of the main advantages of fsQCA. Equiﬁnality means ‘a sce-
nario in which alternative factors can produce the same outcome’ (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012: 5). This assumption is appropriate for our analysis because it 
seems plausible that the same outcome might be caused by different paths, which 
means different combinations of conditions. Secondly, fsQCA is a method which is 
suitable for the systematic analysis of a medium number of cases. This applies to 
our research question of how the 16 Länder position themselves on GMO regulation 
issues. 
Thirdly, QCA makes use of the concept of necessity and sufﬁciency, a differenti-
ation we believe to be helpful when analysing Länder positioning towards GMO 
regulation and accession to the GMO-free network; as it seems plausible to us that 
some of the conditions may be necessary, but not sufﬁcient for the outcome, or the 
other way around. In the following, we will ﬁrst test whether single conditions are 
necessary for accession to the GMO-free network or a speciﬁc positioning of a fed-
eral state on GMO regulation respectively. This means that we are looking for fac-
tors that are present in all cases displaying this speciﬁc outcome. In a second step, 
we check whether there are conditions or combinations of conditions which are 
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sufﬁcient for the outcome. This means that we are searching for conditions or 
combi-nations of conditions which are characteristic for the cases displaying a 
speciﬁc position on a GMO outcome and not characteristic by the cases not having 
this position. 
On the other hand, QCA also bears several speciﬁc characteristics that must be 
dealt with. Among others, the calibration of the data is required, bringing a subjec-
tive element into the analysis. Therefore, all our calibration decisions can be checked 
up in Table A3 which provides an overview of the calibration of the conditions. The 
outcomes of the German states’ positions on GMO regulation are displayed in Table 
4 above. This provides the possibility to check the robustness of our calibration de-
cision. Furthermore, having only 16 cases for analysis leaves us with a high number 
of possible logical remainders when analysing sufﬁcient conditions. While neces-
sary conditions are usually tested separately, for sufﬁcient conditions we include 
only those conditions which seem to be the most important; to prevent the number 
of logical remainders from becoming too high. 
3.7    Empirical Findings 
Figure 5 gives an overview of the partisan afﬁliation of the state ministers of agri-
culture and/or the environment of all 16 German states in the period from 2010 to 
2015. The bar graphs indicate that these ministers were mostly afﬁliated to the 
CDU/CSU or Greens, where the Union parties slightly predominate in agriculture 
ministries, and the Greens in the ministries of the environment. Whilst the position 
of Green ministers on GMOs is rather straightforward, CDU/CSU ministers in 
charge of the issue might align their policy-making to different kinds of pressures, 
depending on the predominant kind of agriculture in a state (e.g. large-scale or or-
ganic agriculture) or whether farmers approve of GM agriculture. 
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Figure 5. The Party Affiliation of Ministers of Agriculture and Ministers of the En-
vironment of the German States, 2010-2015 
 
Source: own elaboration based on various online sources.  
Note: the data refers to 42 cabinets and displays absolute numbers. In some cases, ministries com-
prised agriculture and environmental issues. 
In the following, we will present the results of the analyses for necessity and 
sufﬁciency of the fsQCA which tests the hypotheses developed above. The results 
of the analysis of necessary conditions for the outcome ‘Accession to the GMO-free 
network’ are shown in Table 5.14 The consistency value thereby measures the degree 
to which the conditions are in fact empirically necessary for the outcome (the same 
applies to the test of sufﬁcient conditions below). In contrast, the coverage indicates 
how much of the outcome can be explained by the conditions; that is to say, how 
relevant the condition or combination of conditions is for the outcome (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012: 325).15 
  
 
14 For all calculations, we used the fsQCA program (Ragin et al. 2006). Please keep in mind that ∗ is 
the logical AND while + is the logical OR in fsQCA notation and ~ marks the negated condition/out-
come. 
15 Concerning the threshold of consistency, we follow the suggestions of Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012: 143) as well as Ragin (2006) and apply a threshold of 0.9 for necessary conditions. 
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Table 5. Necessary Conditions for the Outcome “Accession to the GMO-Free Net-
work” 
Condition Consistency Coverage Condition Consistency Coverage 
Green minister 0.67 1.00 ~Green minister 0.33 0.42 
CDU minister 0.43 0.61 ~CDU minister 0.57 0.76 
SPD minister 0.42 0.82 ~SPD minister 0.58 0.61 
East Germany 0.09 0.18 ~East Germany 0.91 0.97 
Maize cultiva-
tion 
0.51 0.71 ~Maize cultiva-
tion 
0.49 0.67 
Tourism 0.49 0.67 ~Tourism 0.51 0.71 
NABU-member-
ship rate 
0.64 0.95 ~ NABU-mem-
bership rate 
0.36 0.46 
BUND-member-
ship rate 
0.58 0.95 ~ BUND-mem-
bership rate 
0.42 0.50 
Voter turnout 0.73 0.86 ~Voter turnout 0.27 0.45 
GDP 0.67 0.92 ~GDP 0.33 0.46 
GM crop plant-
ings 
0.33 0.48 ~ GM crop plant-
ings 
0.67 0.88 
Organic farming 0.48 0.67 ~ Organic farm-
ing 
0.52 0.71 
Large scale 
farming 
0.33 0.48 ~ Large scale 
farming 
0.67 0.88 
Rural tourism 0.48 0.73 ~ Rural tourism 0.52 0.65 
Source: own calculation. Consistent conditions are marked bold. 
The results of the test for necessity indicate that there is one condition that fulﬁls 
the criteria of a necessary condition: Not being an Eastern state. This means that 
being part of the set of ‘western states’ is consistently and highly necessary for ac-
cession to the GMO-free network. Accordingly, while all western states are mem-
bers of the network, of the eastern states only Thuringia is a member. Notably, Thu-
ringia was also the ﬁrst German state which joined (and remained in) the GMO-free 
network in 2010.16 A partisan explanation of this ﬁnding is insufﬁcient as the state 
joined the network under a coalition of CDU and SPD with a GMO-competent CDU 
minister. However, in an interview the Thuringian representative emphasised that 
 
16 The ﬁrst state which joined the network was Schleswig-Holstein in 2003. However, after changes 
in governments the state ﬁrst abandoned the network in 2005 and then re-entered it in 2012. 
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the promising prospects for organic agriculture were the reason for joining the net-
work at that time. Thuringia supported the development of organic farming with 
the goal to increase the share of organic agriculture areas to 10 percent in 2020. 
Against this background, it seems plausible that the CDU minister has given in to 
the prospects of organic agriculture, a decision that would have been further facili-
tated by the fact that farmers were in any case not allowed to grow MON810 since 
2009. All other conditions tested for necessity do not fulﬁl the criteria of consistency. 
Table 6. Sufficient Conditions for the Outcome “Accession to the GMO-Free Net-
work” 
Condition Consistency Coverage Condition Consistency Coverage 
Green minister 1.00 0.67 ~Green minister 0.42 0.33 
CDU minister 0.61 0.43 ~CDU minister 0.76 0.57 
SPD minister 0.82 0.42 ~SPD minister 0.61 0.58 
East Germany 0.18 0.09 ~East Germany 0.97 0.91 
Maize cultiva-
tion 
0.71 0.51 ~Maize cultiva-
tion 
0.67 0.49 
Tourism 0.67 0.49 ~Tourism 0.71 0.51 
NABU-mem-
bership rate 
0.95 0.64 ~ NABU-mem-
bership rate 
0.46 0.36 
BUND-mem-
bership rate 
0.95 0.58 ~ BUND-mem-
bership rate 
0.50 0.42 
Voter turnout 0.86 0.73 ~Voter turnout 0.45 0.27 
GDP 0.92 0.67 ~GDP 0.46 0.33 
GM crop plant-
ings 
0.48 0.33 ~ GM crop plant-
ings 
0.88 0.67 
Organic farming 0.67 0.48 ~ Organic farm-
ing 
0.71 0.52 
Large scale 
farming 
0.48 0.33 ~ Large scale 
farming 
0.88 0.67 
Rural tourism 0.73 0.48 ~ Rural tourism 0.65 0.52 
Source: own calculation. Consistent conditions above a consistency threshold of 0.85 are marked 
bold; consistent conditions above 0.75 in italics. 
The analysis of sufﬁcient conditions for the outcome ‘Accession to the GMO-free 
network’ are displayed in Table 6. The results reveal that there are many conditions 
which are sufﬁcient for the outcome. If a rather conservative consistency threshold 
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of 0.85 is chosen, eight conditions are sufﬁcient for accession to the GMO-free net-
work,17 of which some – of course – might be interrelated: A Green minister in 
charge of the policy ﬁeld, high NABU and BUND membership rates, a high voter 
turnout, a comparably high GDP, being a western state, as well as being a member 
of a state with no or rather low GM crop plantings and large-scale farming. Further-
more, if a more relaxed threshold for sufﬁciency of 0.75 is chosen, the set of states 
with a high share of SPD ministers as well as those with a low share of CDU minis-
ters becomes sufﬁcient.18 
Turning to the results for the outcome of a high GMO regulation index score Ta-
ble 7 shows that there are no necessary conditions for a high score in the GMO reg-
ulation index. This is an interesting ﬁnding in itself because it means that, for exam-
ple, states with a high membership score for ministers of all three party families 
tested have implemented rather strict GMO regulations. The same applies for east-
ern and western German states as well as states with rather high and low levels of 
maize cultivation, tourism, rural tourism, NABU and BUND membership rates, 
voter turnout, GDP, GM crop plantings as well as organic and large-scale farming.  
Also, the results of the test for sufﬁciency for high GMO regulation reveal that 
there are no conditions which are alone consistently sufﬁcient conditions for the 
outcome. This shows that explaining hard regulation is much less straightforward 
than explaining the signalling of an accession to the GMO-free network above (Ta-
ble 8). 
  
 
17 For sufﬁcient conditions, we take a two-step approach and implement a rather conservative thresh-
old for consistency of 0.85 (marked bold) and a second threshold of 0.75 for sufﬁcient conditions as 
suggested in the literature (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 279; in italics). 
18 We do not display the results for the test for sufﬁcient conditions for the combination of two or 
more conditions here due to the already very high number of single conditions being sufﬁcient for 
the outcome. 
 91 
 
Table 7. Necessary Conditions for the Outcome “GMO-Regulation Index Score” 
Condition Consistency Coverage Condition Consistency Coverage 
Green minister 0.56 0.59 ~Green minister 0.54 0.48 
CDU minister 0.56 0.57 ~CDU minister 0.55 0.52 
SPD minister 0.38 0.53 ~SPD minister 0.62 0.46 
East Germany 0.28 0.39 ~East Germany 0.72 0.54 
Maize cultiva-
tion 
0.64 0.63 ~Maize cultiva-
tion 
0.52 0.51 
Tourism 0.60 0.58 ~Tourism 0.54 0.53 
NABU-mem-
bership rate 
0.49 0.53 ~ NABU-mem-
bership rate 
0.67 0.60 
BUND-mem-
bership rate 
0.52 0.61 ~ BUND-mem-
bership rate 
0.59 0.49 
Voter turnout 0.65 0.54 ~Voter turnout 0.47 0.55 
GDP 0.67 0.65 ~GDP 0.40 0.39 
GM crop plant-
ings 
0.52 0.53 ~ GM crop 
plantings 
0.60 0.56 
Organic farm-
ing 
0.57 0.56 ~ Organic farm-
ing 
0.45 0.44 
Large scale 
farming 
0.44 0.45 ~ Large scale 
farming 
0.65 0.61 
Rural tourism 0.56 0.60 ~ Rural tourism 0.56 0.50 
Source: own calculation. No consistent conditions. 
Accordingly, we also tested whether the combination of two or more conditions 
is sufﬁcient for being a member of the set of states with high GMO regulation. As 
we have only 16 cases, we cannot test all 14 conditions separately in one model be-
cause of the enormous number of logical remainders that would result from this 
procedure. Correspondingly, we opt for testing the three partisan conditions we are 
most interested in, as well as the three conditions (from the environmental interest 
groups we chose NABU) that were highly sufﬁcient (above 0.9) for accession to the 
GMO-free network. Concerning the treatment of the logical remainders, the ‘Stand-
ard analysis’ option of the fs/QCA programme of Ragin et al. (2006), as suggested 
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by Ragin (2008), was applied to derive the parsimonious solution.19 The most parsi-
monious solution term is the superset of the paths that form the complex or con-
servative solution (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 151–193). 
Table 8. Single Sufficient Conditions for the Outcome “GMO-Regulation Index 
Score” 
Condition Consistency  Coverage Condition Consistency  Coverage 
Green minister 0.59 0.56 ~Green minister 0.48 0.54 
CDU minister 0.57 0.56 ~CDU minister 0.52 0.55 
SPD minister 0.53 0.38 ~SPD minister 0.46 0.62 
East Germany 0.39 0.28 ~East Germany 0.54 0.72 
Maize cultiva-
tion 
0.63 0.64 ~Maize cultiva-
tion 
0.51 0.52 
Tourism 0.58 0.60 ~Tourism 0.53 0.54 
NABU-mem-
bership rate 
0.53 0.49 ~ NABU-mem-
bership rate 
0.60 0.67 
BUND-mem-
bership rate 
0.61 0.52 ~ BUND-mem-
bership rate 
0.49 0.59 
Voter turnout 0.54 0.65 ~Voter turnout 0.55 0.47 
GDP 0.65 0.67 ~GDP 0.39 0.40 
GM crop plant-
ings 
0.53 0.52 ~ GM crop 
plantings 
0.56 0.60 
Organic farm-
ing 
0.56 0.57 ~ Organic farm-
ing 
0.44 0.45 
Large scale 
farming 
0.45 0.44 ~ Large scale 
farming 
0.61 0.65 
Rural tourism 0.60 0.56 ~ Rural tourism 0.50 0.56 
Source: own calculation. No consistent conditions. 
The results displayed in Table 9 show that there were two consistent paths which 
form a sufﬁcient condition for a high GMO regulation index in the German states. 
The ﬁrst path comprises of all states with moderately low scores in the set of coun-
tries with CDU ministers in charge of GMO regulation, as well as moderately low 
NABU membership rates. Put differently, in these states SPD or Green ministers 
 
19 Due to space constraints, we only display the parsimonious solution as well as the results for the 
positive outcome for all outcomes here. The results for the negated outcomes as well as for the com-
plex and intermediate solution of the test of sufﬁciency for the outcome of a high GMO regulation 
index score are available in the online appendix. 
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working in combination with low NABU membership rates conditioned the adop-
tion of GMO regulations. This path comprises Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Thu-
ringia, Brandenburg and Bremen. 
Table 9. Combined Sufficient Conditions for the Outcome “GMO-Regulation In-
dex Score” 
Solution Term 
(Parsimonious 
Solution) 
~CDU minister*~NABU-membership rate + Green minister*CDU 
minister → GMO-regulation index score 
Variables 
Entered 
Green minister; CDU minister; SPD minister; East Germany; NABU-
membership rate; GDP 
Ideal Type ~CDU minister* 
~NABU-membership 
rate 
Green minister*CDU minister 
Federal States 
covered 
Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania (1,0.8), 
Thuringia (1,0.8), 
Brandenburg (0.67,0.6), 
Bremen (0.67,0.8) 
Baden-Wuerttemberg (0.67,1), 
Hamburg (0.67,0.6), Hesse (0.67,0.8), North 
Rhine-Westphalia (0.67,0.8), 
Schleswig-Holstein (0.67,0.6) 
Consistency 0.89 0.96 
Raw Coverage 0.49 0.41 
Unique 
Coverage 0.37 0.28 
Solution Consistency: 0.91 
Solution Coverage: 0.78 
The second path consists of all states with high membership scores in the set of 
Green and CDU ministers in charge of GMO regulation, and covers the ﬁve states 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hamburg, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-
Holstein. Notably, all these states belong to the set of ‘western states’ which are 
characterised by no or moderately low GM crop cultivations. This may have made 
it easier for key politicians from both political parties to adopt further GMO regula-
tions, as their relevance for farmers was anyway rather low and disappeared en-
tirely with the ban on MON810. Bavaria, for instance, has been a supporter of GM 
agriculture for years. However, only CSU ministers in charge of GMOs have en-
acted several regulations between 2010 and 2015, the period that followed the ban 
on MON810. 
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3.8    Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The study analysed the policy variation of the German states with regard to GMOs 
in the period from 2010 to 2015. We differentiated between two types of policies: 
ﬁrst, becoming a member of the GMO-free network, a highly visible act signalling 
a government’s GMO-adverse stance; second, the adoption of regulatory/policy 
measures, which were captured by a composite index. We provided various theo-
retical explanations for the variation of both outcomes, which were subsequently 
tested by fsQCA. The results show that Green ministers were the leading drivers for 
accessions to the GMO-free network. Possibly, Green ministers intended to signal 
their GMO-adverse standpoint due to the party’s electorate, which is highly op-
posed to GMOs for reasons of nature and consumer protection. Moreover, the 
Greens might employ symbolic policy-making to attract voters beyond its elec-
torate, but also because they are concerned about the risk technology. However, we 
did not identify the Greens or their ministers as predominant conditions for the 
adoption of GMO policies. As indicated, this might be due to the relatively little 
need for the states to adopt such regulations, which applies to the Greens just as to 
the other parties. In sum, these ﬁndings contradict our theoretical reasoning under-
lying H1. 
For CDU and CSU we did not ﬁnd consistent effects on both outcomes of interest. 
This is a result which contradicts H2. Notably, the two parties regulated GMOs in 
the western states, while they abstained from regulating in the eastern states where 
GM crops were mainly cultivated. This ﬁnding might be explained by the internal 
divisions within these parties. Presumably, Christian beliefs are more relevant in 
the western states; in contrast, these beliefs might be overlaid by a more positive 
view of a productive agriculture, a less romantic view of the environment or less 
sceptical consumers in the eastern states. 
Another possible explanation is that CDU and CSU are the leading parties repre-
senting agricultural interests, wherefore they refrained from regulating GMOs in 
the eastern states where GM farmers beneﬁted from higher yields, while they 
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adopted such regulations in western states where farmers mostly refused GM agri-
culture. This interpretation corresponds with the different agricultural structures of 
the two parts of Germany, the large farms in the eastern states principally favouring 
GM agriculture and the smaller-scale farming hampering GMO cultivation in the 
western states (see Table A3 in the appendix for the average farm sizes in the 16 
states). 
Turning to the SPD, we assumed that this party and its ministers would not take 
regulatory action regarding GMOs due to its partisan ideology and its electorate 
interested in other policy ﬁelds. However, we ﬁnd that SPD ministers regulated 
GMOs similarly to the other parties. This ﬁnding contradicts H3 but might be inter-
preted by the fact that the SPD often forms coalitions with either the Greens or the 
CDU, which both might push SPD ministers to adopt certain regulations. Another 
explanation refers to the SPD’s orientation to public opinion, which might have in-
duced SPD ministers to institute certain regulations. Hence, although GMOs might 
not represent a major issue for the SPD, the party can function as a condition for 
regulatory action. 
Turning to the environmental interest groups, we found that powerful regional 
associations of BUND and NABU have consistently sufﬁcient effects on the acces-
sion to the GMO-free network – a ﬁnding that so far corresponds with H4. Probably, 
these actors managed to exert pressure on state governments and/or competent 
ministers, which induced these to publicly signal GMO-adverse stances. For the 
adoption of concrete regulations, however, we do not ﬁnd consistent effects from 
strong regional associations of the two interest groups. On the contrary, our results 
show strict GMO regulations in states where the NABU and BUND are rather weak. 
Therefore, in sum, we must reject H4. Possibly interest groups are less inﬂuential 
for the establishment of regulations, as signalling already satisﬁes their objectives 
of increasing their resources. 
In summary, the study demonstrated that the German states can play an im-
portant role within multi-level GMO governance by adopting stricter regulations 
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than deﬁned on a national level. However, we found that the states tend to prefer 
symbolic action, as opposed to concrete regulation, within their legislative leeway. 
Interestingly, we found neither single necessary nor sufﬁcient conditions for a high 
degree of the composite index. This ﬁnding is noteworthy, as our dataset comprises 
data for variables which have functioned in other research settings. The relatively 
weak results might be due to the high complexity of the issue, which, for instance, 
is fraught with notions about what ‘natural’ is, how food shall be produced, as well 
as ethical and cultural implications which might also vary at the regional level (see, 
e.g. Devos et al. 2008; Lassen et al. 2002). Additional research is needed to further 
investigate the driving factors for GMO regulations on this level in more detail. For 
example, case studies of exceptional cases such as Thuringia could shed a more 
reﬁned light on the complex conditions of GMO regulations on a regional level. 
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Chapter 4 
4    Why Parties take Neutral Positions on Policy Is-
sues: Insights from the German Christian Demo-
cratic Union 
4.1    Introduction 
Scholars have used estimated policy positions for many years to empirically assess 
theoretically derived assumptions about political parties’ positioning on policy is-
sues. The MARPOR project, for instance, provides longitudinal and comparative 
information on how parties positioned themselves on multiple policy topics in over 
50 countries (Volkens et al. 2013). MARPOR and numerous individual studies ap-
plied different quantitative and qualitative methods for analysing the contents of 
election manifestos and government programs in order to generate the position data 
required for analysis (Klingemann et al. 2006; Laver et al. 2003; Slapin and Proksch 
2008). Although these methods identify positions in these textual documents differ-
ently, their results and subjects always reflect distinct positions – policy stances that 
can be placed on a continuum ranging from the strongest support for a certain pol-
icy issue to its strongest rejection. However, this also means that if parties did not 
submit any statements regarding a certain policy issue, these ‘non-positions’ were 
simply treated as missing and their potential causes were not investigated. 
However, parties can have incentives not to position themselves distinctly on 
policy issues – particularly prior to elections, when composing their election mani-
festos. For instance, a party might cease to take a position on a policy issue when it 
wants to pursue its policy agenda and is seeking electoral success at upcoming elec-
tions, but an external shock caused divergences between previously homogenous 
preferences of the party and its electorate (Meyer and Schoen 2015). 
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In this article, such positioning is denominated as ‘neutral’ position-taking. In 
contrast to simple ‘non-positions’, this position-taking is intentional and strategic. 
However, investigating ‘neutral’ positions is difficult as this activity is not indicated 
by textual references. This makes it challenging to distinguish between ‘neutral po-
sitions’ and simple ‘non-positions’. Presumably, scholars have not investigated neu-
tral position-taking for these two reasons, even though it seems likely to take place 
in empirical practice. 
In light of this lacuna, the following research question guides this study: Do par-
ties position themselves neutrally on policy issues for strategic reasons and, if so, 
why? To answer it, we focus on the Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) position-
taking on the topic of agricultural biotechnology (henceforth: agribiotech) at the fed-
eral and regional levels (Thuringia) in Germany. All underlying case selection deci-
sions are detailed below. 
The remainder of this study unfolds as follows. First, it introduces and defines 
‘neutral’ position-taking, then theorises why parties position themselves in that 
way. The next section examines the database and the approach of distinguishing 
between ‘non-positions’ and ‘neutral’ positions. The empirical section consists of 
two parts. The first investigates whether the federal CDU took a neutral position on 
agribiotech in 2017; the second examines the Thuringian CDU’s position-taking on 
agribiotech from 1999–2009. We find that both party branches took neutral positions 
but for different reasons. Both took them in order to reconcile their moderate/pro-
GMO (genetically modified organisms) agendas with their objectives of building 
coalitions with anti-GMO parties. However, the federal CDU also used their neutral 
position to respond to its increasingly unsupportive regional branches, whereas the 
regional CDU used theirs to avoid having to adopt an unpopular pro-GMO posi-
tion, thereby reducing potential vote loss at state elections. The federal CDU had 
already positioned itself cautiously on agribiotech in the 2000s because of negative 
public opinion and party-internal disagreement. In 2017, however, the prospect of 
building a coalition with the Greens, combined with the headwind from its regional 
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branches, gave the party enough incentive to take a neutral position. The paper ends 
by reflecting on the broader implications of neutral positioning.  
4.2   Theoretical Considerations 
This study conceptualises parties as rational and strategic collective actors that use 
their strategic calculus to obtain three major political objectives: to maximise their 
vote share in upcoming elections (vote-seeking), to win government office (office-
seeking), and to enact certain policies (policy-seeking) (Müller and Strøm 1999; 
Strøm 1990). Usually, parties prefer to take positions on policy issues, which concur 
with their policy ideal points (Budge 1994). However, they can also be motivated to 
take positions that deviate from these; for instance, when attempting to attract 
broader voter groups, they sometimes disguise their positions by de-emphasising, 
blurring or obfuscating (Shepsle 1972; Rovny 2012; Bräuninger and Giger 2018). 
Strøm (1990) noted that parties aspire to maximise their three major objectives 
simultaneously if their logical bases do not contradict one another. Accordingly, this 
article’s core argument is that, when facing conflicting political objectives, parties 
have strong incentives to take neutral positions on certain topics, since doing so 
increases their chances of realising these conflicting goals simultaneously. Put more 
precisely, parties take neutral stances on policy issues when they believe their pre-
ferred policy positions to be impeding the obtainment of their other desired political 
objectives, such as vote-seeking and office-seeking. 
Accordingly, neutral position-taking can be considered a positional strategy that 
takes place when parties intentionally desist from taking their intrinsically pre-
ferred positions on policy issues and instead take no positions altogether. Im-
portantly, although parties take neutral positions publicly by means of strategic 
documents, election manifestos or government programs, they pursue their initial 
policy agendas behind closed doors. Before we detail which factors favour neutral 
positioning, we distinguish it from ‘non-positioning’ and forms of partisan position-
taking. 
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4.2.1   Differentiating Neutral Position-Taking from other Forms of Partisan Po-
sition-Taking 
Non-positioning is characterised by two main features: the non-salience of policy 
issues for parties and their unintentional behaviour in relation to the respective 
topic. Policy issues can be considered non-salient for parties when they neither fall 
into the parties’ own, their electorates’, their potential voters’, nor closely related 
interest groups’ preferences. Of course, the salience of policy issues can vary accord-
ing to partisan features, such as the party-family affiliation, which includes their 
basic ideological orientation (Budge 2015).  
Importantly, parties not only lack incentives to respond to non-salient issues in 
terms of position-taking but simply do not consider whether it would be worth tak-
ing a position on these policy issues. In other words, parties have no ideal points on 
non-salient policy issues and therefore will not position themselves on them in their 
election manifestos. Non-positioning is thus an entirely unintentional behaviour, 
meaning that parties do not use it to achieve certain political objectives, such as vote-
seeking or office-seeking.20 In contrast, parties actively take neutral positions when 
they consider their preferred positions (ideal points) on salient policy issues to be 
detrimental to the obtainment of other central political objectives. 
Emphasising certain issues and advertising their corresponding positions une-
quivocally can be a rational move for parties, yet so can disguising their positions 
by obfuscating them (Shepsle 1972; Rovny 2012; Bräuninger and Giger 2018). For 
instance, parties use position-blurring to present vague or mixed positions on policy 
issues in order to obfuscate the distance between themselves and its potential voters 
on critical policy dimensions (Rovny 2012: 273–274). Doing so on appropriate policy 
topics can be expedient for parties wishing to attract voters with more disparate 
 
20 Non-positioning can also occur when parties make mistakes in their election manifestos. This hap-
pens when parties actually have ideal points on certain policy issues and consider position-taking 
on these topics as being expedient politically but forget to include their corresponding position. This 
should, however, be less relevant for this study as national and regional parties are highly profes-
sionalised organisations, making non-positioning on relevant policy issues due to mistakes rather 
unlikely. In addition, parties usually use previous versions when drafting election programs, for 
which reason improper non-positioning seems additionally unlikely. 
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stances or willing to create broader political coalitions (Rovny 2012: 289). Neverthe-
less, blurred positions, whether obfuscated or mixed, carry some positional infor-
mation, which is why they must be carefully distinguished from neutral positions.  
Neutral positions are taken when parties explicitly do not want to submit any 
positional information on policy issues. This difference can be extremely significant. 
This, for instance, can happen when a party obfuscates its stance to prevent the out-
break of party-internal conflicts, electoral losses in upcoming elections, and desired 
coalition partners from turning away. In fact, the act of blurring carries the risk of 
unintended consequences, since party members, potential voters, and coalition 
partners can become suspicious and consider the blurred position a ‘hidden’ posi-
tion in favour of a controversial issue. This can cause serious political damage for 
the party that blurred its position, especially when rival parties start exploiting the 
situation by portraying the party as deceptive and unstable. 
Whenever position-taking on policy issues is likely to trigger politically detri-
mental effects for parties, we can assume that they consider neutral position-taking 
a more appropriate positional strategy. While obfuscating often represents a risky 
endeavour, parties can delimit possible negative effects by taking neutral stances on 
controversial issues, allowing them to pursue their policy objectives behind closed 
doors. 
4.2.2   Explaining Factors of Neutral Position-Taking 
Research on the formation of parties’ positions and their position-changes has ex-
panded considerably during the last decade, revealing numerous factors that ex-
plain how policy positions originate and why parties shift them.21 Drawing on all 
these factors to theorise why parties take neutral positions on policy issues would 
overstretch this paper. Therefore, we use Strøm (1990) and Müller and Strøm (1999) 
 
21 These factors include shifts within electorates (Adams et al. 2004; Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009), 
the influence of leader personalities and intra-party processes (Meyer 2013), party-internal organi-
sation (leadership- or activist-dominated) (Schumacher et al. 2013), the policy-shifts of rival parties 
with similar ideological backgrounds (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009), and the results of previous 
elections, especially when parties deem them insufficient (Somer-Topcu 2009). 
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as our starting point and build on their seminal argument that parties’ political core 
ambitions are vote-seeking, policy-seeking, and office-seeking, and that they seek 
to obtain these objectives simultaneously.  
Vote-seeking 
One major objective of party officials when drafting election manifestos is to in-
crease their parties’ vote-share in upcoming elections (Benoit et al. 2009). However, 
parties’ policy ideal points may be detrimental to vote-maximisation, for instance, 
if polls show that public sentiment on a policy issue is negative. Usually, very spe-
cific policy issues, such as GMOs, cannot be expected to predominate in influencing 
voting decisions (Tosun 2014: 367). However, if public attention is high, for instance 
because of certain focusing events (Meyer and Schoen 2015), parties will fear the 
electoral risks of having unpopular policy positions. Consequently, they may con-
sider adjusting them to suit the favour of the average voter or specific voter groups 
(see, e.g., Adams et al. 2004). 
That said, parties will usually seek to avoid position shifts, for these could be 
considered negative by their constituencies and thus threaten their electoral success 
(Somer-Topcu 2009). Therefore, it appears a reasonable strategy for them to desist 
from taking positions on such contentious policy issues in their election programs. 
On the one hand, this would neither mobilise existing voters nor attract new ones 
as this position-taking does not transport any kind of position-taking in terms of 
content. On the other, and much more importantly, adopting neutral positions 
would reduce the risk of incurring electoral losses, which may materialise if parties 
maintain their ideal points on policy issues that contradict the average voter’s 
and/or parts of its core electorate’s preferences. Altogether, it seems reasonable to 
assume that parties take neutral positions not to increase their electoral success but 
primarily to decrease potential electoral losses at elections. A parties’ vote-seeking 
impetus therefore functions as a major incentive for neutral position-taking on pol-
icy issues. 
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Office-seeking 
Not only does the ordinal order of parties on the left-right scale determine whether 
certain parties build government coalitions; their actual and concrete positions on 
certain individual policy issues likewise cause this effect (Laver and Schofield 1998: 
111). Once we acknowledge that election manifestos serve as an important basis for 
parties’ coalition negotiations (e.g., Budge and Laver 1993), it seems reasonable to 
assume that, when composing these documents, it is considered whether adopting 
certain positions could come into conflict with the preferences of potential coalition 
partners. Therefore, parties which attempt to build coalitions with those that have 
deviating policy objectives should have strong incentives either to align their posi-
tions to their potential partners’ or to adopt neutral stances. However, while the first 
course of action can lead to party-internal disputes or voter estrangement, these po-
litical risks are much lower for parties that adopt neutral positions, which also re-
duce the risk of possible policy conflicts with the desired coalition partner. Accord-
ingly, instead of taking their preferred positions, we expect parties to take neutral 
policy stances in order to prevent possible policy conflicts with their potential part-
ners, thereby improving their chances of future coalition-building at low political 
cost. 
Policy-seeking 
Parties also use election manifestos to ensure intra-party agreement on policy is-
sues; they do this by merging the positions of their intra-party factions into one 
party line in upcoming election periods (Däubler 2012). However, as implied here, 
the positions on policy issues can differ within political parties, and diverging ide-
ological beliefs represent only one of the several reasons for this (Soroka and 
Wlezien 2010). Hence, when parties cannot reconcile different internal positions rea-
sonably, it may be most expedient for them not to position themselves on such is-
sues, but to adopt neutral positions instead. Although such position-taking does not 
solve party-internal disputes over certain policy topics, taking neutral positions 
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allows them to mute the internal conflicts until after the next elections, which is 
important as voters tend to punish parties for not being united on policy issues at 
elections (Greene and Haber 2015). 
Interdependencies between equal parties operating on different political 
levels 
Whether parties take neutral positions on policy issues can also be influenced by 
interdependencies between equal parties operating at different levels in federally 
structured systems (e.g., Jeffery 2009). More precisely, it has been shown that the 
positions of federal parties on certain policy issues influence how their regional 
branches take a position on policy issues (Müller 2013). Interestingly, the opposite 
is also true – namely that regional branches influence the position-taking of their 
federal counterparts (Bäck et al. 2014). Drawing on these insights, we assume that 
parties in federal systems can have strong incentives to position themselves neu-
trally on policy issues rather than to align their existing positions with those of their 
party branch(es) at the respective other level. 
Top-down pressure 
The top-down argument rests on the observation that federal parties pressure their 
regional counterparts to shift certain policy positions in order to adapt the regional 
parties’ deviating positions with their own, since voters tend to punish parties for 
internal disagreement on policy issues (Greene and Haber 2015). Regional branches 
may comply with such demands to avoid conflict with the leading branch (Müller 
2013). However, these position shifts can conflict with the regional parties’ own pol-
icy agenda or the policy preferences of its regional voters or affiliated interest 
groups (Müller 2009). For that reason, regional parties have strong incentives not to 
comply with such position adjustment and may even pursue other courses of action 
to meet the demands of their federal branches. Taking neutral positions represents 
one suitable possibility since it neither offends federal branches (as position mainte-
nance could) nor the regional branches’ members, voters, and affiliated interest 
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groups (as a position shift could). Hence, if federal parties force their regional 
branches to align their positions on certain policy issues, it can be expedient for the 
latter to position themselves neutrally on these. 
Bottom-up pressure 
The bottom-up argument is based on the assumption that federal parties’ policy 
positions represent the results of intra-party bargaining processes, in which regional 
branches compete with each other to get their own positions into national party 
manifestos (Bäck et al. 2014). Referring to the notion that regional branches influence 
the position-taking of their federal counterparts on policy topics, we argue that if 
the former hold widely homogeneous positions, then the federal party should be 
willing to adopt a corresponding policy position. After all, if a federal party aligns 
itself with the positions of its regional branches, an action that reflects the policy 
preferences of its party members and voters, it can hope for electoral benefits re-
garding the specific policy dimension in upcoming elections. 
However, the policy positions of regional parties frequently differ or even con-
tradict each other (Müller 2009). In this case, federal parties should be motivated to 
seek suitable ways of reconciling the varying stances since providing common party 
lines is important for party-internal cohesion as well as for voters (Greene and Ha-
ber 2015). One option for federal parties is to adopt mixed or blurred positions as 
this allows them to present a policy position that corresponds with those of their 
regional parties. Nonetheless, the adoption of such positions risks sparking (even 
more) party-internal turmoil, for at least some of the regional branches are likely to 
reject the new party line – which could in turn result in electoral losses. Hence, if 
federal parties facing regional counterparts with heterogenous positions wish to 
avoid the risk of negative political effects, the best option for them is to forgo provid-
ing a common party line, taking neutral policy positions instead. 
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4.3   Methodological Clarifications 
Parties use election programs strategically to position themselves on certain policy 
issues, being aware that their election manifestos indicate their chosen positions, as 
well as the policies they would implement upon reaching governmental power, to 
the media, the electorate, and potential coalition partners (Budge 2015). Therefore, 
analysing election programs is considered the most suitable means of identifying 
parties’ policy positions along with their development over time (Benoit et al. 2009: 
443). Accordingly, the central database of this study consists of election manifestos 
published by German parties at the regional and federal levels prior to elections that 
took place from 1990–2017. Of the more than 500 election manifestos analysed, 40 
documents come from federal parties while the great majority comes from the re-
gional branches in the 16 federal states. Most election manifestos analysed can be 
accessed from the open access archive www.polidoc.net (Benoit et al. 2009). The 
ones not available there were found by internet research. 
To identify which election manifestos contain statements related to agribiotech, 
we applied hand-coding based on qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2000). This 
detailed approach appeared most suitable as the study can benefit from interpreta-
tive decisions and context knowledge. We extracted documents which included the 
keywords ‘genetic’ (gentechnisch) or ‘GMO’ (GVO) and screened the texts for ‘bio-
tech’ (Biotechnologie) to assess whether statements related to biotechnology were 
relevant for the analysis. Generally, the non-automated, interpretative coding de-
creased the risk of including irrelevant statements. For instance, statements related 
to genetic engineering for medical applications could be distinguished and ex-
cluded. 
Next, the manifestos were coded manually into five categories: positions in fa-
vour of agribiotech (PRO) and against it (CON), moderate positions (MOD), and 
those without any relevant statements regarding the issue (NST). Moreover, we 
coded when parties did not publish election manifestos (NEM). Statements support-
ing the deregulation of GM crop application and scientific research on these crops 
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or emphasising the potential of GM crops were coded as ‘PRO’. We coded state-
ments as ‘CON’ if they proposed (stricter) regulations for commercial cultivation, 
restrictions on GMO research, or emphasised the possible risks of GM technology. 
Statements giving priority to the need to balance risks and benefits, and which 
thereby expressed no explicit wish to restrict the use of GMOs, were coded as 
‘MOD’. Finally, statements that made no (relevant) mention of agribiotech were 
coded as ‘NST’. Hence, the latter category comprises ‘non-positions’ as well as po-
tential ‘neutral positions’. The assignment of the manifestos to the various catego-
ries proved challenging and was revised and double-checked several times. Table 
A4 in the appendix can be consulted for retracing the individual coding for the fed-
eral parties, and Table A5 for the Thuringian parties. The coding decisions for the 
other regional parties can be requested from the author. 
Distinguishing ‘neutral’ positions from ‘non-positions’ – both coded with NST – 
is important because, in both cases, parties make no statements in their election 
manifestos. Hence, to differentiate between the two phenomena, we apply an ap-
proach that does not merely acknowledge the presence of such statements but con-
siders two important facets of contextual information: first, the programmatic de-
velopment of parties on the GMO topic over extended time periods; second, (polit-
ical) incentives that might have induced them to take neutral positions in certain 
situations. 
To start with the programmatic development, parties usually use previous elec-
tion manifestos as reference documents when drafting new ones (Benoit et al. 2009). 
In light of this, it seems reasonable to assume that parties, if they positioned them-
selves on a topic in a certain way, and this topic remains salient, keep holding the 
same position, even if they do not include a statement on it in any subsequent elec-
tion manifesto. To assess whether strategic rationales guided the decisions of parties 
to desist from position-taking, we analyse whether any party-internal and/or -ex-
ternal) factors induced them to do so. If this is the case, it may indeed be neutral 
positions; if not, non-positions are more plausible. To investigate such cases 
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empirically, we employed various data sources, including governmental docu-
ments, press releases, position papers, and surveys. In addition, we conducted two 
expert interviews to obtain more fine-grained data on the Thuringian case; the in-
terview data can be requested from the author. Finally, these primary sources are 
complemented by observations influenced by the empirical insights of Cooper 
(2009), Katzek (2014) and Tosun and Hartung (2018). 
4.4   Case Selection 
We argued above that parties should be particularly willing to take neutral posi-
tions when dealing with controversial policy issues. Research has shown that moral 
issues, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, as well as risky technologies, such as 
nuclear power, animal cloning, chemicals, agribiotech, or hydraulic fracturing, rep-
resent policy topics that are particularly controversial in many countries worldwide 
(e.g., Sjöberg 2002). From these, we selected agribiotech, for several factors have 
made it a controversial topic around the world. Among these are for example socio-
economic concerns, such as monopolies of multinationals in the agriculture sector; 
ethical concerns over GMOs being unnatural and intervening in creation; and con-
cerns over the potential negative effects of GM crops on the environment or human 
health (Herring and Paarlberg 2016). 
Agribiotech represents a particularly controversial issue in the EU, where the 28 
member states fundamentally disagree in their standpoints towards GMOs. While 
some countries, including Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United King-
dom, are open to GMO agriculture, Austria, France, Germany and Greece have en-
acted national cultivation bans on GM crops (Tosun 2014: 370). Germany was se-
lected, since it is politically rather divided on agribiotech, which is most promi-
nently indicated by the countries’ frequent abstentions from voting in the European 
Council on the approval of GM products (Mühlböck and Tosun 2018: 394). Germany 
was also chosen because of its federal system, in which equal parties operate at fed-
eral and regional levels (Jeffery 2009). This polity is particularly well suited for 
 109 
 
assessing whether a party on one level of governance influences the neutral posi-
tion-taking of the equal party branch on a different level.  
Germany’s party spectrum has changed considerably over the last few decades. 
Currently, it consists of six parties that operate on the federal and regional levels.22 
The CDU was selected because it is characterised by features that appear especially 
promising to explore (potential) neutral position-taking on agribiotech (Debus and 
Müller 2013). The CDU has strongly advocated agribiotech for years, but during the 
2000s it grew cautious as the issue became increasingly unpopular (Katzek 2014). 
Recently, it has managed to retain electoral popularity while pursuing a moderate 
GMO agenda even though public sentiment towards GMOs remains negative (To-
sun and Hartung 2018). Nonetheless, the CDU disagrees internally on agribiotech. 
While Christian members tend to reject GMOs as unethical interventions in God’s 
creation, others support agribiotech as an economic means to maintain Germany’s 
international competitiveness in the agricultural sector (Cooper 2009). 
Like all German parties, the CDU usually needs to build coalitions in order to 
reach governmental power (Laver and Schofield 1998). However, since two of its 
potential coalition partners have always been (Greens), or have become (SPD), op-
ponents of GM technology, maintaining its moderate GMO position may become 
difficult (Katzek 2014). Finally, the CDU is the only party in Germany to have held 
a moderate GMO position during the last 30 years. In contrast to the even pro-GMO 
FDP, it has also always been represented in the federal parliament (Bundestag) and 
many state governments (Debus and Müller 2013). 
 
22 Germany’s party spectrum includes the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Alliance 90/The 
Greens (Greens), which both belong to the centre-left, and the Left Party (Left), which can be located 
further left. The CDU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) both belong to the centre-right, which is 
also the case for the CDU’s regional sister party from Bavaria, the Christian Social Party (CSU), which 
is also influential in policymaking at the federal level. However, as the CSU usually publishes joint 
election manifestos with the CDU, it is considered together with the CDU in this study. Usually, the 
CDU and the CSU are referred to together as the Union. The Alternative for Germany, which ranks 
further to the right, is not considered as it was founded as recently as 2013 and thus does not fit our 
longitudinal analysis. 
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In order to explore neutral position-taking at the regional level, we concentrate 
our empirical focus on the CDU as the most interesting party regarding neutral po-
sitioning on the issue of agribiotech in Germany. Regional CDU branches should 
also position themselves on this issue, as in Germany, the federal states have far-
reaching possibilities to regulate this policy area (see, Chapter 3). Since the German 
unification in 1990, CDU branches have become relevant in all 16 states. We chose 
Thuringia considering that in this state the CDU has not positioned itself on agribi-
otech longer than any other CDU branch in any other non-city state (Table A6). This 
is remarkable as Thuringia belongs to the eastern states, which are generally rather 
pro-GMO, because their large-scale agricultural structures provide much more fa-
vourable conditions for GMO cultivation than their western counterparts (Table 12, 
below). However, in 2010, CDU-led Thuringia became the first state to join and re-
main in the ‘European Network of GMO-free Regions’ – a transnational network of 
EU regions that oppose GMO farming (see, Chapter 3). Unlike in the other eastern 
states, GMO cultivation was generally low in Thuringia (Table 12, below). 
In principle, we could investigate whether the non-positionings of several other 
CDU branches on agribiotech actually represent neutral positions. Except for the 
city-states, as well as Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg (see below), every branch 
has positioned itself pro-GMO since around 2000 and has not repositioned itself 
since the 2010s (Table A6). However, none of these has such striking characteristics 
that favour neutral position-taking on agribiotech as the Thuringian CDU. Never-
theless, as it is possible that other CDU branches took neutral positions as well, we 
will address this later on. 
4.5   Analysis of the Position-Taking of the Federal CDU 
In order to determine whether the CDU was motivated by vote-seeking aspirations 
to take a neutral position on agribiotech in 2017, we present Figure 6. This figure 
shows decreasing public support for GMOs in Germany from 1996–2010, and a par-
ticular decline from 2002–2005. The latter decline resulted from the bovine 
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spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, which spread during the 1990s and eroded 
the Germans’ trust in the existing institutions of food supply (Feindt and Klein-
schmit 2011). Even though BSE had nothing to do with agribiotech, the epidemic 
led to increased opposition towards the use of biotechnology in German agriculture 
(Herring and Paarlberg 2016: 401). 
Figure 6. Public Support for GMOs in Germany, 1996-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since 2010 the topic of agribiotech has not been excluded from Eurobarometer 
surveys; however, several national studies indicate that the broad anti-GMO senti-
ment in Germany remained high from 2010–2017.23 Nevertheless, Table 10 shows 
that the CDU maintained moderate/pro-GMO positions throughout the 2000s. In 
contrast, the SPD shifted to an anti-GMO position in 2009, since it wished to form a 
coalition with the Greens (Cooper 2009: 549). Hence, neither did the CDU adjust its 
position in response to negative public opinion nor did it respond to important 
 
23 In 2010, 87% of Germans rejected GMOs and considered banning them an important measure for 
protecting the natural environment; in 2015, 45% of Germans believed that GM crops ‘strongly’ dam-
aged the natural environment and biological diversity, and another 31% believed that GM crops 
were at least ‘somewhat’ damaging; in 2017, 79% agreed to that GMOs should be banned in agricul-
ture (Federal Ministry for the Environment and Federal Agency for Nature Conservation 2010, 2015, 
2018). 
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voter groups, the most influential of whom are Catholics, farmers, and older people 
in general. 
Table 10. The Federal Parties’ Positions on Agribiotech, 1990–2017 
Party 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013 2017 
CDU NST PRO PRO MOD PRO MOD MOD NST 
FDP MOD MOD MOD PRO PRO PRO MOD NST 
SPD NST PRO PRO PRO PRO CON CON CON 
Greens CON CON CON CON CON CON CON CON 
Left NST NST NST MOD MOD CON CON CON 
Governing 
Coalition 
Union/ 
FDP 
Union/ 
FDP 
SPD/ 
Green 
SPD/ 
Green 
Union/ 
SPD 
Union/ 
FDP 
Union/ 
SPD 
Union/ 
SPD 
Position NST PRO MOD MOD PRO PRO MOD MOD* 
Source: based on the coding of the parties’ election manifestos and coalition agreements. *The coa-
lition contract was only adopted in 2018. 
Even though the CDU liberalised its religious and ethical-moral stances consid-
erably, the party is still a stronghold for Catholic voters (Debus and Müller 2013). 
However, this voter group strongly opposes agribiotech for reasons such as human 
inference in natural processes (Durant and Legge 2005: 191). Farmers also represent 
an important electoral segment of the CDU: in 2014, nearly 50% of farmers in Ger-
many stated that they would vote for the CDU (Forsa 2015). Yet, small and organic 
farmers reject agribiotech in their vicinity for fear of potential ‘contaminations’ lead-
ing to lower market prices (see, Chapter 2). Finally, the CDU is characterised by 
above-average popularity in the group of older (over 60-year-old) voters (Debus 
and Müller 2013). Research has shown, however, that this group of voters is partic-
ularly opposed to GMOs (Durant and Legge 2005: 193). 
The above-mentioned major voter groups – Catholics, farmers, people older than 
60 – deemed their anti-GMO opinions confirmed by reports on the BSE crisis and 
by the commercial cultivation of GM crops, which started in 2005 (Table 12, below). 
The widespread protests and high media attention that accompanied it led to 
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agribiotech becoming even more critically perceived in Germany, including by the 
three CDU voter groups. Considering this, it would have been electorally opportune 
for the CDU to abandon its moderate/pro-GMO position in the 2000s, that way it 
would have responded to increasingly negative public opinion on the one hand and 
to its traditionally associated voter groups on the other. However, Table 10 shows 
that the CDU maintained its moderate stance until 2013, regardless of its detri-
mental effect on vote-maximisation. Since public opinion and central voter groups’ 
rejection remained high from 2013–2017, vote-seeking aspirations cannot explain 
the CDU’s neutral position in 2017. 
The anti-GMO sentiment during the 2000s also sparked division within the CDU. 
Several CDU ministers, a faction of MPs in the Bundestag, and regional branches in 
states such as Hesse or Rhineland-Palatine, still supported agribiotech. However, 
GMO-opponents, who came from the food-producing industry and agriculture, 
were able to assert their positions more and more successfully (Cooper 2009: 552). 
Farmers and food processing companies, who traditionally supported the CDU, fol-
lowed the demands of the consumer, who rejected the presence of GM ingredients 
in their food. The conflict between those in the CDU who saw tremendous potential 
in GM technology and those who declined it for  economic reasons continued dur-
ing the 2000s as the CDU maintained its pro-GMO agenda (Cooper 2009: 553–554). 
Party-internal turmoil increased when the CSU, the CDU’s electoral alliance part-
ner at the federal level, turned against agribiotech in 2008/9. The CSU had strongly 
supported agribiotech since the early-1990s; however, during the 2000s, the issue 
became increasingly controversial within the party, prompting the CSU to adopt a 
negative stance prior to the regional election in 2008 (Table A5). In 2009, the Federal 
Minister of Agriculture, Ilse Aigner (CSU), even imposed a national cultivation ban 
on MON810, the only GM crop authorised for commercial cultivation in the EU 
(Katzek 2014: 181). Aigner banned GM maize mainly because Bavarian farmers and 
the regional food industry rejected agribiotech, since they had economic interests in 
conventional agriculture (Cooper 2009: 553). Aigner’s move was heavily criticised 
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by politicians within the CDU; for instance, by the Minister of Research, Anette 
Schavan (CDU), and state ministers, such as Christian Wulff (CDU) from Lower-
Saxony, one of Germany’s leading agricultural states (Welt 2009). 
Despite the CSU’s shift of opinion, the CDU-led federal government maintained 
its pro-GMO course (Table 10). Most importantly, from 2015–2017, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Christian Schmidt (CSU), on behalf of the CDU-led government, at-
tempted to enforce a regulatory arrangement that rendered GMO cultivation possi-
ble and facilitated GMO research in the national transposition process, which was 
commenced in response to Directive 2015/412. This directive grants the EU member 
states, and in some countries even their regional units, additional means of restrict-
ing or prohibiting GMO cultivation (Tosun and Hartung 2018). Schmidt’s attempts, 
however, failed as the SPD, the Greens, the Federal Minister of Research, Johanna 
Wanka (CDU), as well as CDU-led state governments in Berlin, Hesse, Mecklen-
burg-West Pomerania, and Saarland opposed the CDU’s legislative proposals (To-
sun and Hartung 2018). 
Ultimately, the disagreement within the CDU, as well as between the CDU and 
the CSU in the late-2000s, neither induced the CDU to abandon its moderate posi-
tion in 2009 nor in 2013. However, in the transposition process of Directive 2015/412, 
regional CDU branches vehemently rejected the pro-GMO agenda of their federal 
counterpart. This increased opposition among regional CDU branches is therefore 
likely to have induced the federal CDU to take a neutral position in 2017. However, 
since this reasoning is not entirely conclusive, we will examine it more closely in 
due course. 
Did the CDU take a neutral position in 2017 to facilitate coalition-building with 
(potential) partners that had different policy objectives? To answer this question, 
we concentrate on the CDU’s coalition options before the 2017 federal elections. The 
CDU formed a coalition with the SPD from 2013–2017; however, already during that 
time, the SPD pronounced against another ‘grand coalition’ with the Union parties 
after the 2017 election (Spiegel Online 2017). Moreover, the CDU could not count on 
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the FDP, its preferred coalition partner, because it was unclear whether it would 
win enough votes to move into the Bundestag, as it was not the case after the 2013 
election (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2016). 
Since forming a coalition with the SPD or the FDP appeared unfavourable, the 
CDU considered coalescing with the Greens after the 2017 election. Two fundamen-
tal factors influenced this decision. First, several new coalitions composed of the 
CDU, the Greens (and the FDP) had formed at the state level in the late 2000s. These 
were the CDU/FDP/Green governments in Saarland (2009-2012) and Schleswig-
Holstein (2017), and coalitions of the CDU and the Greens in Hamburg (2008-2010), 
Hesse (2014), and Baden-Wuerttemberg (2016). Second, the distances between the 
CDU and the Greens in several policy domains had decreased during the years prior 
to the 2017 election (Weckenbrock 2017). Consequently, the CDU, for the first time 
in history, was willing to form a coalition with the Greens in 2017 at the federal 
level. 
However, as Table 10 shows, the distances between the two parties regarding 
agribiotech remained significant until 2017. While the CDU took moderately pro-
GMO stances on the issue until 2017, the Greens were anti-GMO from the outset. In 
fact, agribiotech became one of the most important issues for the Greens after they 
had lost their issue ownership on nuclear power (Meyer and Schoen 2015). Research 
has shown that the Greens increased their electoral success by exploiting anti-GMO 
public sentiments, which was particularly pervasive at the time (see, Chapter 2). 
Hence, the policy distance between the CDU and the Greens, as well as the latter’s 
belief in their ability to assert themselves on this specific topic, which they consid-
ered important for their political success, increased the likelihood of conflict break-
ing out between the two parties during coalition negotiations. 
Considering that the CDU was highly dependent on the Greens as a coalition 
partner for the first time in 2017, it seems reasonable to deduce that it therefore po-
sitioned itself neutrally on the critical policy issue of agribiotech in order to facilitate 
coalition-building with the Greens. This is also supported by the fact that since the 
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early 1990s, when the topic was not yet salient, the CDU had always positioned 
itself on the topic. The notion of the CDU’s neutral position-taking is also supported 
by the fact that, in 2018, the new Minister of Agriculture, Julia Klöckner (CDU), 
spoke out for liberalising the EU regulations on new genetic engineering techniques 
(Reuters 2018). Previously, exploratory discussions over forming a coalition gov-
ernment between the CDU/CSU, the Greens and the FDP had failed. And so, despite 
the SPD’s reluctance to continue governing with the CDU/CSU, another ‘grand co-
alition’ was established after a long struggle in March 2018 (Table 10). 
 
Did the CDU take a neutral position in 2017 in response to the heterogenic posi-
tions of its regional counterparts? To address this question, Figure 7 can be con-
sulted, which depicts the development of the positions held by the regional CDU 
branches on agribiotech; the detailed coding for each individual branch is given in 
Table A6. The figure shows that most CDU branches were pro-GMO from 1999–
2001. Although some did not take any position, the positions of the regional CDU 
branches widely corresponded with the pro-GMO agenda of their federal counter-
parts (Table 10). 
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In 2002, the CDU shifted to a moderate stance (Table 10), and in the same year 
several of its regional branches abandoned their pro-GMO stances, choosing not to 
position themselves anymore on agribiotech (Figure 7). The CDU’s statement in its 
2002 election manifesto reveals that the party adopted a moderate stance in re-
sponse to the increased public concerns regarding agribiotech following the BSE 
crisis (Table A4). Hence, the CDU did not fundamentally change its policy agenda; 
it is more probable that the party only took the moderate stance in order to make 
the negative public sentiment towards GMOs compatible with its goal of reducing 
electoral losses that might have resulted from being considered pro-GMO (Meyer 
and Schoen 2015). Strategic manoeuvring in response to the BSE crisis is particularly 
likely for the CDU branches in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt 
as (productive) agriculture is highly important in all of these states (Table 12, be-
low). The two CDU branches did not take positions on agribiotech in the election 
campaigns following the BSE crisis; however, they returned to pro-GMO positions 
before the 2006 elections (Table A6). Figure 7 illustrates the corresponding peak of 
non-positions between 2001–2006. 
The federal CDU’s pro-GMO position in 2005 widely aligned with the positions 
of its regional branches, proving that a bottom-up effect cannot have taken place 
(Table 10, Figure 7). However, a bottom-up effect does appear to have been the rea-
son for the CDU’s adoption of a moderate position in 2009 (Table 10). This is evident 
since the CSU, one of the most strongly pro-GMO branches, shifted to an anti-GMO 
stance in 2008, and pro-GMO branches from Lower Saxony (2008) and Schleswig-
Holstein (2009) shifted to moderate positions (Table A6). Cooper (2009) showed that 
the CDU  maintained its pro-GMO course, even after its regional branches, includ-
ing the CSU, had withdrawn their support for agribiotech. Nevertheless, it seems 
plausible that the federal CDU branch responded to declining support at the re-
gional level by moderating its positioning. The reason for this is that farmers in 
many states had started cultivating GM crops in 2005 – a move which led to strong 
anti-GMO mobilisation of environmental, agriculture and consumer associations as 
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well as considerable pressure on political decision-makers, especially those of the 
ruling parties. 
Figure 7 shows that more and more regional CDU branches abandoned their pro-
GMO positions in the run-up to the 2013 elections and that most of them chose not 
to position themselves on the topic anymore. This information may lead to the con-
clusion that the federal CDU took its moderate position in 2013 in response to the 
reduction in regional support. On the one hand, only the CDU branches from North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, and Saxony-Anhalt remained 
pro-GMO prior to 2013. On the other, the CDU branch in Baden-Wuerttemberg fol-
lowed the neighbouring CSU in Bavaria in 2011 by shifting to an anti-GMO stance 
(Table A6). Cooper (2009: 553) stated that farmers’ votes have always been im-
portant for the Union parties and that most German farmers rejected GMOs. This 
would have been especially true of these two southern states, in which farms are 
small-structured, industrial agricultural production is negligible, and farmers com-
pete with nearby Austrian farmers. 
In its 2013 election program the federal CDU stated that consumers should know 
whether food products are being produced using GM technology (Table A4). Yet, 
this statement does not indicate unambiguously whether the party attempted to ac-
commodate the increasingly divergent positions of its regional branches. Hence, alt-
hough a clear effect cannot be observed here, the trend shown in Figure 7 suggests 
that the federal CDU took their moderate position in 2013 in order to adapt to the 
decreasing GMO-support of its regional branches. 
Finally, Figure 7 shows that the support of regional CDU branches for agribiotech 
had completely collapsed prior to the 2017 election as they all abandoned their mod-
erate and pro-GMO positions. In fact, even the pro-GMO branches in Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt abandoned their supportive positions and 
have not positioned themselves on the issue since (Table A6). Considering that the 
support of regional CDU branches dissipated in 2016, it seems reasonable that their 
federal counterpart shifted to a neutral position in the 2017 election campaign in 
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order not to set a party line that stood in sharp contrast to the positions of the re-
gional branches. This reasoning is substantiated by the conjecture above, namely 
that the federal CDU took moderate positions in 2009 and 2013 to accommodate for 
the regional CDU branches’ decreasing support of/increasing opposition to GMOs. 
Recapitulating the above, it becomes obvious that the entire evolution of the 
CDU’s position-taking on agribiotech represents strategic behaviour. While it actu-
ally maintained its pro-GMO agenda during the 2000s, it took a moderate stance in 
response to the increased anti-GMO sentiment held by the German publics and ma-
jor voter groups and to settle party-internal disagreement. However, these two fac-
tors were apparently not enough to convince the CDU to abandon its moderate 
stance and to shift to a neutral position. In fact, the party only did so in 2017, when 
the advantages of taking a neutral position outweighed the disadvantages. This was 
because the CDU was seeking a coalition with the Greens and the support of re-
gional CDU branches for agribiotech had collapsed. These two final factors ‘tipped’ 
the CDU into taking a neutral position, which enabled the party to pursue its polit-
ical objectives simultaneously. Finally, it should be noted that the CDU took their 
neutral position in response to the increasingly homogenous positions of its re-
gional parties, rather than any heterogenous ones. 
4.6   Analysis of the Position-Taking of the Thuringian CDU 
Since there are no survey data available that document the Thuringian population’s 
opinions on GMOs, we reconstruct them to examine whether this factor influenced 
the CDU to position itself neutrally on agribiotech. In the late 1980s, this issue was 
non-salient at the German regional level. Back then, EU institutions had not yet ap-
proved any GM crops for commercial cultivation, and the planning for scientific 
field experiments had just begun. In fact, only a few experts knew that relevant pro-
gress in plant-breeding had made the planting of GM crops for scientific purposes 
an imminent possibility.  
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Such scientific field experiments were the initial cause why agribiotech suddenly 
became salient in Thuringia in the mid-1990s. Two agribiotech companies, Hoechst-
Schering AgrEvo (1993) and Monsanto (1996), soon attempted to conduct field trials 
in two municipalities, namely Friemar and Hohlstedt (Graswurzel Revolution 
1997). These trials rapidly sparked fierce conflicts at the local level. Citizen initia-
tives were founded; environmental, agricultural, and consumer organisations mo-
bilised against the trials; anti-GMO protests were organised; anti-GMO camps were 
constructed; and activists made the scientific releases impossible or destroyed them 
(Friends of the Earth 1994). Consequently, Monsanto’s attempts to sow glyphosate-
resistant GM canola in Hohlstedt failed, and Hoechst-Schering AgrEvo even with-
drew its application for test plots with GM maize and GM canola in Friemar 
(Friends of the Earth 1996). 
Our interviews provided critical information on why this resistance proved par-
ticularly successful. Most importantly, the movement to combat such field experi-
ments began earlier in Thuringia than in other states and followed a more vehement 
course. Moreover, the movement’s mobilisation efforts fell on fertile ground due to 
the special location of the two experimental plots. In Hohlstedt, citizens strongly 
opposed the field trials from the outset because the community had suffered greatly 
from the excessive use of pesticides during the era of the German Democratic Re-
public. In Friemar, the local anti-GMO movement successfully mobilised students 
from the nearby city of Jena to support their actions against the trials. 
Regional media brought the two local conflicts to the attention of all of Thuringia, 
with the result that public opinion towards agribiotech in the mid-1990s swiftly be-
came hostile. Based on the interview data, we can deduce that, even though the 
Thuringian CDU initially took a pro-GMO position in 1994, the party became in-
creasingly cautious over time. This is evinced by the fact that the party has not in-
cluded any positions on agribiotech in their manifestos until 1999 (Table 11). Hence, 
the CDU responded to the broad public rejection of agribiotech in order to avoid 
incurring electoral loses. 
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Table 11. Thuringian Parties’ Positions on Agribiotech, 1990–2014 
Party 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
CDU NST PRO NST NST NST NST 
FDP MOD MOD NST PRO MOD MOD 
SPD NST PRO CON CON CON CON 
Greens CON CON NST NST CON NST 
Left NST CON MOD NST CON CON 
Governing 
Party/ies 
CDU/ 
FDP 
CDU/ 
SPD 
CDU CDU CDU/ 
SPD 
Left/SPD/ 
Green 
Position NST NST NST NST CON CON 
Source: based on the coding of the parties’ election manifestos and coalition agreements. 
Note: in 1999 and 2004, the election manifestos of the CDU also functioned as a government pro-
gram. 
Agricultural interests represent an important factor for the understanding of the 
Thuringian case; however, unlike public opinion, they had no significant effect on 
the CDU’s position-taking. The Thuringian farmers’ association has supported 
GMO farming from the very beginning until today (Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk 
2018). However, the experts we interviewed made it clear that anti-GMO sentiment 
made the farmers’ union become more cautious in its statements and generally less 
assertive in promoting agribiotech in the political sphere, just like the CDU. 
In the same way as the majority of the population, most Thuringian farmers re-
jected GMO cultivation. Nevertheless, following the EU approval of MON810 in 
2005, some farmers submitted – or wanted to submit – applications for cultivating 
this type of GM maize. In reaction, individual actors of the anti-GMO movement 
informed these farmers, for example, of the negative effects of GM feed on the health 
of dairy cows. In fact, the overall campaign led to almost all farmers refraining from 
submitting or withdrawing, their applications. The information campaign proved 
so successful in Thuringia, since – due to large farm sizes – only a few farmers op-
erate there (Table 12). 
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Table 12. A Comparison of the German States 
Federal state Average farm 
size (hectare) 
Number of 
farmers (in 
thousands) 
GMO Culti-
vation (hec-
tare) 
GMO-free 
Regions Net-
work (entry 
date) 
Western states 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 31.7 42.4 17.4 2012 
Bavaria 32.1 93.3 35.5 2014 
Hesse 43 17 0.2 2014 
Lower Saxony 40.9 39.5 49 2014 
North Rhine-Westphalia 61.8 34,3 0.8 2011 
Rhineland-Palatine 34.3 19.1 1.2 2013 
Saarland 59 1.2 0 2013 
Schleswig-Holstein 70.5 13.3 0.1 2012 
Eastern states 
Brandenburg 237.8 5.4 3153.7 - 
Mecklenburg-West P. 285.9 4.7 1743.8 - 
Saxony 145.2 6.3 1800.3 - 
Saxony-Anhalt 278 4.2 352.2 - 
Thuringia 215.1 3.4 1 2010 
City-states 
Berlin 33.1 * 0 - 
Bremen 51.3 * 0 2015 
Hamburg 18.5 * 0 2015 
Source: the data on the average farm sizes come from Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Län-
der (2010) and the data on the number of farmers were taken from the German Farmers’ Union 
(2015). GMO cultivation refers to the planting areas of MON810 (2005–2008); this data stems from 
the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (2019). The data on the accession to the 
GMO-free Regions Network were taken from GMO-free Europe (2019). * The city states together 
have less than 900 farmers. 
Accordingly, Table 12 shows that Thuringian farmers only cultivated MON810 
to an extremely limited extent. Although most farmers had decided against culti-
vating GM crops and one interviewee estimated the Thuringian farmers’ voting 
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preferences as being fairly evenly split between the CDU and the Left, their views 
had no significant effect on the CDU’s position-taking. 
Has party-internal disagreement been the reason for the Thuringian CDU to take 
neutral positions since 1994? One interviewee estimated that approximately 80% of 
the CDU MPs have never dealt with the GMO issue themselves as it is common 
practice for them to support the position of their party expert. The key actor in this 
regard remains MP Egon Primas, who has represented the CDU in the Thuringian 
Parliament (Landtag) since 1990. In one interview, we learned that MP Primas has 
been setting the CDU’s party line regarding agribiotech largely autonomously since 
the early 1990s. Accordingly, party-internal disagreement on this policy topic has 
virtually never existed as most CDU MPs have not concerned themselves with ag-
ribiotech but followed the party line. In addition, party-internal consensus arose out 
of the mutual agreement of the CDU MPs, who considered productive agriculture 
important, while possible contradictions with, for instance, Christian beliefs were 
of no significance. 
Although the Thuringian CDU was pro-GMO for a long time, its position can be 
further differentiated. The party agreed with the regulations set by EU institutions 
on commercial usage, such as to guarantee ‘freedom of choice’ for consumers and 
farmers (European Commission 2019b). Like the FDP, the CDU had a very progres-
sive stance on research, believing that it should be used to harness the potential of 
GM technology. Since MP Primas spearheaded this stance and the other MPs 
agreed, the CDU’s possible neutral positions since 1999 cannot be explained by in-
tra-party disagreement. 
We now analyse whether the CDU had incentives to shift from its pro-GMO po-
sition to a neutral one in order to facilitate coalition-building with parties whose 
positions on GMO differed from their own. Having cooperated with the FDP from 
1990–1994, the CDU lost its ‘natural’ coalition partner after the 1994 elections. Figure 
8 shows the results of Thuringian state elections from 1990–2014 and reveals that 
 124 
 
the FDP failed the 5-percent hurdle in 1994. Consequently, the CDU had to look for 
other possible coalition partners. 
Figure 8. Election Results (%) for Regional Elections in Thuringia, 1990–2014. 
Since the Greens and the Left had substantially different ideological stances and 
policy objectives to the CDU during the 1990s, the CDU excepted them as potential 
coalition partners. This means that only the SPD represented an appropriate partner 
for building a coalition government after the 1994 election – which is exactly what 
happened (Table 11). Although this table indicates that we coded a non-position for 
the SPD in 1994 and a moderate position in 1999, one interviewee revealed that the 
SPD was already overtly anti-GMOs in the early-1990s. Furthermore, based on in-
formation collected in the same interview, we can state that the CDU’s reliance on 
the SPD as a coalition partner was the main reason why the CDU did not take posi-
tions in its election manifestos. The latter maintained its pro-GMO agenda up to 
2009/10; however, prior to the elections in 1999, 2004, 2009, it strategically took no 
position on agribiotech, thereby reducing its policy distance to the SPD, their most 
likely coalition partner.  
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Until the mid-2000s, the CDU could hope for election results that enabled it to 
govern alone, and Table 11 shows that the party actually achieved this in 1999 and 
2004. Nevertheless, prior to each election in the 1990s and 2000s, the regional party 
could not be sure that it would achieve the necessary majority for forming a single 
government, making the CDU highly dependent on the SPD as a coalition partner. 
The SPD exploited this situation by enforcing its anti-GMO position. As Table 11 
shows, the CDU subsequently chose not to assert its pro-GMO position in the two 
coalition agreements made with the SPD. Larger coalition partners are usually as-
sumed to assert their policy objectives when parties stipulate coalition agreements 
(Budge and Laver 1993). However, when analysing Figure 8 and Table 11, we can 
see that the CDU (31,2%) did not prevent the SPD (18,5%) from asserting its anti-
GMO position in 2009. 
2009 represented a major turning point for the agribiotech agendas of both the 
CDU and the state of Thuringia as the staunchly anti-GMO Minister of Health, 
Heike Taubert (SPD), became the head of her party’s anti-GMO course (Thuringian 
Ministry of Health 2010). The course of action she pursued, which vehemently op-
posed the CDU’s pro-GMO agenda, was supported by the Greens, who re-entered 
the Landtag in 2009 after years of absence, as shown in Figure 8. This signified the 
first-ever political anti-GMO alliance was established in the Landtag. The SPD, the 
Greens, and the Left, backed by anti-GMO groups and the overwhelmingly anti-
GMO public, strongly opposed agribiotech. The anti-GMO camp gained further 
momentum in 2009, when the federal government banned the cultivation of 
MON810. The FDP, which was still moderate on agribiotech and which had also re-
joined the Landtag in 2009, could do nothing about this.  
In response, the CDU abandoned its pro-GMO agenda – not its neutral position 
– and began to oppose agribiotech actively. In 2010, the CDU faction, together with 
the SPD, submitted the proposition ‘Thuringia active against the cultivation of ge-
netically modified plants’ to the Landtag, where it was quickly adopted (Thuringian 
Landtag 2010). Moreover, the CDU-led state became the first German state to join 
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and remain in the European Network of GMO-free Regions – a transnational net-
work of EU regions that advocates farming without the use of agribiotech (Table 
12). In 2012, Thuringia adopted another resolution, committing the state, among 
other measures, to advocate the extension of existing labelling obligations to animal 
products whose production process included genetic engineering; however, this has 
not yet been regulated on the EU level (Thuringian Landtag 2012). Finally, also in 
2012, Thuringia hosted the 9th major conference of the abovementioned network in 
Erfurt (European GMO-Free Regions Network 2012). 
In a last step, we investigate whether the federal CDU obliged its Thuringian 
counterpart to align its GMO-position and whether the regional party responded 
by taking a neutral position. Upon first comparison of the positions of the federal 
CDU (Table 10) with those of the Thuringian CDU (Table 11), it appears that these 
branches only held congruent positions in 1994. It has been theorised above that 
regional branches should only have incentives to shift to neutral stances if their pol-
icy preferences diverge from those of their federal counterparts. However, as just 
revealed, the Thuringian CDU actually pursued a pro-GMO agenda from 1994–
2009, while it used neutral positions to limit the negative political consequences of 
an overtly pro-GMO position. Because the policy objectives of the two CDU 
branches were actually coherent from 1994-2009, it can be inferred that the regional 
branch did not use neutral positions to respond to any top-down pressure from its 
federal counterpart. 
However, the anti-GMO program of the Thuringian CDU has been in contrast to 
the federal CDU’s agenda since 2010, making a top-down effect plausible. But then 
again, one interviewee said that this could not have taken place as the regional 
branch would not have tolerated top-down interference in this domain. Rather, in 
line with our previous findings, the interviewee stated that it was electorally bene-
ficial for the Thuringian CDU to distinguish itself from the anti-GMO position vis-
à-vis the federal party. Figure 7 substantiates this reasoning by indicating that the 
support of almost all regional branches declined from 1994–2017 and that most of 
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them replaced their pro-GMO stances with non-positions (respectively neutral po-
sitions). Considering that the regional CDU branches performed these position-
shifts while the federal CDU was moderate/pro-GMO, we can arrive at the conclu-
sion that the neutral positions taken by the Thuringian CDU from 1999–2009 were 
not triggered by top-down pressure. 
Altogether, two major factors motivated the Thuringian CDU to take a neutral 
position in 1999 and to maintain this strategic position until 2009. The first was the 
negative public opinion sparked by the conflicts which were triggered by the two 
scientific experiments in local spheres. The second was the CDU’s endeavour to stay 
in power, which entailed relying on the anti-GMO SPD as a coalition partner. In 
addition, the CDU was strongly pressured by the SPD during their time in govern-
ment with the consequence that the CDU accepted an anti-GMO position in the 2009 
coalition agreement. The SPD, backed by a broad anti-GMO alliance in the Landtag 
and bolstered by the cultivation ban on MON810, subsequently managed to induce 
the CDU into pursuing an anti-GMO agenda. 
Due to space constraints, it is not possible to examine in the necessary qualitative 
manner whether the other parties also positioned themselves neutrally on agribi-
otech. However, to address this briefly, Figure 9 can be consulted as it depicts the 
evolution of the other parties’ position-taking on agribiotech at the regional level. 
When we compare position-taking of the regional branches with that of their federal 
counterparts (Table 10), two main phenomena can be observed. First, and as ex-
pected, the Greens positioned themselves most consistently anti-GMO across the 
two levels. Second, and more interestingly, the SPD and the FDP are both charac-
terised by rather large divergences on this policy topic since their regional branches 
have only rarely taken any positions at all (Table A7, Table A9). 
At least some of these supposedly non-positions may actually represent neutral 
positions. In other words, besides CDU branches, regional branches of the SPD and 
the FDP possibly positioned themselves neutrally on agribiotech for strategic rea-
sons as well. One possible explanation for these neutral positions could be that, due 
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to the existence of competences to regulate agribiotech at regional level in Germany 
(see, Chapter 2), regional parties could be even more exposed to pressure from re-
gional anti-GMO movements than federal parties, and therefore more frequently 
take neutral positions to achieve their political goals. 
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Figure 9. The Development of the Regional Parties’ Positions on Agribiotech, 1990-2017 
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4.7   Concluding Remarks 
Beyond its specific empirical results, this study makes two major contributions to 
the literature on policy positions. First, rather than ignoring supposedly non-posi-
tions, scholars should consider the possibility that these may actually represent neu-
tral policy stances – positions that parties take strategically to reconcile their con-
tested policy agendas with other important political objectives. Parties use neutral 
positions to pursue contested policy agendas while they seek to reduce possible 
electoral loss caused by voters turning away. They also use them to settle party-
internal disagreement and to reduce policy distance between desired coalition part-
ners. In addition, federal parties may use neutral positions to maintain policy 
stances that deviate from their regional branches (bottom-up).  
The second key finding is that parties tend to maintain positions previously taken 
on policy issues even though they thereby risk negative political consequences 
(Budge 1994). Although it would have been opportune for the federal CDU to aban-
don its pro-GMO position during the 2000s, it maintained this highly controversial 
position for many years. It only took a neutral stance following the simultaneous 
emergence of several critical factors that caused it to abandon its previous moderate 
position. That is to say, parties make use of the positional strategy of neutral posi-
tion-taking to maintain their contested policy-seeking aspirations. Hence, our re-
sults question the assumption that parties are first and foremost vote-seekers (Strøm 
1990; Müller and Strøm 1999). 
Finally, the present article attempted to provide a first step into exploring neutral 
position-taking, which is why it faces some limitations. The results are based on one 
party, one specific policy issue, and two contexts of partisan activities. For that rea-
son, further research is needed to explore the determinants underling neutral posi-
tion-taking; this should be done by examining other parties, policy issues, and con-
texts. This could improve our empirical understanding of strategic position-taking 
as well as our theorising on this matter. 
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Chapter 5 
5    Inside-Lobbying on the Regulation of New Plant 
Breeding Techniques in the European Union: 
Determinants of Venue Choices 
5.1    Introduction 
GMOs have been among the most controversial and unpopular policy issues in the 
EU since the mid-1990s. Numerous actors at various political levels have been in-
volved in the disputes raised by the topic of GMO field regulation (see, e.g. Dobbs 
2016). In addition to policymakers, political parties, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and various associations, also private companies are committed to 
representing their (economic) interests (see, e.g. Tosun and Schaub 2017). However, 
while researchers investigated the lobbying activities of anti-GMO groups (see, e.g., 
Bodiguel and Cardwell 2010; Clancy and Clancy 2016; Paarlberg 2014; Schurman 
and Munro 2006; Schurman 2004), there is a considerable need for research into the 
lobbying activities of companies interested in agricultural biotechnology (agribi-
otech). 
One of the main reasons for this research gap seems to be that biotech companies 
usually avoid campaigning publicly as GMOs are unpopular in many countries 
around the world, especially in the EU (see, e.g., Herring and Paarlberg 2016). Nev-
ertheless, these actors are frequently presumed to pursue their interests by means 
of inside-lobbying tactics, that is, through personal contacts with politicians or high-
ranking bureaucrats behind closed doors (see, e.g. Baumgartner and Jones 2009). 
However, research has so far provided few empirical insights into such activities. 
One of the few studies to have done so comes from Lamphere and East (2017), who 
showed that Monsanto ‘consistently employed discursive resources that concealed 
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details about actors and action, reflected trends among experts in global sustaina-
bility discourse, and reshaped narratives to promote itself, its products, and bio-
technology in general’. 
In addition, it became public in 2019 that a PR agency commissioned by Mon-
santo had collected data from critical journalists, politicians and other stakeholders 
in several EU member states, mainly on their attitudes to the active component 
glyphosate prior to its reassessment by the EU in 2017 (Bayer AG 2019). Since bio-
tech companies reputedly tend to pursue their goals through inside-lobbying tac-
tics, there is room and need for further investigations in this field. One of the fun-
damental aspects in this respect concerns the venues, i.e. certain institutional deci-
sion-settings, in which these firms choose to promote their widely unpopular objec-
tives. 
To reduce the above-described research lacunae, this study investigates the 
venue choices made by US-based Cibus in the EU multi-level system. Cibus aspired 
to market newly modified seeds to EU farmers even though EU institutions had not 
yet decided on whether products derived by ‘New Plant Breeding Techniques’ 
(NPBTs) were to be legally classified as GMOs or ‘traditionally’ bred products 
(Jones 2015c). As this classification entailed far-reaching implications, Cibus at-
tempted to influence the EU regulatory process on NPBTs in its favor. 
In light of this, the following research question guides this study: Which venues 
did Cibus select to promote NPBT deregulation in the EU and which factors explain 
these selection decisions? Our first interest is which venues Cibus chose for the pro-
motion of the unpopular issue of NPBT deregulation in the EU, whose multi-level 
polity provides advocates with multiple channels and targets for lobbying their ob-
jectives (Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Princen and Kerremans 2009). Secondly, we 
are interested in the factors which explain Cibus’ venue choices because previous 
research has revealed various venue-internal and -external factors accounting for 
advocates’ choices of venues (see, e.g., Buffardi et al. 2015; Holyoke et al. 2012; Ley 
2016; Ley and Weber 2015; Marshall and Bernhagen 2017; Pralle 2003). 
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This study draws on the concept of venue shopping, which became widespread 
in the last two decades, especially for analysing interest group politics (Baumgart-
ner and Jones 2009; Pralle 2003; Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Beyers et al. 2015; 
Buffardi et al. 2015; Huwyler et al. 2018). Based on various sources, it uses counter-
factual reasoning to assess the importance of institutional ‘closedness’ for Cibus’ 
venue choices as well as a comparative, factor-based approach to explain the firm’s 
choices for venues in certain EU member states. Finally, an in-depth study on Cibus’ 
activities in Germany in that field is conducted to produce more fine-grained infor-
mation on the reasons for Cibus’ choices. 
The results show that Cibus bypassed the EU level and chose national competent 
authorities (CAs), the key national bodies deciding on the legal classification of 
NPBT-modified crops, for its inside-lobbying tactics. The firm chose the CAs be-
cause their institutional ‘closedness’ promised to prevent debates on the unpopular 
topic of NPBT deregulation from becoming public. However, the company also did 
so, since the CAs’ were able to produce regulatory opinions on NPBTs and influence 
EU decision-making by cooperating with the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA). The firm lobbied CAs, which were embedded in national contexts favorable 
to agribiotech, based in Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom (UK). Two factors appear to have influenced Cibus’ choices for these 
countries: high-level political support for agribiotech and the high relevance of bio-
tech sectors. In contrast, public support for GMOs hardly had any influence, and 
virtually no association could be observed for the agricultural application of bio-
technology in the past nor for the weakness of domestic anti-GMO lobby groups. 
Finally, the in-depth study on Germany affirms that ‘closedness’ was important for 
Cibus’ choices and reveals that technical information served as an additional venue-
internal factor that influenced the firm’s choices. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section provides 
an overview of the EU regulatory process on NPBTs, laying the groundwork for the 
empirical analysis. Next, the theoretical framework is introduced. After presenting 
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the database and the methodical approach, the empirical analysis is executed in 
three steps. First, it assesses whether institutional ‘closedness’ influenced Cibus’ 
venue choices, then the institutional channel that the firm used to influence regula-
tory decision-making on NPBTs at the EU level is delineated. Secondly, it compar-
atively examines the reasons for Cibus’ decision to lobby CAs in certain member 
states and not in others. Thirdly, the case study is used to investigate further factors 
that influenced Cibus’ choices. The article ends with some concluding remarks. 
5.2    The EU Regulatory Process 
The European Commission made several attempts to agree on a regulatory ap-
proach towards NPBTs in the last decade. The authority started dealing with the 
issue in 2007 when it established a ‘New Techniques Working Group’ in order ‘to 
analyse a non-exhaustive list of techniques for which it is unclear whether they 
would result in a GMO’ and ‘whether the resulting products fall under the scope of 
the existing GMO […] legislation’ (European Commission 2011: 1–2). The group de-
fined the term ‘New Plant Breeding Technology’ to designate eight new breeding 
techniques.24 They evaluated them in the light of Directive 2001/18/EC, which de-
fines a GMO as ‘an organism/micro-organism […] in which the genetic material has 
been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recom-
bination’. The EU’s original GMO definition dates to the initial establishment of the 
EU regulatory framework as prescribed by Directive 90/220/EEC. Four years later, 
however, experts arrived at differing legal interpretations of the techniques, though 
most breeding tools were deemed not to produce GMOs (European Commission 
2011). 
The European Commission also mandated the ‘Joint Research Centre’, its scien-
tific service agency, to assess the economic relevance of new breeding techniques. 
 
24 The working group considered the following eight breeding techniques: Oligonucleotide Directed 
Mutagenesis technique, Zinc Finger Nuclease Technology (ZFN) comprising ZFN-1, ZFN-2, and 
ZFN-3, Cisgenesis and Intragenesis, Grafting Agro-infiltration, RNA-dependent DNA methylation, 
Reverse breeding and Synthetic genomics (European Commission 2011). 
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Its report was published in 2009. The scientific experts focused on the same eight 
techniques as evaluated by the beforementioned working group and investigated 
their status of research development of, the adoption of NPBTs by the breeding sec-
tor, the potential development of commercial products, and the challenges of de-
tecting resulting products. The report states that the level of development of new 
breeding techniques varies considerably and that, besides technical advantages, 
several challenges, of which consumer acceptance and regulatory aspects are the 
most important, exist for the commercialization of resulting products in the EU 
(Lusser et al. 2011). 
Moreover, the European Commission requested the EFSA to deliver a scientific 
opinion on plants developed through two new breeding tools (cisgenesis and 
intragenesis). EFSA concluded that the existing guidance for the risk assessment of 
GM plants (food and feed and environment) was applicable also for the evaluation 
of plants derived by these techniques and that there was no need to develop the 
existing guidance (EFSA 2012: 2). Moreover, EFSA compared the hazards associated 
with plants developed by the two techniques with those obtained by ‘conventional’ 
breeding or by genetic engineering (transgenesis). It concluded that ‘similar hazards 
can be associated with cisgenic and conventionally bred plants, while novel hazards 
can be associated with intragenic and transgenic plants’ (EFSA 2012). Since ‘unin-
tended changes’ might occur through various breeding techniques, EFSA suggested 
a case-by-case-based risk assessment for products derived by new breeding tools. 
In 2015, the European Commission called upon the so-called ‘High Level Group’, 
a scientific advisory board on the EU level, to compile a report on new breeding 
techniques. According to the report, which was published in 2017, new breeding 
tools offer various benefits. Among these is the reduced risk of unintended effects, 
since these new tools are more precise than their ‘conventional’ counterparts. More-
over, the board recommended in line with EFSA that safety assessments for newly 
modified products should be based on case-by-case assessments (European Com-
mission 2017). 
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It took more than a decade until the EU provided the member states with regu-
latory guidance on NPBTs. In July 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) ruled that these ‘genome editing’ techniques should be legally classified as 
genetic engineering techniques, wherefore resulting products fall under Directive 
2001/18/EC (CJEU 2018). The phase preceding the final regulatory decision, when 
plant scientists increasingly applied NPBTs, represented a crucial period for lobby-
ing activities. 
5.3    Theoretical Framework 
This study draws on the concept of venue shopping, which originally relates to ad-
vocates who face obstacles in certain decision-settings and therefore look out for 
other ones, which they consider more promising for the promotion of their policy 
objectives (Baumgartner and Jones 2009: 36). Recently, scientific attention surround-
ing advocates’ decision to select certain venues has increased; scholars refer to this 
as venue choice (Ley 2016; Ley and Weber 2015; Marshall and Bernhagen 2017; 
Huwyler et al. 2018). This study concentrates on the factors that influenced Cibus’ 
venue choices when this firm looked out for the most suitable decision-settings for 
promoting NPBT deregulation in the EU multi-level system. 
5.3.1    Unpopular Policies and Institutionally Closed Venues 
Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 36) have argued that some venue shoppers attempt 
to realize their policy objectives by inciting policy conflicts as this generates public 
attention and mobilization (‘image manipulation’), while others practice inside-lob-
bying tactics based on personal contact with politicians and high-ranked bureau-
crats. The central variable determining which of these two fundamentally diverging 
strategies advocates opt for essentially relates to policy objectives. Hence it seems 
expedient to distinguish whether their pursued policy goals are popular or unpop-
ular in certain societal/political spheres.  
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When advocates strive for popular policy objectives, which most citizens and the 
media welcome, they can use these headwinds to assert themselves in public dis-
courses and accomplish their policy goals. However, when advocates seek widely 
unpopular policy objectives, they will struggle to assert themselves in public dis-
courses because their policy opponents are backed by the major population and the 
media. To increase their chances of achieving their unpopular policy objectives de-
spite this disadvantage, advocates make use of certain strategies. Weaver (1986) 
noted in his seminal work that political actors employ certain ‘blame-avoidance’ 
strategies to reduce the risk of potential political losses when pursuing unpopular 
policy reforms because voters tend to be more sensitive to real or potential losses 
than to gains (see, e.g., Hood 2011; Hood et al. 2016; Hinterleitner 2017). The domain 
of social policy reform in particular has investigated these strategies, analyzing 
which specific strategies political advocates opt for and why (Vis 2015). Neverthe-
less, this lens of blame avoidance also been applied to other policy domains, re-
searching, for example, governments’ use of strategic communication for justifying 
the liberalization of national GMO regulatory frameworks (Wenzelburger and Kö-
nig 2017). 
At first glance, it appears that Cibus could have attempted to realize its objective 
of deregulating NPBT by mobilizing the public. After all, EU citizens are generally 
unfamiliar with the NPBT topic, meaning that framing strategies, for instance, could 
be successful. However, the decade-long struggle over GMOs has indicated that 
topical unfamiliarity, in combination with negative public bias, results in the in-
stinctive rejection of technological innovations (Legge and Durant 2010). In addi-
tion, the GMO case has shown that anti-GMO groups have been exploiting the topic 
since the mid-1990s to shape anti-GMO public sentiment (see, e.g., Clancy and 
Clancy 2016). This, in turn, has induced policy-makers in several member states to 
abandon supporting GMOs and instead advocate stricter regulations (see, e.g., 
Schurman and Munro, 2006). Accordingly, we have reason to assume that the stra-
tegic calculations underlying Cibus’ venue choices will differ from those of venue 
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shoppers seeking popular policy objectives. Consequently, we can infer from this 
that the company should not have incentives to choose venues that generate public 
attention and mobilization. Rather, we expect Cibus to opt for those venues, which 
facilitate its pursuit of NPBT deregulation behind closed doors. 
Research has shown that venues differ from each other institutionally in many 
ways and that advocates take features such as internal rules, decision-making pro-
cedures and institutional actors into account before choosing in which venues to 
pursue their policy objectives (Ley 2016; Ley and Weber 2015; Marshall and Bern-
hagen 2017; Constantelos 2010; Holyoke et al. 2012; Huwyler et al. 2018). In light of 
this, the first major argument of this article is that Cibus will choose venues that are 
characterized by institutional ‘closedness’. 
Institutionally ‘closed’ venues can be conceived as decision-making arenas that 
inhibit participation. For instance, participation can be confined to small sets of ac-
tors comprising, as a minimum, the venue shopper himself and the venue decision-
maker. Hence the public, the media, and policy opponents have no or only limited 
access to such ‘closed’ venues. This implies that institutional closedness limits the 
possibilities of external actors to interfere in venue-internal processes and to influ-
ence the judgments of venue decision-makers. However, it also means that advo-
cates of unpopular policy objectives can better anticipate the probable outcomes of 
their access to such venues. Furthermore, limited participation reduces the trans-
parency of venue-internal processes, meaning that social debates are unlikely to 
emerge, even though unpopular policy options might be at stake. This further raises 
the likelihood of advocates realizing unpopular policy goals. For example, bureau-
cratic authorities are more closed than, say, legislative bodies, in which internal pro-
cesses are more easily influenced by the public or policy opponents. 
Taken together, this paper argues that Cibus will choose venues characterized by 
institutional closedness for their promotion of NPBT deregulation since these re-
duce the risk of sparking public debates, which could ultimately threaten their 
chances of success.  
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5.3.2    Venue Decision-Makers and Venue Contexts 
Research has shown that venue shoppers take several venue-related factors into ac-
count before making their choices (see, e.g., Buffardi et al. 2015; Holyoke et al. 2012; 
Ley 2016; Ley and Weber 2015; Marshall and Bernhagen 2017; Pralle 2003). Never-
theless, venue decision-makers ultimately represent the key actors, who determine 
whether their activities will be successful. Holyoke and colleagues (2012) have 
shown that policy advocates assess their congruence with venue decision-makers 
regarding mutual policy preferences and ideological stances before making their 
venue choices. This information is crucial for venue shoppers as it is the most re-
vealing indicator of how successful their lobbying in a particular venue is likely to 
be.  
However, advocates often lack the necessary information concerning venue de-
cision-makers, for instance, when no working contacts previously existed or when 
advocates access multiple venues to promote their policy goals (‘venue diversifica-
tion’) (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). When advocates lack information on how 
venue decision-makers will most probably decide on certain issues, on which pa-
rameters will the venue shoppers base their venue choices? Ley and Weber (2015) 
indicated that venue shoppers choose venues by strategically assessing venue con-
texts. This argument aligns well with one central premise of behavioral theory, 
which states that societal contexts shape humans’ attitudes, standpoints, and deci-
sions (see, e.g. Larrick 2016). On this theoretical ground, we presume that advocates, 
who look out for the most promising venues to promote their objectives but lack 
information on venue decision-makers, will strategically consider venue contexts, 
since these shape the judgments of venue decision-makers. 
Assessing venue contexts should be less promising when issues are uncontrover-
sial and scientifically certain as, in these cases, decision-makers will guide their 
judgments using certain standard procedures. However, consideration of venue 
context should be expedient for advocates pursuing cutting-edge projects, since 
these entail scientific uncertainty and decision ambiguity (see, Florin 2014). For 
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example, certain member states invoked the precautionary principle for dealing 
with the uncertain risks arising from GMOs, while others did not (Tosun 2013a). In 
this light, we assume that, when dealing with scientifically uncertain/ambiguous 
policy issues, venue contexts may critically influence the judgments of venue deci-
sion-makers. Generally, this reasoning should apply to almost all venues, because 
ultimately venue decision-makers make formal decisions. Florin (2014), for in-
stance, has shown that bureaucratic agencies do not necessarily guide their deci-
sions by following certain standard procedures that have been provided by scien-
tific evidence; rather, even scientific bodies are responsive to societal or political 
pressures/demands. 
NPBTs represent an ambiguous and scientifically uncertain issue, which is why 
regulatory decision-making on this topic is cutting edge. In other words, regulators 
may arrive at different assessments of these new breeding tools. There is reason to 
expect that certain contextual factors may crucially influence venue decision-mak-
ers’ judgments on whether NPBTs should be regulated under the provisions already 
in place for GMOs. We therefore expect Cibus to choose venues located in contexts 
that are favorable to NPBT deregulation. 
5.3.3    Reasons for Cibus’ Venue Choices 
The first contextual factor that we expect to favor NPBT deregulation, and which 
might have influenced Cibus’ venue choices, relates to the application of agribiotech 
in domestic agriculture in the past. When farmers could plant GM crops or, put 
differently, where legislators did not prohibit them from doing so (even though ap-
propriate legal possibilities existed), agribiotech served as a part of agricultural pro-
duction. For this reason, future applications of NPBTs should be more likely in these 
countries. Accordingly, Cibus can be expected to choose venues in member states 
in which GMO farming took place since venue decision-makers should always con-
sider the future relevance of agribiotech, for example, to the agricultural 
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productivity and competitiveness of a country and therefore decide in favor of 
NPBT deregulation. 
The second factor of importance for this analysis is public support for agribiotech. 
Venue decision-makers are necessarily part of their respective societies, and collec-
tive attitudes on policy issues rub off on those of individual actors. So, if a national 
public is generally positive towards agribiotech, venue decision-makers in this 
country should also view this issue generally positively and voice regulatory opin-
ions in favor of NPBTs. Given that venue decision-makers are influenced by public 
sentiment on policy issues, we expect Cibus to choose venues located in member 
states in which most citizens are open to agribiotech. 
The third factor that we expect to influence Cibus’ choices is political support for 
agribiotech. Governments usually have a leadership role vis-à-vis subordinate au-
thorities. Hence, in countries where leading politicians are positive towards agribi-
otech, their top-down instructions are likely to materialize in venue decision-mak-
ers deciding in favor of NPBT deregulation. If agribiotech is supported at high po-
litical levels in a member state, this should increase Cibus’ willingness to select a 
venue for inside-lobbying in this country. 
The fourth factor relates to the economic relevance of domestic biotech sectors. 
National key industries can have a strong influence on the decisions of venue deci-
sion-makers as they often have long-standing working relationships with agency 
employees. Given that the operations of venue decision-makers are influenced by 
the importance of certain industry sectors, we expect Cibus to choose venues in 
member states that have strong biotech industries. 
The fifth factor important for this study relates to domestic anti-GMO lobby 
groups. These groups, among others, consist of NGOs as well as environmental, 
agricultural and consumer associations and have mobilized against GMOs in many 
member states, compelling policy-makers on different levels to enact stricter regu-
lations (see, e.g., Paarlberg 2014). Even though these groups have limited access to 
institutionally closed venues, they may interfere in venue-internal processes by 
 142 
 
attracting public attention towards the unpopular topic of NBPTs and by mobilizing 
against it, which could ultimately result in venue decision-makers choosing to reg-
ulate NPBTs. Accordingly, we expect Cibus to select venues in those countries, in 
which anti-GMO groups are weak. 
In sum, we expect Cibus to choose venues in member states in which: 1) agribi-
otech has been relevant in agricultural production; 2) the public is relatively open 
to agribiotech; 3) agribiotech is supported at high political levels; 4) biotech indus-
tries are powerful; 5) anti-GMO groups are weak. 
5.4    Clarifications on Data and Methods 
The dependent variable of this study, CA Accessed, is binary and takes the value 1 
for those member states, in which CAs received Cibus’ requests for scientific field 
trials with its NPBT-modified canola as prescribed by the EU’s authorization proce-
dure for the experimental release of GMOs into the environment (European Com-
mission 2018a). There are two main reasons why Cibus used requests for scientific 
field trials to influence the EU regulatory process on NPBTs.25 
To assess whether the feature of institutional ‘closedness’ influenced Cibus’ 
venue choices, we discuss the ‘closedness’/’openness’ of several venues that the EU 
multi-level system provides and that the firm could have lobbied. Based on coun-
terfactual reasoning, we examine whether it is plausible that this factor affected Ci-
bus’ venue choices. Accordingly, the data were gathered by means of Internet re-
search on biotech lobbying and from previous research on venue shopping in the 
EU multi-level system. 
To examine the effects of the factors specified in the previous section, we used 
different measurements. Generally, all indicators are not older than 2014, which is 
 
25 The first one is that the cultivation of the specific canola variety is considered suitable only for 
agricultural use in Scandinavian countries because of the climate. However, the company filed re-
quests to countries across the EU. The second reason is that the specific herbicide-tolerance of the 
canola contradicted usual commercialization practices in the EU as crops with these traits are usually 
not used in EU agriculture (Agrarzeitung 2015). 
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important because Cibus performed its lobbying activities from 2011–2014. For me-
thodical reasons, all indicators which were not already binarily were coded in this 
way. Table 15 below presents the indicators for all EU member states. 
First, the indicator of GMO farming is used to assess whether the past application 
of agribiotech in domestic agricultures has influenced Cibus’ choice. The indicator 
reports whether GM crops were ever cultivated commercially in a member state. 
The data were taken from the annual report of the US Department of Agriculture 
on agribiotech in the 28 EU member states (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
2015a). Secondly, to measure the public support for GMOs in the member states, we 
used the result of the question of the 2010 Special Eurobarometer on Biotechnology, 
which asked the respondents whether they agreed or disagreed that the develop-
ment of GM foods should be encouraged (European Commission 2010b). To make 
the indicator Public GMO-support binary, we calculated the average for all member 
states (25.96%), then separated the countries against this threshold. 
Using data on the voting behavior of national governments on the authorization 
of new GM products in the Council of the European Union, we examine whether it 
affects Cibus’ venue choices (Council Voting). If governments voted more often ‘Yes’ 
or ‘Abstention’ than ‘No’, they can be assumed to support NPBT deregulation. In 
addition, we combined the ‘Yes’ and ‘Abstention’ votes, since the latter is usually 
considered a softer form of approval as abstentions prevent the Council from reach-
ing qualified majorities, thereby prevent the authorization of GM products. The 
data on this variable were taken from Mühlböck and Tosun (2015). 
The fourth indicator refers to the economic relevance of domestic biotech sectors 
and indicates whether or not a member state has a leading biotech industry. The 
data for the variable Strong biotech industry were taken from Cooper (2009: 537). Fi-
nally, to determine whether anti-GMO groups are influential – the fifth factor – we 
used the indicator Weak Anti-GMO Lobby, which indicates in binary fashion whether 
or not the environmental NGO ‘Friends of the Earth’ operates in a member state. 
We used this indicator as research has shown that this NGO, in particular, 
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functioned as the key actor of GMO resistance in several member states (Seifert 
2012: 218). Since data on anti-GMO groups in the EU-28 were not available, we 
asked Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace for member data, but unfortunately, we 
did not receive it. Therefore, we took data for this variable from the Friends of the 
Earth Europe Annual Review (2014). 
Based on the five binary indicators, we created a crosstab and calculated 
Cramers’ V to explain Cibus’ venue choices comparatively (see, Table 14 below). 
Cramers V is a contingency coefficient that lies between 0 and 1. It is a measure of 
the strength of the relationship between two nominally scaled variables if at least 
one of the two variables has more than two values. If Cramer’s V = 0, then no asso-
ciation exists between two variables; if Cramer’s V = 1, a perfect connection exists 
between the variables (Cramers’ V = 0.1–0.3: weak association; 0.4–0.5 middle asso-
ciation; > 0.5 strong association). 
Finally, to explore Cibus’ venue choice for Germany, several primary data 
sources were used, including official documents, position papers, legal opinions, 
and scientific reports. In addition, partly redacted confidential communication be-
tween Cibus and the German CA were consulted. These data were obtained by Ger-
man NGOs by means of a freedom of information request and can be accessed in 
the online appendix. Lastly, we complemented the database for the case study by 
drawing on insights from Corporate Europe Observatory (2016) and Sprink and col-
leagues (2016). 
5.5    Empirical Analysis 
Cibus considers itself the ‘world leader in advanced breeding technologies, gener-
ally, and advanced non-transgenic [non-genetic engineering] breeding, specifically’ 
(Cibus 2018). The company employs a breeding technique called ‘Rapid Trait De-
velopment System’, which, it claims, facilitates non-genetic engineering plant 
breeding. Using this breeding tool, the company developed several plants: herbi-
cide tolerant canola, Glyphosate tolerant flax, herbicide-tolerant rice, and potato 
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resistant to Phytophthora (Cibus 2018). However, none of these products have been 
commercialized in the EU yet – unlike in other countries, including, the US and 
Canada (The Western Producer 2016). 
5.5.1    Assessing the Effect of Institutional Closedness on Cibus’ Choices 
As indicated above, the fundamental competences for the regulation of NPBTs re-
side at the EU level, where the European Commission, the Council of the European 
Union, the European Council, the European Parliament, the CJEU, the EFSA, as well 
as the various subdivisions of these bodies, such as the Directorate-Generals in the 
European Commission, all represent possible venues that Cibus could have ac-
cessed (Beyers and Kerremans 2012). Most of these venues, except for the European 
Parliament, are rather closed in institutional terms, for which reason one might 
think that they offered promising venues for Cibus aspirations.26 However, lobby-
ing these venues would not have guaranteed success for the company, because EU 
institutions have failed for about a decade to establish an NPBT regulatory ap-
proach, as indicated in Section 2 above. Hence, it is highly plausible that the persis-
tent EU regulatory gridlock on NPBTs compelled Cibus to make use of the multi-
level system and look out for promising venues for their promotion of NPBT dereg-
ulation at the member state level. Consequently, Cibus selected national CA’s for its 
lobbying strategy. 
The CAs are staffed with appointed and career professionals and are designed to 
concentrate their scientific and technical expertise on tasks ranging from food, ani-
mal feed, consumer products, pesticides, and veterinary drugs to GMOs. The na-
tional agencies work closely together within the network on GMO risk assessment, 
which allows them to share information, expertise and practices among each other 
and particularly with EFSA (European Food Safety Authority 2018). Both the CA-
 
26 The consequences of the institutional ‘openness’ of the European Parliament is shown by the fact 
that a proposal filed by a British MP (EPP) in 2016 (i.e. after Cibus’ activities) to classify NPBTs as 
‘precision breeding’ (i.e. not genetic engineering) was cut from the European Parliament’s agenda 
before it reached the decision-making stage (European Parliament 2016). 
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internal processes as well as their operations within expert networks take place be-
hind closed doors. Usually, the agencies only publish their final assessments and 
press releases, and internal processes are generally not accessible to the public. 
Therefore, external actors have extremely limited possibilities to intervene in either 
the internal or network-based processes of the CAs.  
For this reason, it seems plausible that Cibus’ selected the CAs because of their 
institutional closedness. The company could be certain that social debates and pol-
icy conflicts would be unlikely to emerge from their accessing of these venues, 
which consequently increased its likelihood of success. Nevertheless, we cannot 
provide sufficient evidence at this point that Cibus’ venue choices were in fact pri-
marily affected by the feature of closedness, since two other factors are also likely 
to have influenced its choices. 
The first of these concerns the necessary competences of venue decision-makers 
to assess whether NPBT-modified crops represent GMOs. This decision is such a 
complex one that many venue decision-makers, such as politicians, cannot even an-
swer it competently at all. However, the CA professionals have the scientific and 
technical expertise to classify NPBTs on scientifically sound bases. The second factor 
relates to the fact that the basic regulatory decisions on NPBTs are taken at the EU 
level and not at national or regional levels. Hence Cibus could, for instance, have 
lobbied competent ministries, such as those for agriculture or certain expert com-
missions. However, this would not have been expedient for them, for the influence 
of these venues on the NPBT regulatory process at the EU level, even though it may 
be present, is generally unclear. The CAs can, however, use the institutionalized 
cooperation bodies with EFSA to exert influence over the regulatory assessment of 
biotechnology products (see below). 
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The opportunity structure, as well as the way Cibus aimed to influence the EU 
regulatory process on NPBTs, is schematized in Figure 10. Cibus made use of two 
institutional procedures as defined by EU law. The first one is the authorization 
procedure for experimental GMO releases carried out by national agencies in the 
member states, namely CAs. The second procedure is the institutionalized cooper-
ation of these national bodies with EFSA in the regulatory assessment of biotech-
nology products. 
Source: own presentation. 
The authorization procedure for the experimental release of GMOs into the envi-
ronment requires that a ‘person or a company […]first obtain written authorisation 
by the competent national authority of the [m]ember [s]tate within whose territory 
the experimental release is to take place’ (European Commission 2018a). Usually, 
when a CA has to decide on a request for an experimental release, it bases its deci-
sion on an evaluation of the risks to the environment and human health presented 
by the GM crop (Directive 2001/18/EC). The European Commission (2018a) denom-
inates such an authorization process as a ‘purely national procedure as it is only 
applicable in the [m]ember state where the notification was submitted’. 
Figure 10. Scheme of the Opportunity Structure 
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However, Cibus did not request the CAs for scientific releases of GM crops, 
which would have triggered the standard procedure commonly applied for years. 
Rather, the company requested the bodies for scientific releases of a crop modified 
by its new breeding technique (Rapid Trait Development System). Hence the re-
quest denoted a completely new challenge for the CAs, which had to evaluate 
whether they considered the crop a GMO. Only after these assessments could they 
decide on the release of the Cibus’ modified canola. Of course, the firm could have 
performed this lobbying strategy during the phase of NPBT regulatory gridlock at 
the EU level, as indicated in Section 5.2. 
In the second procedure, the CAs cooperate with EFSA in the regulatory assess-
ment of biotechnology products. EFSA is the key player for scientific advice on and 
risk assessment of food products developed by agricultural biotechnology at the EU 
level (Paoletti et al. 2008). While EFSA provides scientific information, the decision-
making on the authorization, inspection, and control of products is the responsibil-
ity of the risk managers, namely the European Commission and the individual 
member states. Although the member states mainly function as risk managers, at 
least two channels exist by means of which national decisions can influence regula-
tory activities at the EU level. 
First, the CAs can influence GMO assessments conducted by the EFSA. They do 
this by issuing opinions on EFSA safety assessments when GM products are to be 
cultivated or processed commercially. EFSA consults the CAs on every GMO appli-
cation and provides feedback to their scientific concerns during the risk assessment 
process (Paoletti et al. 2008: 71). Secondly, national bodies can promote their views 
by means of information and expertise exchange as well as by best practices within 
a joint network, in which they work together with EFSA on certain projects on GMO 
risk assessment (European Food Safety Authority 2018).  
Taken together, there is reason to assume that Cibus’ venue choices were indeed 
influenced by the feature of institutional closedness. Nevertheless, apparently, two 
other factors also motivated Cibus to choose the national CAs: their specific 
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competence for classifying NPBTs, and their privileged ability to influence EU reg-
ulatory decision-making via EFSA. Since the CAs were institutionally closed, capa-
ble to assess NPBTs in regulatory terms, and could, at least in principle, influence 
EFSA opinions, they represented favorable venues for Cibus’ lobbying aspirations. 
Nevertheless, our results on institutional closedness are not entirely clear, which is 
why we further examine the relevance of this aspect in the in-depth study on Ger-
many.  
5.5.2    Comparative Explanation of Cibus’ Venue Choices 
When Cibus started filing requests for field experiments in 2011, the firm lacked 
information regarding how the CAs would classify NPBTs in regulatory terms, for 
these bodies had scarcely dealt with the issue of NPBT regulation. After all, NPBTs 
only started to be developed during the mid-2000s, and for years no commercially 
relevant applications existed that would have activated the CAs to deal with this 
issue.27 Due to this lack of information, Cibus presumably had strong incentives to 
consider certain contextual factors in their assessment of how successful they were 
likely to be when lobbying CAs in particular member states. 
Table 13 shows that Cibus chose CAs in six EU member states, namely Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, and the UK in order to provide regulatory opin-
ions on its NPBT-modified canola. Even though it is not the focus of this study, the 
company’s success in this regard should be noted as each of the CAs came to the 
opinion that the crop should not be regulated as a GMO.28 Can these – from Cibus’ 
point of view, successful – venue choices be in terms of the indicators introduced 
above? 
 
27 The first NPBT crops reached marketability in the early 2010s, which increased the need for appro-
priate regulatory frameworks, including the legal assessment of NPBTs, around the world (Wolt et 
al. 2016). 
28 In addition, the authorities noted that if the European Commission arrived at a differing evalua-
tion, they would reconsider their opinions. Although Cibus’ main interest was not to conduct field 
trials in these countries, it started executing field trials in Sweden and the UK after the authorities 
permitted these experiments (Gen-ethisches Netzwerk 2015). 
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Table 13. The CAs’ Regulatory Opinions upon Cibus’ Request, 2011–2014 
Member State Competent Authority Regulatory Opinion 
Finland Finnish Board of Gene Technology non-GE 
Germany Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food 
Safety 
non-GE 
Ireland Food Safety Authority of Ireland non-GE 
Spain Inter-ministerial Council for GMOs non-GE 
Sweden Swedish Board of Agriculture non-GE 
United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food and Rural Af-
fairs 
non-GE 
Source: Own compilation based on various data sources. 
Table 14 presents the results of a crosstab of the 28 EU countries, separated into 
‘CA Accessed’ and ‘Other Member States’ – i.e. those which have not received re-
quest for field trials by Cibus. In addition, the crosstab encompasses the five indica-
tors introduced for calculating the associations for each of them separately. The fol-
lowing interpretation of the results can be easily comprehended by using the over-
view of the member states and the indicators given by Table 15 below. 
The calculation of Cramer’s V in Table 14 shows that no association exists be-
tween GMO Farming and Cibus’ venue choices. The company filed requests to only 
two of the six countries in which GMO cultivation took place, namely Germany and 
Spain (33,3%). However, GMO farming was of minor importance in Germany until 
it was banned in 2009 (Cooper 2009). Only in Spain, where the EU-wide most liberal 
GMO regulatory framework exists, does GM maize continue to be an important 
economic factor. Remarkably, the firm also targeted Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and 
the UK, even though farmers have never cultivated GM crops for commercial pur-
poses in these countries (Table 15). Furthermore, farmers also planted GM crops in 
six member states, whose CAs did not receive requests from Cibus (27,27%): the 
Czech Republic, France, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. 
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Table 14. Results of the Crosstab 
* Bulgaria was excluded from the analysis. 
The computation of Cramer’s V indicates a weak relationship between those 
countries which Cibus targeted and public support for agribiotech (Public Opinion). 
The firm lobbied Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Spain, and the UK (83,33%) – all coun-
tries, whose populations view agribiotech relatively positive (Table 15). Of the six 
countries accessed, only in Germany was public opinion below the average of all 
the member states. The publics in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia also consider ag-
ribiotech relatively positive (Table 15; 45,45%); however, Cibus did not file requests 
to those countries’ CAs. 
Cramer’s V shows a strong association for Council Voting. In other words, all 
countries in which CAs were requested by Cibus voted in favor of the authorization 
of new GM products in the Council of the European Union (100%). This pattern 
even includes Germany, which often abstained from such votes due to inter-minis-
terial disagreement (see above). Remarkably, seven other countries – Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Slovenia – also voted 
 CA Accessed  
(6 MS) 
Other Member States  
(22 MS) 
Cramer’s V (p-
value) 
GMO Farming 33,3% 
(2 MS) 
27,27% 
(6 MS) 
0,0535 
(0,8231) 
Public Opinion 83,33% 
(5 MS) 
45,45% 
(10 MS) 
0,3117 
(0,2351) 
Council Vot-
ing* 
100% 
(6 MS) 
33,33% 
(7 MS) 
0,5548 
(0,0156) 
Strong Biotech 
Industry 
66,66% 
(4 MS) 
9,09% 
(2 MS) 
0,5757 
(0,0129) 
Weak Anti-
GMO Lobby 
16,66% 
(1 MS) 
22,73% 
(5 MS) 
0,0598 
(0,8065) 
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mostly in favor of new authorizations in the Council (33,33%); however, none of 
their CAs received Cibus’ requests.  
Table 14 also shows a strong association for Strong Biotech Industry. Of the coun-
tries with powerful biotech industries, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and the UK have 
been lobbied by the firm (66,66%). While France and the Netherlands, the other two 
member states with powerful biotech sectors, were not lobbied by Cibus (9,09%), 
Ireland and Spain received requests for field experiments with the modified canola, 
even though they have no major biotech industries (Table 15). 
Finally, Table 14 shows that no association exists between the indicator Weak 
Anti-GMO Lobby and Cibus’ venue choices. Of the member states lobbied by the 
firm, only the UK has a non-influential anti-GMO lobby (16,66%). The other member 
states with weak anti-GMO lobbies are Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Slove-
nia (Table 15, 22,73%). From our point of view, the indicator employed for this var-
iable seems rather reliable for Portugal, Romania, and Slovenia; however, it does 
not appear to fit with Greece and Italy since these two countries have relevant anti-
GMO lobbies, which mostly come from the agricultural sector and defend the eco-
nomic interests of organic and conventional food production chains. 
Taking the observations together, two factors can be observed that appear to have 
influenced Cibus’ choices for CAs in certain member states: high-level political sup-
port for agribiotech (Council Voting) and the high relevance of biotech sectors (Strong 
Biotech Industry). Values for Cramer’s V for these main explanatory factors are sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level, which further strengthens our results, especially 
when considering the low number of cases (p-values: 0,0156; 0,0129). Public support 
for GMOs (Public Opinion) turned out to have minimal influence. The relationship 
is also not statistically significant. It should be noted, however, that, due to the small 
number of cases, weak associations are less likely to be statistically significant in 
general. Virtually no association could be observed for the agricultural application 
of biotechnology in the past (GMO Farming) nor for the weakness of domestic anti-
GMO lobby groups (Weak Anti-GMO Lobby). 
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Table 15. Overview of the Indicators 
 
Member State 
(* CA Accessed) 
GMO 
Farming 
Public 
Opinion 
Council 
Voting 
Strong  
Biotech 
Industry 
Weak 
Anti-
GMO 
Lobby 
1 Austria      
2 Belgium  X X   
3 Bulgaria   -    
4 Croatia      
5 Cyprus      
6 Czech Republic  X X X   
7 Denmark  X    
8 Estonia  X X   
9 Finland*  X X X  
10 France X  X X  
11 Germany* X  X X  
12 Greece     X 
13 Hungary  X    
14 Ireland*  X X   
15 Italy     X 
16 Latvia      
17 Lithuania      
18 Luxembourg       
19 Malta  X    
20 Netherlands  X X X  
21 Poland X X    
22 Portugal X X   X 
23 Romania X    X 
24 Slovakia X X X   
25 Slovenia   X  X 
26 Spain* X X X   
27 Sweden*  X X X  
28 United Kingdom*  X X X X 
Note: Bulgaria voted each once with ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ in the Council. 
The varying associations can also be seen in cases that arguably provide rela-
tively unfavorable contexts for Cibus’ objective of NPBT deregulation. For instance, 
Table 15 indicates that GM crops have never been cultivated commercially in Ire-
land, that the Irish biotech industry is not particularly powerful, and that anti-GMO 
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lobbies exist in this country. Nevertheless, Cibus’ lobbied the country, presumably 
because Irish governments strongly supported GMOs. 
Based on these findings, it is also worth considering the countries that were not 
selected by Cibus, since several interesting patterns can be observed. According to 
Table 15, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in particular would have represented 
rather favorable contexts for Cibus’ venue strategy. In both countries, farmers com-
mercially cultivated GM crops, the public was relatively positive regarding GMOs, 
and governments mostly voted in favor of new GM products. However, since the 
factor of strong biotech industries appears to have had a rather strong influence on 
Cibus’ venue choices, Cibus might have been motivated to leave these two countries 
out of its lobbying strategy since of neither them have especially strong biotech sec-
tors. 
Furthermore, interesting patterns exist regarding a large group of countries to 
which Cibus also filed no requests. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg all represent countries that are characterized by 
overtly unfavorable contexts in terms of the indicators (Table 15). The fact that no 
CAs in these countries were chosen by Cibus generally substantiates our empirical 
observations above. Finally, there is another group of countries that is characterized 
by rather favorable contexts for NPBT deregulation, which, however, has also not 
been lobbied by the firm. This group consists of Belgium, Estonia, France, the Neth-
erlands, Poland, and Portugal (Table 15). 
Overall, we find empirical support for the reasoning that Cibus selected CAs in 
member states where agribiotech is supported politically at high levels and where 
strong biotech industries exist. It becomes even clearer that Cibus made their venue 
choices for strategic reasons, when considering also those member states whose CAs 
were not accessed by the company. Next, the case of Germany is investigated in 
order to reflect both the relevance of institutional closedness and certain venue-ex-
ternal factors. In addition, the case study serves to explore venue-internal factors 
that might have influenced Cibus’ venue choices. 
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5.5.3    Explaining Cibus’ Choice of Germany 
In 2014, the German CA – the Federal Office for Consumer Protection and Food 
Safety (BVL) – received Cibus’ request for field experiments by Perseus Consulting 
(Perseus), a consultancy that specializes in ‘biotechnology regulatory challenges’ 
(Perseus 2018). The BVL’s response to this request provide enlightening insights for 
our argument regarding institutional closedness. The BVL wrote back that 
‘the evaluation of your request by the BVL will not include any participation or active 
information of the public or involvement of other authorities. We will probably ask our 
national expert committee (ZKBS [Central Commission for Biological Safety]) for an 
opinion on the request.’ 
This statement indicates that the BVL was aware of how important it was for 
Cibus that the proceedings take place behind closed doors. Therefore, even the Ger-
man CA’s awareness that Perseus wanted the regulatory assessment to be dealt 
with away from other stakeholders and the public supports our above reasoning 
regarding institutional closedness. 
Technical Information & Personal Contacts 
In fact, the BVL mandated the ZKBS to be the evaluation authority. This advisory 
body should now assess whether the modified canola falls into the scope of the Ger-
man genetic engineering law, which reflects the GMO definition included in Di-
rective 2001/18/EC. What is important here is that the ZKBS had already published 
a position paper on NPBTs in 2012. Therein, the experts concluded that most NPBT-
modified products, including such produced by Cibus, should not be considered 
and regulated as GMOs (BVL 2012). In fact, the committee, upon the BVL’s mandate 
and in line with its previous opinion, classified Cibus’ canola as non-GMO (ZKBS 
2015). Does this opinion represent an unpredictable, fortunate decision for Cibus or 
did its consultant, Perseus, know about how ZKBS would classify the crop? 
Apparently, the latter holds true. In the request for the field trials sent to the CAs, 
Perseus, among many other things, refers to the ZKBS’s 2012 regulatory opinion 
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(Perseus 2014). Most importantly, Perseus states therein that the ZKBS concluded 
that  ‘organisms which have been generated using the ODM [Oligo Directed Muta-
genesis] technique are not GMOs’ (Perseus 2014: 9). To make this clear: it is scientif-
ically widely undisputed that the breeding technique employed by Cibus to modify 
the canola (Rapid Trait Development System) represents one variant of ODM. In-
terestingly, Perseus, in its request for field trials, also referred to the regulatory opin-
ions from two other CAs that received requests – the UK DEFRA and the Swedish 
Board of Agriculture, which had also concluded that the canola would not fall in 
the scope of their respective national GMO legislations (Perseus 2014: 8). 
Hence, it can be concluded that Perseus was aware that the BVL would mandate 
the ZKBS to evaluate Cibus’ canola. On this ground, the consultant apparently an-
ticipated the BVL’s regulatory opinion. Ultimately, in early-2015, Cibus received the 
response from the German CA, Perseus had anticipated. In fact, the BVL stated that 
the canola would not be considered a GMO in Germany, wherefore it would be de-
regulated, which means that field trials with the crop could be conducted without 
regulatory oversight (BVL 2015a). 
Since personal contacts lie at the centre of theoretical considerations on inside-
lobbying tactics, we also attempted to empirically investigate a possible influence 
of such relationships between the lobbyist (Perseus/Cibus) and the venue decision-
maker (BVL) on Cibus’ venue choices. Therefore, we asked several actors for inter-
views; however, unfortunately, we could interview only one expert as the others 
have not responded to our requests. The anonymous expert did not want to com-
ment on possible personal contacts, however, according to the expert, a personal 
relationship appeared as not being decisive for Cibus to request the BVL. Instead, 
the interviewee pointed out that it would have been much more important that the 
outcome of the inquiry to the BVL had been open in principle, which means that the 
BVL could have assessed Cibus’ rape as a GMO but also as a non-GMO. This is 
remarkable, as it corresponds with our above observation regarding the relevance 
of the ZKBS (2012) regulatory opinion. 
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Nonetheless, to shed at least some light to whether personal contacts influenced 
Cibus’ venue choices we again consulted the e-mail correspondence between Per-
seus and the BVL. The e-mails at least suggest that personal contacts between both 
sides might have existed. The fact that the leading officials of Perseus and the BVL 
addressed each other by their forenames in the e-mails at least points into that di-
rection, especially when considering that, in Germany, people usually use their fore-
names if a personal relationship exists. Although this observation might indicate a 
personal relationship, it is far from being sufficient enough to draw any conclusion 
regarding whether this influenced Cibus to choose the BVL for its lobbying strategy. 
In sum, one venue-internal factor appears to have influenced Cibus’ choice for 
the German CA, namely the ‘technical information’ published by the ZKBS in 2012. 
Since Perseus apparently knew the bureaucratic procedure, according to which the 
BVL usually relies on ZKBS opinions in such cases, the firm could be confident that 
lobbying the BVL would be successful. 
Anti-GMO groups 
Finally, the German case illustrates the relevance of anti-GMO groups, a venue-ex-
ternal factor that we viewed as being of minor importance for the venue choices 
taken by Cibus above. First of all, Germany diverges significantly from the other 
five countries that were lobbied because it is the only one in which the CAs’ decision 
to deregulate Cibus’ canola sparked strong resistance of an anti-GMO coalition. In 
Germany, this coalition consisted of various environmental, agricultural, and con-
sumer associations. Responding to the BVL’s de-regulatory decision, the anti-GMO 
coalition legally contested it in March 2015. The coalition stated that the BVL would 
not have the competence to evaluate whether the canola represented a GMO and 
that this regulatory decision would fall into the sole competences of the European 
Commission. Moreover, the objection criticized that a non-application of co-exist-
ence rules to Cibus’ canola would carry high risks of crossover with conventional 
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canola as this crop is one of the most frequently planted crops in Germany (Brock-
mannn 2015). 
In June 2015, the BVL (2015b) rejected the legal objection and confirmed its initial 
notification, though this did not induce the anti-coalition to resign. On the contrary, 
the latter issued a legal complaint against the BVL’s rejection in July 2015, obligating 
the BVL to inform the European Commission by the end of that same month that 
the court proceedings effectuated a suspension of its regulatory decision. As a re-
sult, this prohibited Cibus from carrying out further field trials in Germany, at least 
not until a final court decision was reached. In the meantime, in June 2015, as an-
other result of these proceedings in Germany, the European Commission (2015) 
warned the member states against the unauthorized approval of field trials with 
Cibus’ canola. 
The authority stated that it had already conducted a legal analysis of NPBTs and 
their resulting products against the backdrop of Directive 2001/18/EC. They there-
fore asked the member states to adopt a ‘protective approach’, which meant that 
they should not approve field trials with the canola – as well as stop existing exper-
iments – until the legal status of NPBTs could be clarified at the EU level (European 
Commission 2015). It took three more years until the CJEU ruled that the NPBTs 
represent genetic engineering techniques and that products of these new tools fall 
within the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC (CJEU 2018). Accordingly, the BVL with-
drew its regulatory opinion on Cibus’ canola in August 2018, and, since then, the 
scientific authority has considered the modified crop as being a GMO (BVL 2018). 
Taken together, the in-depth study substantiates our assumption that institu-
tional closedness represented an important factor for Cibus when calculating its 
venue choices, since the BVL and Cibus’ consultant, Perseus, addressed the topics 
of limited participation and transparency in their communication. Moreover, the 
venue-internal factor of technical information provided by a venue helps explaining 
Cibus’ choice for Germany. Whether personal contacts influenced the choice for 
Germany could not be clarified sufficiently. However, we could show that venue-
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external factors can be significant when determining whether lobbyists will achieve 
their policy goals because a German anti-GMO coalition managed to interfere with 
the processes of the BVL. Finally, we could show that Cibus accessed the German 
CA hoping that this would remain hidden; however, the anti-GMO coalition be-
came active and prevented Cibus from obtaining a blank check for NPBT deregula-
tion. 
5.6    Concluding Remarks 
This study investigated the inside-lobbying activities of Cibus, a US biotech firm 
that advocated the deregulation of NPBTs within the EU and hoped thereby to mar-
ket its newly modified seeds to EU farmers. Based on the concept of venue shop-
ping, the study focused on two main explanations for why this firm chose national 
CAs in certain member states to pursue NPBT deregulation. By using different 
sources and methods, the study found general support for both arguments, namely 
that advocates of unpopular policy objectives favor institutionally closed venues 
and that they strategically assess the favorability of certain contextual factors before 
choosing venues. 
The results of this study support the argument that advocates of unpopular pol-
icy objectives favor institutionally closed venues as these reduce the risk of policy 
conflicts entering the public sphere. In principle, the EU multi-level system pro-
vided Cibus with multiple channels and targets for lobbying NPBT deregulation. 
However, the company chose the CAs as it could be certain that social debates and 
policy conflicts would be unlikely to emerge from accessing these bureaucratic and 
science-based authorities. The case study on Germany substantiates this finding as 
limited participation and transparency have been important issues in the commu-
nication between the German CA (BVL) and Cibus’ consultancy Perseus. However, 
it also turned out that Cibus’ chose the CAs both because of their specific compe-
tences, which allowed them to classify NPBT-modified crops in regulatory terms, 
and because of their influence on EU decision-making. 
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The second major argument explaining Cibus’ venue choices was based on the 
assumption that venue decision-makers ultimately represent the key actors who de-
termine whether lobbying activities in these decision-making arenas will be suc-
cessful. We argued that when advocates lack information regarding the decisions 
which venue decision-makers will likely make, they will strategically consider 
venue contexts, for these influence the judgments of venue decision-makers when 
dealing with issues that are cutting-edge in terms of scientific uncertainty and deci-
sion ambiguity. Five indicators were used for assessing how favorable national con-
texts were towards NPBT deregulation, and two factors were ascertained as expla-
nations for Cibus’ choices of Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, and the 
UK. The first one relates to the high-level political support for agribiotech, as meas-
ured by the voting behavior of national governments on the authorization of new 
GM products in the Council of the European Union. The second factor refers to the 
economic relevance of national biotech industries, as provided by Cooper (2009). 
While public opinion on GMOs turned out to have minimal influence, virtually no 
associations could be observed for prior agricultural application of biotechnology 
nor for the weakness of domestic anti-GMO lobby groups. 
Finally, the case study of Germany revealed that one venue-internal factor also 
influenced Cibus’ choice for this country, a member state that can be considered as 
being ‘conflicted’ on agribiotech. This factor relates to specific technical information 
provided by the venue. More precisely, Cibus could be sure that lobbying the Ger-
man CA would be successful as it had access to an opinion promoting the deregu-
lation of NPBTs, which was published by the German expert panel (ZKBS) in 2012. 
Apparently, Cibus knew that this opinion would function as the basis of the BVL’s 
decision. 
Overall, the study showed that lobbyists may carefully consider venue-internal 
and -external factors to calculate their chances of success before opting for certain 
venues. Nevertheless, this study examined a very specific empirical case, which is 
why the generalizability of the results obtained is limited. In order to produce more 
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generalizable insights, and to examine the importance of other influential factors, 
further qualitative research is needed. Future inquiries could, for instance, analyze 
how influential resource endowments are for lobbyists’ venue choices. This deter-
minant is widely considered influential, but did not play a role in the case at hand. 
The central take-home message for companies and business associations is that 
looking out for suitable venues is worthwhile, especially if they are seeking to pro-
mote unpopular topics. Institutionally closed venues are particularly suitable for 
advancing unpopular topics, but the suitability of each needs to be carefully as-
sessed in order to minimalize the risk of producing negative effects. In addition, 
considering venue-internal information, such as the decisions which decision-mak-
ers will (most probably) reach on certain issues, and venue-external information, 
such as societal and political support for policy topics, is particularly important. 
Policy-makers can take away from this piece that scientifically and technically-
based decisions can spark societal conflicts if they become known to the general 
public. If this is the case, political actors need to take the appropriate decisions 
through democratic procedures. Finally, if civil society is interested in uncovering 
inside-lobbying activities, it should support respective interest groups and NGOs 
as these have the means to investigate such lobbying tactics, initiate public dis-
courses, and even take legal action.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. List of Municipalities with Cultivation Bans 
Name of municipality State Date 
München Bavaria 01.02.1999 
Riedstadt Hesse 24.06.1999 
Adendorf Lower Saxony 15.07.1999 
Schwebheim Bavaria 26.08.1999 
Maintal Hesse 06.09.1999 
Burgkunstadt Bavaria 17.09.1999 
Kümmersbruck Bavaria 12.10.1999 
Langenhagen Lower Saxony 29.11.1999 
Reutlingen Baden-Wuerttemberg 15.12.1999 
Neetze Lower Saxony 17.02.2000 
Burgdorf (Hannover) Lower Saxony 09.03.2000 
Seligenstadt Hesse 28.03.2000 
Waldbüttelbrunn Bavaria 03.05.2000 
Friedrichsdorf (Taunus) Hesse 18.05.2000 
Neustadt an der Aisch Bavaria 07.06.2000 
Nidderau Hesse 16.06.2000 
Blaubeuren Baden-Wuerttemberg 01.09.2000 
Hannover Lower Saxony 01.09.2000 
Schwalmtal (Niederrhein) North Rhine-W. 29.11.2000 
Margetshöchheim Bavaria 01.01.2001 
Blaustein Baden-Wuerttemberg 24.04.2001 
Witzenhausen Hesse 01.04.2003 
Neuendettelsau Bavaria 15.12.2003 
Wetter (Ruhr) North Rhine-W. 16.12.2003 
Markt Emskirchen Bavaria 20.02.2004 
Laatzen Lower Saxony 26.02.2004 
Gerhardshofen Bavaria 15.04.2004 
Gutenstetten Bavaria 19.04.2004 
Münchsteinach Bavaria 20.04.2004 
Marburg Hesse 30.04.2004 
Blomberg (Lippe) North Rhine-W. 01.05.2004 
Ingolstadt Bavaria 19.05.2004 
Lüneburg Lower Saxony 27.05.2004 
Schlangenbad Hesse 02.06.2004 
Darmstadt Hesse 24.06.2004 
Hüttisheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 29.06.2004 
Uhldingen-Mühlhofen Baden-Wuerttemberg 29.06.2004 
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Mechernich North Rhine-W. 06.07.2004 
Bad Zwesten Hesse 08.07.2004 
Herdecke North Rhine-W. 15.07.2004 
Bochum North Rhine-W. 20.07.2004 
Mösbach Baden-Wuerttemberg 31.07.2004 
Tittmoning Bavaria 05.08.2004 
Sehnde Lower Saxony 29.08.2004 
Schöffengrund Hesse 13.10.2004 
Metzingen Baden-Wuerttemberg 14.10.2004 
Lengerich (Westfalen) North Rhine-W. 23.11.2004 
Freiburg im Breisgau Baden-Wuerttemberg 14.12.2004 
Kassel Hesse 24.01.2005 
Ühlingen-Birkendorf Baden-Wuerttemberg 24.01.2005 
Neuss North Rhine-W. 02.02.2005 
Kirchhain Hesse 14.02.2005 
Nettetal North Rhine-W. 22.02.2005 
Augsburg Bavaria 04.03.2005 
Klettgau Baden-Wuerttemberg 14.03.2005 
Pattensen Lower Saxony 15.03.2005 
Waldbronn Baden-Wuerttemberg 13.04.2005 
Neunkirchen (Hunsrück) Rhineland-Palatine 19.04.2005 
Dortmund North Rhine-W. 21.04.2005 
Ansbach Bavaria 13.05.2005 
Eberswalde Brandenburg 16.05.2005 
Leipzig Saxony 18.05.2005 
Karlsbad (Baden) Baden-Wuerttemberg 06.06.2005 
Tübingen Baden-Wuerttemberg 13.06.2005 
Kamen North Rhine-W. 14.06.2005 
Bornheim North Rhine-W. 31.08.2005 
Weingarten (Baden) Baden-Wuerttemberg 28.11.2005 
Berliner Stadtgüter Berlin 09.12.2005 
Königsmoos Bavaria 13.02.2006 
Leingarten Baden-Wuerttemberg 24.02.2006 
Karlsruhe Baden-Wuerttemberg 28.03.2006 
Neustrelitz Mecklenburg-West P. 30.03.2006 
Dossenheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 25.04.2006 
Markt Langquaid Bavaria 03.05.2006 
Huglfing Bavaria 04.05.2006 
Waghäusel Baden-Wuerttemberg 08.05.2006 
Nußloch Baden-Wuerttemberg 17.05.2006 
Mögglingen Baden-Wuerttemberg 29.06.2006 
Lahr (Schwarzwald) Baden-Wuerttemberg 15.08.2006 
Greven North Rhine-W. 24.08.2006 
Ladbergen North Rhine-W. 21.09.2006 
Deidesheim Rhineland-Palatine 21.09.2006 
Ampfing Bavaria 10.10.2006 
Lauffen am Neckar Baden-Wuerttemberg 25.10.2006 
Weiden in der Oberpfalz Bavaria 27.10.2006 
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Speyer Rhineland-Palatine 14.11.2006 
Emsdetten North Rhine-W. 29.11.2006 
Rostock Mecklenburg-West P. 06.12.2006 
Wiesenfelden Bavaria 07.12.2006 
Bonn North Rhine-W. 14.12.2006 
Saerbeck North Rhine-W. 14.12.2006 
Markt Offingen Bavaria 08.01.2007 
Hennef North Rhine-W. 16.01.2007 
Lichtenau (Baden) Baden-Wuerttemberg 23.01.2007 
Fischbachtal Hesse 30.01.2007 
Wendlingen am Neckar Baden-Wuerttemberg 16.02.2007 
Röbel Mecklenburg-West P. 20.02.2007 
Waren (Müritz) Mecklenburg-West P. 22.02.2007 
Zepkow Mecklenburg-West P. 08.03.2007 
Chemnitz Saxony 14.03.2007 
Schotten Hesse 15.03.2007 
Lauda-Königshofen Baden-Wuerttemberg 19.03.2007 
Fincken Mecklenburg-West P. 20.03.2007 
Grünsfeld Baden-Wuerttemberg 27.03.2007 
Bühl (Baden) Baden-Wuerttemberg 28.03.2007 
Bollewick Mecklenburg-West P. 29.03.2007 
Sietow Mecklenburg-West P. 29.03.2007 
Strausberg Brandenburg 29.03.2007 
Melz Mecklenburg-West P. 02.04.2007 
Buchholz (bei Röbel) Mecklenburg-West P. 04.04.2007 
Stuer Mecklenburg-West P. 12.04.2007 
Bad Nauheim Hesse 26.04.2007 
Igersheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 26.04.2007 
Kammerstein Bavaria 01.05.2007 
Günzburg Bavaria 07.05.2007 
Obertaufkirchen Bavaria 16.05.2007 
Echzell Hesse 21.05.2007 
Schopfheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 21.05.2007 
Büchenbach Bavaria 22.05.2007 
Creglingen Baden-Wuerttemberg 22.05.2007 
Wertheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 22.05.2007 
Bernbeuren Bavaria 23.05.2007 
Bad Rappenau Baden-Wuerttemberg 30.05.2007 
Windeck North Rhine-W. 30.05.2007 
Königheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 18.06.2007 
Florstadt Hesse 29.06.2007 
Glauburg Hesse 04.07.2007 
Markt Pretzfeld Bavaria 24.07.2007 
Rednitzhembach Bavaria 26.07.2007 
Markt Schwanstetten Bavaria 31.07.2007 
Kempten Bavaria 02.08.2007 
Altenstadt Hesse 09.08.2007 
Havixbeck North Rhine-W. 06.09.2007 
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Ginsheim-Gustavsburg Hesse 15.09.2007 
Bodolz Bavaria 27.09.2007 
Wasserburg Bavaria 09.10.2007 
Malchin Mecklenburg-West P. 17.10.2007 
Markt Neunkirchen am Brand Bavaria 17.10.2007 
Markt Bad Grönenbach Bavaria 22.11.2007 
Memmingen Bavaria 29.11.2007 
Hohenpeißenberg Bavaria 19.12.2007 
Soltau Lower Saxony 20.12.2007 
Markt Weiler-Simmerberg Bavaria 11.02.2008 
Fischen im Allgäu Bavaria 18.02.2008 
Schnaitsee Bavaria 19.02.2008 
Ortenberg Hesse 26.02.2008 
Bernau bei Berlin Brandenburg 28.02.2008 
Ingersheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 11.03.2008 
Amöneburg Hesse 17.03.2008 
Jengen Bavaria 17.03.2008 
Oberkirch Baden-Wuerttemberg 31.03.2008 
Oberasbach Bavaria 07.04.2008 
Oberreute Bavaria 08.04.2008 
Röthenbach Bavaria 15.04.2008 
Ellwangen (Jagst) Baden-Wuerttemberg 17.04.2008 
Pankow Berlin 17.04.2008 
Welzheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 22.04.2008 
Hergensweiler Bavaria 28.04.2008 
Alfdorf Baden-Wuerttemberg 05.05.2008 
Schwäbisch Gmünd Baden-Wuerttemberg 11.06.2008 
Weimar Thuringia 11.06.2008 
Lindau Bavaria 17.06.2008 
Obermichelbach Bavaria 17.06.2008 
Gnarrenburg Lower Saxony 23.06.2008 
Burggen Bavaria 24.06.2008 
Hasloch Bavaria 26.06.2008 
Nonnenhorn Bavaria 07.07.2008 
Weißensberg Bavaria 10.07.2008 
Brück Brandenburg 06.08.2008 
Linthe Brandenburg 07.08.2008 
Markt Heimenkirch Bavaria 08.09.2008 
Markt Kaufering Bavaria 16.09.2008 
Markt Scheidegg Bavaria 19.09.2008 
Markt Pöttmes Bavaria 23.09.2008 
Dinkelsbühl Bavaria 24.09.2008 
Kitzingen Bavaria 07.10.2008 
Leutershausen Bavaria 14.10.2008 
Lindenberg Bavaria 23.10.2008 
Traunstein Bavaria 23.10.2008 
Limbach-Oberfrohna Saxony 28.11.2008 
Langensendelbach Bavaria 01.12.2008 
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Bremen Bremen 09.12.2008 
Wildsteig Bavaria 13.01.2009 
Weilersbach Bavaria 16.01.2009 
Freyung Bavaria 02.02.2009 
Dietramszell Bavaria 17.02.2009 
Wielenbach Bavaria 17.02.2009 
Baden-Baden Baden-Wuerttemberg 02.03.2009 
Panketal Brandenburg 13.03.2009 
Kronach Bavaria 16.03.2009 
Wonneberg Bavaria 17.03.2009 
Illerkirchberg Baden-Wuerttemberg 19.03.2009 
Markt Hirschaid Bavaria 24.03.2009 
Ulm Baden-Wuerttemberg 25.03.2009 
Greifswald Mecklenburg-West P. 30.03.2009 
Vöhringen Bavaria 30.03.2009 
Grasbrunn Bavaria 31.03.2009 
Thurmansbang Bavaria 02.04.2009 
Markt Schierling Bavaria 06.04.2009 
Stegaurach Bavaria 07.04.2009 
Morschen Hesse 16.04.2009 
Belzig Brandenburg 20.04.2009 
Alheim Hesse 22.04.2009 
Markt Jettingen-Scheppach Bavaria 27.04.2009 
Markt Mallersdorf-Pfaffenberg Bavaria 28.04.2009 
Roggenburg Bavaria 28.04.2009 
Markt Marktrodach Bavaria 05.05.2009 
Thulendorf Mecklenburg-West P. 26.05.2009 
Ainring Bavaria 09.06.2009 
Stockheim Bavaria 15.06.2009 
Neu-Ulm Bavaria 24.06.2009 
Markt Teisendorf Bavaria 06.07.2009 
Heilsbronn Bavaria 09.07.2009 
Kiel Schleswig-Holstein 09.07.2009 
Schwaigern Baden-Wuerttemberg 14.07.2009 
Golzow Brandenburg 07.08.2009 
Illertissen Bavaria 01.09.2009 
Hohenthann Bavaria 09.09.2009 
Parkstetten Bavaria 12.09.2009 
Suhl Thuringia 23.09.2009 
Nuthe-Urstromtal Brandenburg 08.10.2009 
Markt Velden Bavaria 26.10.2009 
Wurmsham Bavaria 26.10.2009 
Nentershausen Hesse 10.02.2010 
Ehekirchen Bavaria 13.04.2010 
Dinslaken North Rhine-W. 19.04.2010 
Bad Heilbrunn Bavaria 20.04.2010 
Bamberg Bavaria 21.04.2010 
Schmölln Thuringia 06.05.2010 
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Wildeck Hesse 10.06.2010 
Friesenheim Baden-Wuerttemberg 28.06.2010 
Münster North Rhine-W. 07.07.2010 
Magdeburg Saxony-Anhalt 19.08.2010 
Dettingen an der Erms Baden-Wuerttemberg 23.09.2010 
Osnabrück Lower Saxony 28.09.2010 
Neufraunhofen Bavaria 26.10.2010 
Gersthofen Bavaria 24.11.2010 
Murrhardt Baden-Wuerttemberg 25.11.2010 
Flecken Steyerberg Lower Saxony 09.12.2010 
Marbach am Neckar Baden-Wuerttemberg 16.12.2010 
Gessertshausen Bavaria 10.01.2011 
Kreuth am Tegernsee Bavaria 13.01.2011 
Mittelneufnach Bavaria 24.01.2011 
Scherstetten Bavaria 02.02.2011 
Mickhausen Bavaria 14.02.2011 
Walkertshofen Bavaria 22.02.2011 
Breitenbach am Herzberg Hesse 28.02.2011 
Cornberg Hesse 07.03.2011 
Ustersbach Bavaria 22.03.2011 
Markt Diedorf Bavaria 29.03.2011 
Markt Dinkelscherben Bavaria 29.03.2011 
Markt Welden Bavaria 29.03.2011 
Hansestadt Lübeck Schleswig-Holstein 31.03.2011 
Langenneufnach Bavaria 05.04.2011 
Hiltenfingen Bavaria 07.04.2011 
Langerringen Bavaria 11.04.2011 
Ettlingen Baden-Wuerttemberg 13.04.2011 
Kutzenhausen Bavaria 18.04.2011 
Bonstetten Bavaria 09.05.2011 
Emersacker Bavaria 18.05.2011 
Großaitingen Bavaria 28.05.2011 
Bobingen Bavaria 31.05.2011 
Markt Biberbach Bavaria 31.05.2011 
Gablingen Bavaria 07.06.2011 
Langweid am Lech Bavaria 07.06.2011 
Bindlach Bavaria 27.06.2011 
Graben (Lechfeld) Bavaria 29.06.2011 
Markt Meitingen Bavaria 05.07.2011 
Markt Thiersheim Bavaria 07.07.2011 
Allmannshofen Bavaria 11.07.2011 
Schwabmünchen Bavaria 26.07.2011 
Nordendorf Bavaria 28.07.2011 
Ellgau Bavaria 03.08.2011 
Höchstädt im Fichtelgebirge Bavaria 18.08.2011 
Steinen Baden-Wuerttemberg 13.09.2011 
Bad Berneck im Fichtelgebirge Bavaria 15.09.2011 
Rockenberg Hesse 19.09.2011 
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Kühlenthal Bavaria 11.10.2011 
Markt Thierhaupten Bavaria 25.10.2011 
Immenstadt im Allgäu Bavaria 17.11.2011 
Jossgrund Hesse 05.12.2011 
Bebra Hesse 15.12.2011 
Weißenburg in Bayern Bavaria 15.12.2011 
Haslach im Kinzigtal Baden-Wuerttemberg 14.02.2012 
Markt Kreuzwertheim Bavaria 14.02.2012 
Waltershausen Thuringia 28.02.2012 
Berghaupten Baden-Wuerttemberg 05.03.2012 
Ebhausen Baden-Wuerttemberg 18.06.2012 
Lahnau Hesse 28.06.2012 
Kehl Baden-Wuerttemberg 21.11.2012 
Piding Bavaria 16.01.2013 
Rottendorf Bavaria 21.02.2013 
Buchen (Odenwald) Baden-Wuerttemberg 07.05.2013 
Gladbeck North Rhine-W. 07.05.2013 
Markt Zell am Main Bavaria 14.05.2013 
Weinstadt Baden-Wuerttemberg 16.05.2013 
Gerlingen Baden-Wuerttemberg 10.07.2013 
Fischerbach Baden-Wuerttemberg 14.11.2013 
Wandlitz Brandenburg 17.01.2014 
Mühlenbach (Schwarzwald) Baden-Wuerttemberg 11.02.2014 
Hofstetten (Baden) Baden-Wuerttemberg 18.02.2014 
Bielefeld North Rhine-W. 20.03.2014 
Hanstedt (Nordheide) Lower Saxony 22.04.2014 
Bad Reichenhall Bavaria 24.06.2014 
Heilbronn Baden-Wuerttemberg 03.07.2014 
Ratekau Schleswig-Holstein 02.10.2014 
Appenweier Baden-Wuerttemberg 20.11.2014 
Source: based on data taken from gentechnikfreie-regionen.de. 
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Risk 
1 
Risk 
2 
Eco-
nomic 1 
Eco-
nomic 2 
Eco-
nomic 3 
Eco-
nomic 4 
Eco-
nomic 5 
Eco-
nomic 6 
Eco-
nomic 7 
Cultiva-
tion 1 
Cultiva-
tion 2 
Rejection 
1 
Rejection 
2 
Diffu-
sion 1 
Diffu-
sion 2 
Risk 1 0 0.75 0.67 0.64 0.71 0.62 1.00 0.50 0.57 0.67 0.40 0.44 0.67 0.21 0.50 
Risk 2 0.75 0 0.72 0.60 0.71 0.48 1.00 0.25 0.57 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.24 0.25 
Economic 1 0.67 0.72 0 0.96 0.71 0.71 0.50 0.75 0.71 0.67 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.32 0.50 
Economic 2 0.64 0.60 0.96 0 0.57 0.48 1.00 0.50 0.71 0.56 0.00 0.56 0.20 0.28 0.13 
Economic 3 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.57 0 0.57 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.00 
Economic 4 0.62 0.48 0.71 0.48 0.57 0 0.50 0.00 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.57 0.20 0.24 0.19 
Economic 5 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.50 0 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 
Economic 6 0.50 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.50 0 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 
Economic 7 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.43 0.29 
Cultivation 1 0.67 0.44 0.67 0.56 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.25 0.00 0 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.00 
Cultivation 2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.00 
Rejection 1 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.56 0.43 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.22 0.40 0 0.67 0.35 0.31 
Rejection 2 0.67 0.47 0.40 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.67 0 0.07 0.07 
Diffusion 1 0.21 0.24 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.22 0.00 0.35 0.07 0 0.19 
Diffusion 2 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.07 0.19 0 
Legend 
Risk 1 Risk for the environment Economic 7 Land value conservation 
Risk 2 Risk for human health Cultivation 1 Potential GMO cultivation 
Economic 1 Impact on conventional agriculture Cultivation 2 Planned GMO cultivation 
Economic 2 Impact on organic agriculture Rejection 1 Rejection by the population 
Economic 3 No economic benefit Rejection 2 Rejection by farmers 
Economic 4 Dependency on multinationals Diffusion 1 Horizontal diffusion (neighbouring municipalities) 
Economic 5 Surveillance costs Diffusion 2 Vertical diffusion (higher administrative units) 
Economic 6 Low consumer demand   
Table A2. Interdependencies between Reasons for Banning GMO Cultivation 
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Table A3. Outcomes and Conditions and their Calibrations 
  
Federal state 
GMO-
Free Net-
work 
Ban 
around 
nature re-
serves 
Ban on state-
owned 
ground 
Protein 
strategy 
Regional 
quality  
label 
Index 
score 
CDU/CSU 
CDU/CSU 
_cal. 
SPD 
SPD 
_cal. 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 1 1 1 1 1 1 0,18 0,33 0,37 0,33 
Bavaria 1 1 0 1 1 1 0,9 1 0 0 
Berlin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,30 0,33 0,59 1 
Brandenburg 0 1 0 0 0 0,6 0 0 0,56 1 
Bremen 1 0 1 0 1 0,8 0 0 0,65 1 
Hamburg 1 0 1 0 0 0,6 0,17 0,33 0,77 1 
Hesse 1 0 1 0 1 0,8 072 1 0 0 
Mecklenburg-West P. 0 0 0 1 1 0,8 0,42 0,67 0,58 1 
Lower Saxony 1 0 0 0 0 0 0,44 0,67 0,33 0,33 
North Rhine-Westphalia 1 0 1 1 0 0,8 0,31 0,33 0,45 0,67 
Rhineland-Palatine 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,67 1 
Saarland 1 0 0 0 0 0 0,59 1 0,3 0,33 
Saxony 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,8 1 0,03 0,33 
Saxony-Anhalt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,70 1 0,29 0,33 
Schleswig-Holstein 1 0 1 0 0 0,6 0,27 0,33 037 0,33 
Thuringia 1 0 1 1 0 0,8 0,62 1 0,35 0,33 
Unit present/absent 
Cali-
brated 
value 
Aggregated vote share of all political parties of 
the governing coalition weight per days/ cali-
brated values 
Data source 
GMO-free 
states in Ger-
many (2016) 
GMO-free states in Germany (2016), expert interviews, 
desktop research 
Wahlrecht (2017) 
Period 2010-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
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Table A3. (Continued) 
  
Federal state Greens Greens_cal. Left Left_cal. FDP FDP_cal. 
CDU/CSU 
minister 
CDU/CSU 
minister_cal. 
SPD min-
ister 
SPD minis-
ter_cal. 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0,39 1 0 0 0,04 0,33 0,22 0,33 0 0 
Bavaria 0 0 0 0 0,1 1 1 1 0 0 
Berlin 0 0 0,09 1 0 0 0,68 0,67 0 0 
Brandenburg 0 0 0,43 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bremen 0,35 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Hamburg 0,05 0,33 0 0 0 0 0,19 0,33 0,68 0,67 
Hesse 0,07 0,33 0 0 0,20 1 0,67 0,67 0 0 
Mecklenburg-West P. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Lower Saxony 0,14 0,67 0 0 0,08 0,67 0 0 0 0 
North Rhine-Westpha-
lia 
0,21 1 0 0 0,01 0,33 0,08 0,33 
0 0 
Rhineland-Palatine 0,23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,23 0,33 
Saarland 0,04 0,33 0 0 0,07 0,67 0 0 0,60 0,67 
Saxony 0 0 0 0 0,17 1 1 1 0 0 
Saxony-Anhalt 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Schleswig-Holstein 0,16 0,67 0 0 0,13 0,67 0,40 0,33 0 0 
Thuringia 0,02 0,33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,82 0,67 
Unit 
Aggregated vote share of all political parties of the governing 
coalition weight per days/calibrated values 
Relative period of incumbency of GMO-competent ministers/cali-
brated values 
Data source Wahlrecht (2017) Own data based on ministry websites and various online sources 
Period 2010-2015 2010-2015 
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Table A3. (Continued) 
 
 
 
  
Federal state 
Green  
minister 
Green 
minister_cal. 
Left 
minister 
Left minis-
ter_cal. 
FDP 
minister 
FDP  
minister_cal. 
East Ger-
many_cal. 
GM crop 
plantings 
GM crop 
plantings_ cal. 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0,77 0,67 0 0 0 0 0 183305,182 0,67 
Bavaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 363511,727 0,67 
Berlin 0 0 0,31 0,33 0 0 0,67 0 0 
Brandenburg 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 31542318,9 1 
Bremen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hamburg 0,11 0,33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hesse 0,325 0,33 0 0 0 0 0 2584,72727 0,33 
Mecklenburg-West P. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17534422,2 1 
Lower Saxony 0,47 0,33 0 0 0,52 0,67 0 505663,364 0,67 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0,91 0,67 0 0 0 0 0 10218,6364 0,33 
Rhineland-Palatine 0,77 0,67 0 0 0 0 0 15839,9091 0,33 
Saarland 0,39 0,33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saxony 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 18003967,5 1 
Saxony-Anhalt 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3551781,18 1 
Schleswig-Holstein 0,59 0,67 0 0 0 0 0 999,636364 0,33 
Thuringia 0,17 0,33 0 0 0 0 1 10990,3636 0,33 
Unit Relative period of incumbency of GMO-competent ministers/calibrated values 
present/ ab-
sent as cali-
brated value 
Commercial 
cultivation 
and field tri-
als in m² 
Calibrated 
value 
Data source Data based on ministry websites and various online sources  BVL (2017) 
Period 2010-2015  2005-2015 
 197 
 
Table A3. (Continued) 
 
 
  
Federal state Tourism 
Tourism 
_cal. 
NABU 
NABU   
_cal. 
BUND 
BUND 
_cal. 
Voter 
turnout 
Voter 
turnout 
_cal. 
Maize   
cultivation 
Maize culti-
vation_ cal. 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 4411,19228 0,33 7,83 0,67 4,70 0,67 66,2 1 191707,5 0,67 
Bavaria 6614,28038 1 5,16 0,33 14,43 1 63,9 1 533626,833 1 
Berlin 7385,09248 1 3,70 0 2,17 0,33 60,2 1 0 0 
Brandenburg 4642,81194 0,33 4,28 0,33 1,48 0 47,9 0 191035,667 0,67 
Bremen 3122,03929 0 5,73 0,33 8,01 1 52,85 0,33 0 0 
Hamburg 6121,55527 0,67 12,16 1 4,63 0,67 56,9 0,33 0 0 
Hesse 4955,44767 0,67 8,78 0,67 3,93 0,67 73,2 1 48146,1667 0,33 
Mecklenburg-West P. 17393,7953 1 2,01 0 1,78 0 51,5 0,33 148769,667 0,67 
Lower Saxony 5061,61592 0,67 10,37 1 2,71 0,67 59,4 0,67 590045,333 1 
North Rhine-Westphalia 2574,8708 0 4,03 0,33 1,43 0 59,45 0,67 299993,5 1 
Rhineland-Palatine 5285,11891 0,67 11,63 1 3,01 0,67 61,8 1 42471,3333 0,33 
Saarland 2534,64648 0 18,38 1 4,01 0,67 61,6 1 4294 0,33 
Saxony 4390,99481 0,33 3,63 0 0,92 0 49,2 0 96799,3333 0,33 
Saxony-Anhalt 3155,03887 0 1,89 0 1,25 0 51,2 0 130442 0,67 
Schleswig-Holstein 8924,69658 1 6,17 0,67 2,10 0,33 60,2 1 180092,667 0,67 
Thuringia 4360,36821 0,33 3,96 0 1,76 0 52,7 0 59257,5 0,33 
Unit 
Overnight 
stays per 
1000 inhab-
itants 
Cali-
brated 
value 
Members 
per 1000 
inhabit-
ants 
Cali-
brated 
value 
Members 
per 1000 
inhabit-
ants 
Cali-
brated 
value 
Turnout 
in % 
Cali-
brated 
value 
hectare 
Calibrated 
value 
Data source Destatis (2015) NABU (2015) BUND (2017) Wahlrecht (2017) DMK (2016) 
Period 2010-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015 2010-2015 2010-2015 
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Table A3. (Continued) 
 
 
Federal state GDP GDP_cal. 
Organic 
farming 
Organic far-
ming_cal. 
Large-scale 
farming 
Large-scale 
farming_cal. 
Rural tourism 
Rural tou-
rism_cal. 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 42.745 1 9,2 0,67 32,6 0 20,95 0,67 
Bavaria 43.092 1 7,3 0,33 32,85 0 78,40 1 
Berlin 35.627 0,67 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Brandenburg 26.493 0 10,3 1 240,6 1 9,65 0,33 
Bremen 47.603 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Hamburg 61.729 1 0 1 0 0 0,55 0 
Hesse 43.073 1 11,4 1 44,2 0,33 7,44 0,33 
Mecklenburg-West P. 24.909 0 9,4 0,67 284,9 1 32,25 1 
Lower Saxony 32.890 0,33 2,8 0 61,8 0,67 22,32 0,67 
North Rhine-Westpha-
lia 
36.509 0,67 4,7 0 41,75 0,33 4,98 0,33 
Rhineland-Palatine 32.814 0,33 8 0,33 35,7 0 14,55 0,67 
Saarland 35.409 0,67 13 1 61,3 0,67 5,02 0,33 
Saxony 27.776 0 4,1 0 144,85 1 8,32 0,33 
Saxony-Anhalt 25.198 0 4,9 0 277,6 1 3,11 0,33 
Schleswig-Holstein 30.134 0,33 4,1 0 72,4 0,67 73,80 1 
Thuringia 26.364 0 4,2 0 221,65 1 9,21 0,33 
Unit 
€ per cap-
ita 
Calibrated 
value 
Share of or-
ganic agri-
culture 
Calibrated 
value 
Mean of 2010 
and 2013 val-
ues for farm 
size in hectar 
Calibrated 
value 
Farmers offering 
holidays as 
share of popula-
tion 
Calibrated value 
Data source Destatis (2017) BMEL (2017) Destatis (2014) Bauernhofurlaub (2017) 
Period 2015 2014 2010-2013 2017 
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Table A4. Coding Decisions Taken for German Federal Parties, 1990-2017 
 1990 1994 1998 2002 
CDU  
 NST 
Wir brauchen einen neuen For-
schungs- und Technologieschub. 
Durch klare Entscheidungen für die 
Anwendung von Spitzentechnolo-
gien wie die Gentechnologie, die 
Kernenergie und die Magnetschwe-
bebahn Transrapid, durch die konse-
quente Umsetzung der Postreform 
mit dem Ziel der weitgehenden Libe-
ralisierung im Post- und Telekommu-
nikationsbereich sowie der Privatisie-
rung von Telekom, Postdienst und 
Postbank, durch den forcierten Aus-
bau von Glasfaserverbundnetzen für 
den Aufbau von Datenautobahnen. 
 PRO 
Wir werden unsere Position als High-
Tech-Land weiter ausbauen, indem wir 
Schlüsseltechnologien mit Vorrang för-
dern. Biotechnologie und Gentechnologie, 
Umwelttechnologien, Multimedia und die 
Telekommunikationstechnologien, Luft- 
und Raumfahrt mit ihren Schlüsseltechno-
logien - daraus entwickeln sich die Wachs-
tumsmärkte der Zukunft, Topbranchen 
mit enormen Beschäftigungschancen 
-- 
Bio- und Gentechnologie sind Zukunfts-
technologien. Sie leisten unverzichtbare 
Beiträge zur Bekämpfung von Krankhei-
ten durch neue Medikamente sowie zur 
Ernährung einer wachsenden Weltbevöl-
kerung. Wir haben eine Aufbruchstim-
mung für Existenzgründungen geschaf-
fen: Die Zahl der Biotechnologie-Unter-
nehmen hat sich in den letzten zwei Jahren 
jeweils verdoppelt. Wir werden diese Dy-
namik weiter fördern. 
 PRO 
 
Die neuen und noch zu erwartenden 
Möglichkeiten der Gentechnologie und 
Biomedizin stellen uns vor große Her-
ausforderungen. Gerade bei diesen Zu-
kunftstechnologien müssen wir Chan-
cen und Risiken sorgfältig prüfen und 
abwägen, um die richtigen Weichen für 
nachfolgende Generationen zu stellen. 
Wir dürfen keinesfalls einem wissen-
schaftlichen Machbarkeitswahn verfal-
len. Nützlichkeitserwägungen dürfen 
nicht über den Schutz allen menschli-
chen Lebens gestellt werden. Deshalb 
halten wir an den strengen Grundsät-
zen des deutschen Embryonenschutz-
gesetzes fest und lehnen eine Legalisie-
rung der aktiven Sterbehilfe ab. 
-- 
Wir werden die Möglichkeiten der Ver-
braucher verbessern, die Qualität eines 
Produkts erkennen und beurteilen zu 
können. Dazu gehören starke Verbrau-
chervertretungen, mehr Verbraucher-
aufklärung sowie praktikable und für 
den Laien verständliche Kennzeich-
nungsregelungen. Gentechnisch verän-
derte Lebensmittelmittel sind als solche 
kenntlich zu machen, denn ein verant-
wortungsvoller Gebrauch der Bio- und 
Gentechnologie in der Landwirtschaft 
erfordert objektive 
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Verbraucherinformationen und eine 
optimale Verbrauchersicherheit. 
 MOD 
FDP Würde, Leben, Freiheit und Ge-
sundheit des Menschen und seiner 
Umwelt. Die Liberalen fordern 
eine Verstärkung und Intensivie-
rung vorausschauender Technik-
folgenabschätzung. Die technische 
Anwendung wissenschaftlicher 
Erkenntnisse darf nicht zu irrever-
siblen Gefahren für Mensch und 
Umwelt führen. Dies gilt beson-
ders für die Gentechnologie. Sie ist 
Schlüsseltechnologie zur Förde-
rung der Gesundheit, der Beherr-
schung der Probleme der Welter-
nährung und Verstärkung des 
Umweltschutzes. Dauernde Tech-
nikfolgenabschätzung auf die ethi-
schen, sozialen, ökologischen und 
ökonomischen Konsequenzen hin 
ist gerade für die Gentechnologie 
unabdingbar. Gefährdungen von 
Mensch und Umwelt durch die 
weitere Erforschung und bei der 
Anwendung der Gentechnologie 
müssen durch strenge Sicherheits-
anforderungen ausgeschlossen 
werden. 
 MOD 
Die Chancen neuer Technologien, ins-
besondere der Bio- und Gentechnolo-
gie, für neue und zukunftssichere Ar-
beitsplätze müssen genutzt werden. 
-- 
Ein globaler sicherheitstechnischer 
Mindeststandard für kerntechnische 
Anlagen im Rahmen des Vertrages 
der Internationalen Atomenergieor-
ganisation von 1957 sowie bei gen-
technischen und großchemischen An-
lagen ist festzulegen. 
-- 
Deshalb fordert die FDP es sind For-
schungs- und Entwicklungsschwer-
punkte zu setzen in Informations- 
und Kommunikationstechnik, neue 
Werkstoffe, Biotechnologie und Gen-
technik, Software-Technik, Luft- und 
Raumfahrt sowie Umwelttechnolo-
gie. 
-- 
Die Gentechnik-Richtlinie der EU ist 
bislang nicht in allen Ländern voll-
ständig umgesetzt worden. Die sich 
daraus ergebende unterschiedliche 
Vollzugspraxis führt zu Wettbe-
werbsverzerrungen innerhalb Euro-
pas. Unter Berücksichtigung des In-
ternationalen Entwicklungs- und 
Kenntnisstandes auf dem Gebiet der 
gentechnischen Sicherheit sollten 
weiterreichende 
Entwicklung und Anwendung von ethisch 
und ökologisch vertretbaren Maßnahmen 
der Bio- und Gentechnologie dürfen nicht 
behindert werden. 
 MOD 
 
Eine unternehmerische Landwirtschaft 
ist auf die Nutzung des technischen 
Fortschritts angewiesen. Daher ist es 
unverantwortlich, die Potentiale der 
Grünen Gentechnik in der Landwirt-
schaft aus ideologischen Gründen in 
Deutschland und Europa zu blockieren. 
 PRO 
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Verfahrensvereinfachungen insbe-
sondere in den Unteren Sicherheits-
stufen vorgenommen werden. Ver-
braucherschutz muss gewährleistet 
werden durch deutliche Informati-
onspflicht gegenüber dem Bürger 
über genetisch veränderte wie auch 
bestrahlte und chemisch veränderte 
Lebensmittel. 
 MOD 
Greens Ökologisch und sozial bedenkli-
che Großtechnologien wie die 
Atomtechnologie, die zentral an-
gelegten und gesteuerten IuK-
Technologien, die Bio- und Gen-
technologie sowie die Weltraum-
technik dürfen nicht länger geför-
dert und angewendet werden. 
-- 
Für einen Schutz vor irreversiblen 
Schäden – gegen Gentechnologie: 
Mit dem Gentechnik-Gesetz und 
einer Vielzahl von Rechtsverord-
nungen soll die industrielle An-
wendung der Gentechnik stö-
rungsfrei sichergestellt werden. 
Insbesondere die Rechtsverord-
nungsentwürfe zeigen in aller 
Deutlichkeit, daß anerkannte Si-
cherheitsstandards im Bereich des 
technischen Sicherheitsrechts nun-
mehr ihre Gültigkeit verlieren sol-
len. Es handelt sich nicht um ein 
Gesetz zum Schutz Mensch und 
Umwelt vor den Risiken und Ge-
fahren der Gentechnologie, 
Die Bundesregierung verschärft mit 
Ihrer desolaten Politik die Probleme, 
die sie zu lösen vorgibt. Sie erleichtert 
Genehmigungsverfahren für Stras-
senbau und umweltgefährdende Risi-
kotechnologien wie die Gentechnik 
und Die Giftmüllverbrennung. Sie 
vertut ihre Zeit mit Planspielen für 
den Bau neuer, angeblich sicherer 
Atomkraftwerke. 
-- 
Mit der Gentechnologie werden die 
Eingriffsmöglichkeiten des Menschen 
in Naturzusammenhänge um Dimen-
sionen erweitert. Unter Umgehung 
natürlicher Fortpflanzungsmechanis-
men Und Evolutionsmechnismen 
wird Erbmaterial über alle vorfindli-
chen Artgrenzen hinweg übertragen. 
Das Wissen um die möglichen Wir-
kungen solcher Eingriffe hat damit 
aber nicht Schritt gehalten. Die lang-
fristigen Folgen für Mensch und Na-
tur über den unmittelbaren Erfolg (o-
der Misserfolg) eines gentechnischen 
Experimentes oder Produktes hinaus 
Gesunde Umwelt - gesunde Tiere - ge-
sunde Lebensmittel: Ausreichende Men-
gen an hochwertigen Lebensmitteln lassen 
sich auch ohne den heutigen Einsatz von 
Pestiziden, Mineraldüngern, importierten 
Futtermitteln und Gentechnik erzeugen. 
-- 
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN lehnen die 
Gentechnologie in der Landwirtschaft und 
bei der Lebensmittelproduktion ab. 
Die Novel-Food-Verordnung der Europäi-
schen Union dient allein der Vermarktung 
gentechnischer Produkte und nicht dem 
VerbraucherInnenschutz. Durch die Poli-
tik der EU-Kommission gelangen immer 
mehr Lebensmittel, bei deren Herstellung 
Gentechnik zum Einsatz kommt, unge-
kennzeichnet auf den Markt. Dieser Be-
trug an den VerbraucherInnen wird von 
den anderen Parteien mitgetragen. BÜND-
NIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN fordern eine über 
die Novel-Food-Verordnung hinausge-
hende erweiterte Kennzeichnungspflicht 
(v.a. für Enzyme und andere Zusatzstoffe). 
Solange der Ausstieg aus der Gentechnik 
nicht vollzogen ist, müssen wenigstens 
Die Verbraucherinnen und Verbrau-
cher wollen wissen, was auf ihren Tisch 
kommt. Wir wollen einen gesundheit-
lich vorsorgenden Verbraucherschutz, 
der den Menschen garantiert, sichere 
Lebensmittel zu konsumieren. Chemie, 
Gentechnik und Antibiotika gehören 
nicht in Lebensmittel. 
-- 
Wir wenden uns gegen die schlei-
chende Einführung der Gentechnik in 
die Ernährung und die Freisetzung von 
gentechnisch veränderten Pflanzen. 
Gentechnische Veränderungen sind in 
der Landwirtschaft und in Lebensmit-
teln nicht notwendig, stellen aber ein 
unkalkulierbares Risiko für Mensch 
und Umwelt dar. Für uns steht die 
Wahlfreiheit der Landwirte und Ver-
braucher an erster Stelle. Es muss künf-
tig weiter möglich sein, gentechnikfreie 
Lebensmittel zu produzieren und zu 
kaufen. Wir fordern eine europaweit 
klare Kennzeichnung gentechnisch ver-
änderter Lebens- und Futtermittel und 
von gentechnisch verändertem Saatgut. 
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sondern um ein Gesetz zum 
"Schutz" der Gentechnik-Industrie 
vor Bevölkerungs- und Umweltin-
teressen. 
-- 
DIE GRÜNEN lehnen die Einfüh-
rung dieser Technologie ab, die 
zum ersten Mal die von der Natur 
gesetzten Grenzen überschreitet 
und zu irreversiblen Schäden bei 
Lebewesen und ganzen Ökosyste-
men führen kann. 
-- 
DIE GRÜNEN setzen sich für ein 
fünfjähriges Moratorium für den 
gesamten Bereich der Anwendung 
der Gentechnik ein. Dieses Mora-
torium gilt für die Forschung und 
die Produktion, so dass die Her-
stellung, Anwendung, Verbrei-
tung und Freisetzung von gen-
technisch veränderten Organis-
men und deren Produkten inner-
halb dieses Zeitraumes nicht mög-
lich ist. 
-- 
DIE GRÜNEN beharren darauf, 
dass die Suche nach alternativen 
Problemlösungsstrategien Priori-
tät hat. Es darf keine Entscheidung 
zugunsten der Gentechnologie er-
folgen. 
-- 
DIE GRÜNEN fordern, daß immer 
nur die umweltund sozialverträg-
lichste Technologie Anwend ung 
sind nach wie vor kaum abschätzbar. 
In Anbetracht dieser Verantwortbar-
keitslücke (Hans Jonas), die bei dieser 
Technologie besonders sichtbar wird 
und alle ihre Anwendungsfelder be-
trifft, lehnen Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
die Gentechnologie grundsätzlich ab. 
Sie befürworten stattdessen die Ent-
wicklung von Umwelt- und sozial-
verträglichen Technologien, Produk-
ten und Verfahren, die auf die natür-
lichen Zusammenhänge und Kreis-
läufe Rücksichtnehmen und reversi-
bel und Fehlerfreundlich sind. 
-- 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen lehnen jegli-
che Freisetzung von gentechnisch 
veränderten Tieren, Pflanzen und an-
deren Organismen ab. Sie lehnen 
auch Nahrungsmittel, die mittels gen-
technischer Verfahren hergestellt 
wurden oder sogar gentechnisch ver-
ändertes Material enthalten, ab. Die 
Risiken solcher Nahrungsmittel sind, 
insbesondere für Risikogruppen wie 
Allergiker, nicht abschätzbar. Sie nüt-
zen nur der Großindustriellen Nah-
rungsmittelherstellung und nicht den 
Menschen. In jedem Falle ist eine kon-
sequente Kennzeichnungspflicht aller 
Produkte, die gentechnisch herge-
stellt wurden oder gentechnisch ver-
ändertes Material enthalten, gesetz-
lich Zu Verankern. […] 
-- 
ökologische und gesundheitliche Mindest-
standards gewahrt werden. Alle genmani-
pulierten Lebensmittel und Zusatzstoffe 
müssen nach einem einheitlichen Verfah-
ren auf ihren Bedarf und ihre Produktsi-
cherheit geprüft werden. Gegen Geheim-
niskrämerei der EU-Gremien fordern wir 
eine Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung bei den 
Zulassungsverfahren. Lebensmittel müs-
sen sicher sein und dürfen kein Risiko für 
Mensch und Umwelt darstellen. Das Gen-
technikrecht muß verschärft und das Vor-
sorgeprinzip durchgesetzt werden. Nicht 
alles, was beantragt wird, darf auch ge-
nehmigt werden. Wir wollen für Gentech-
Betreiber wirksame Haftungsregelungen 
und eine Versicherungspflicht. Freisetzun-
gen gentechnisch manipulierter Pflanzen, 
Tiere und Mikroorganismen sind unver-
antwortlich und in ihren Folgen nicht be-
herrschbar. Gentechnologie ist eine geneti-
sche Umweltverschmutzung. Sie ist in ih-
ren Folgen unbeherrschbar und daher 
nicht zu verantworten. 
-- 
Fördermittel für die Atomforschung, Gen-
technik und andere Risikotechnologien, - 
unsinnige Subventionen für einzelne 
Branchen (z.B. Steinkohle) sowie für eine 
verfehlte Landwirtschaftspolitik, 
-- 
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN lehnen Gen-
technik in der Medizin weiterhin im 
Grundsatz ab. Wir respektieren jedoch den 
Einsatz der Gentechnik bei Medikamen-
ten, Diagnostik und 
Abstands- und Haftungsregelungen 
sollen Nachbarn und Natur vor den 
Auswirkungen gentechnisch veränder-
ter Organismen schützen und die Ver-
ursacher eventueller Schäden haftbar 
machen. 
 CON 
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findet. Dies ist die Gentechnologie 
beim derzeitigen Stand von Wis-
senschaft und Technik nicht, denn 
es gibt bisher keine Beweise, daß 
eine Anwendung ohne Gefähr-
dungspotentiale möglich wäre. 
 CON 
Der Einsatz von Gentechnik in der Le-
bensmittelproduktion kann nach der 
Abwägung von Kosten, Risiken, Nut-
zen und ethischen Erwägungen nicht 
zugelassen werden. (S. Teil Gentech-
nik) Wenn im Ackerbau und in der 
Fleischproduktion die Mengen auf 
ökologischem Wege dadurch redu-
ziert werden, dass der Einsatz er-
tragssteigernder Mittel wie Pestizide, 
Nitrat, Gentechnik massiv begrenzt 
wird, kann sich ein Marktgleichge-
wicht wieder einstellen. 
 CON 
Grundlagenforschung, wenn die heutige 
Medizin den Betroffenen keine Alternative 
bietet. 
-- 
Das mit der Gentechnik verbundene Men-
schenbild gefährdet die Menschenwürde 
und das Recht auf körperliche Unversehrt-
heit. 
-- 
Das Festhalten an den riskanten und un-
produktiven Technologien Atomenergie, 
Kernfusion, bemannte Raumfahrt, Gen-
technik, Rüstung und Transrapid muß be-
endet werden. 
-- 
In einer Zeit, in der Wissenschaft den Bau 
von Massenvernichtungswaffen ermög-
licht hat und mit Hilfe der Gentechnik, 
Klonen und Embryonenmanipulation alle 
natürlichen Grenzen eingerissen werden 
können, muß Wissenschaft gegenüber der 
Gesellschaft verantwortet werden. 
 CON 
Left  
 NST 
 
 NST 
 
 NST 
Die PDS setzt sich für eine gesellschaft-
liche und demokratische Kontrolle der 
Forschung und Anwendung der grü-
nen Gentechnik zum Schutz der Ver-
braucherinnen und Verbraucher und 
der Umwelt ein. 
 MOD 
SPD  
 NST 
Bei den Informations- und Kommuni-
kationssystemen, der Bio- und Gen-
technik, den neuen Werkstoffen und 
der Mikrosystemtechnik, werden wir 
Forschung und Entwicklung verstär-
ken, vor allem die interdisziplinäre 
Wir wollen eine Innovationsoffensive star-
ten: In der Bio- und Gentechnologie, bei 
den neuen Materialien, in der Informati-
onstechnologie, bei Umweltschutztechno-
logien, bei neuen Energiesystemen und in 
der Verkehrstechnologie soll Deutschland 
Die Potentiale der Gentechnik im Be-
reich der Landwirtschaft müssen weiter 
erforscht werden. In Abstimmung mit 
den Unternehmen bringen wir ein sorg-
fältig ausgearbeitetes Forschungs- und 
Begleitprogramm zum Anbau von 
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Zusammenarbeit fördern und auf 
eine sorgfältige Technikfolgenab-
schätzung achten. 
 MOD 
 
im internationalen Wettbewerb eine Spit-
zenposition einnehmen. 
 PRO 
gentechnisch veränderten Pflanzen auf 
den Weg. Chancen und Grenzen gen-
technologischer Forschung müssen da-
her immer wieder neu bestimmt wer-
den. Forschung im Dienste der Men-
schen beachtet die moralische und ethi-
sche Grenze. Die Debatte über wissen-
schaftliche und ethische Fragen begrü-
ßen wir und wollen sie auch künftig 
fördern. 
 MOD 
 2005 2009 2013 2017 
CDU Technologiefeindlichkeit hat Spit-
zentechnologien und Industrie-
branchen (Chemie, Bio- und Gen-
technologie, Kernforschung) mit 
zukunftsträchtigen, wohlstandssi-
chernden Arbeitsplätzen ins Aus-
land vertrieben. Technologischer 
Stillstand führt aber zu wirtschaft-
lichem Abstieg. 
-- 
Wir eröffnen den technologischen 
Spitzenfeldern der Zukunft in 
Deutschland die besten Entwick-
lungschancen: Bio- und Gentech-
nologie, Materialforschung, Medi-
zintechnik und Optik, Nanotech-
nologie, Mechatronik und Ver-
kehrstechnologie, Luft- und 
Raumfahrttechnik, Informations- 
und Kommunikationstechnologie, 
Energie- und Umwelttechnik. 
-- 
Wissenschaft braucht klare ethische 
Einbettung und Orientierung. Das gilt 
gerade für die moderne Bio- und Gen-
technologie. Die Auseinandersetzung 
über ethische Grenzen der Forschung 
muss sachlich und in der Überzeu-
gung, dass Deutschland im internati-
onalen Wettbewerb forschungs-
freundliche Rahmenbedingungen 
braucht, geführt werden. So werden 
gesellschaftlich Vertrauen und Ak-
zeptanz geschaffen. Deshalb brau-
chen wir Sicherheitsforschung in um-
strittenen Forschungsbereichen, ins-
besondere in der grünen Gentechnik. 
-- 
Politik muss die Sorgen der Bürger 
bei grüner Gentechnik ernst nehmen 
und darf keine unnötigen Risiken ein-
gehen. 
 MOD 
Für uns gilt: Lebensmittel müssen klar ge-
kennzeichnet sein. Dazu gehört, dass alle 
Angaben gut lesbar sind und die Verpa-
ckung dem Inhalt entspricht. Verbraucher 
sollen auch wissen, ob Lebensmittel mit 
gentechnischen Verfahren erzeugt worden 
sind, aus welcher Region ein Produkt 
kommt und unter welchen Bedingungen 
Tiere gehalten werden. 
 MOD 
 
 NST 
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Wir werden für die Entwicklung 
der Bio- und Gentechnologie den 
notwendigen und verantwortba-
ren Rechtsrahmen schaffen. 
 PRO 
FDP Das Gegenteil davon ist Fort-
schrittsfeindlichkeit und restrik-
tive Gesetzgebung. Beides hat die 
Entwicklung von wachstums-
trächtigen Zukunftsfeldern, wie 
die Bio- und Gentechnologie oder 
die Medizintechnik, massiv behin-
dert. 
-- 
Ohne die Grüne Gentechnik wer-
den wir an der züchterischen Wei-
terentwicklung unserer Kultur-
pflanzen nicht mitwirken können. 
Resistenzen gegen Schadorganis-
men, Verbesserungen der Inhalts-
stoffe von Kulturpflanzen zur 
Nutzung als nachwachsende Roh-
stoffe, kostengünstige Arzneimit-
telproduktion in Pflanzen sind 
konkrete Vorteile für Mensch und 
Umwelt. Wir wollen das Gentech-
nikgesetz ändern, um die Wert-
schöpfung aus den Forschungser-
gebnissen und weitere Forschun-
gen in Deutschland zu ermögli-
chen. Forschungsverbote für be-
reits genehmigte Projekte lehnt die 
FDP ab. 
-- 
Die FDP tritt für die verantwort-
bare Nutzung der Grünen 
Freiheit für die Forschung – nein zu 
Ideologie und Bürokratie: Forscher 
wollen forschen. Sie wollen nicht mit 
überbordender Bürokratie die Zeit 
vergeuden. Die FDP lehnt Denkblo-
ckaden und ideologische Fixierung 
auf bestimmte Technologien ab. Fusi-
onsforschung, kerntechnische Sicher-
heitsforschung, Stamm-zellfor-
schung, grüne Gentechnik, Biotech-
nologie und Nanotechnologie und 
Raumfahrtprojekte dürfen nicht stig-
matisiert, sondern müssen in wettbe-
werblichen Verfahren unter transpa-
renten und verantwortungsvollen 
Rahmenbedingungen gefördert wer-
den. 
 PRO 
 
Wir wollen dem mündigen Verbraucher 
die notwendigen Informationen für eine 
freie und fundierte Entscheidung für Ein-
kauf und Ernährung zur Verfügung stel-
len. Deshalb möchten wir eine konse-
quente Prozesskennzeichnung für alle Le-
bensmittel und Konsumgüter, bei deren 
Produktion an irgendeiner Herstellungs-
stufe gentechnisch veränderte Organis-
men beteiligt sind. Nur so ist eine vollstän-
dige Aufklärung des Verbrauchers mög-
lich. 
-- 
Gentechnisch veränderte Organismen 
werden heute bereits in vielen Herstel-
lungsprozessen zum Vorteil der Verbrau-
cher eingesetzt, beispielsweise in der Arz-
neimittelproduktion. Ob er diese Produkte 
nutzen will, darüber soll jeder Verbrau-
cher aber – wie sonst auch –vollständig frei 
entscheiden können. Wir setzen uns daher 
für eine Kennzeichnung solcher Lebens-
mittel ein, damit diese Entscheidung über-
haupt erst möglich ist. Gleichzeitig legen 
wir Wert auf eine wissenschaftliche und 
objektive Information und Verbraucher-
bildung über den Nutzen und Wert mo-
derner Herstellungsmethoden. 
 MOD 
Mit neuen Forschungsrichtungen der 
Grünen Biotechnologie 
wie dem „Genome-Editing“ wollen wir 
offen und transparent umgehen. Wir 
lehnen pauschalisierende 
Verbote ab und fordern stattdessen eine 
faktenbasierte, ergebnisoffene Bewer-
tung neuer Technologien. 
 PRO 
 206 
 
Gentechnik in der Landwirtschaft 
ein. Die Potentiale der Grünen 
Gentechnik sind vielfältig. Sie be-
treffen viele Lebensbereiche und 
bieten Vorteile für Verbraucher, 
Umwelt und Landwirtschaft: Ver-
minderung von Umweltbelastun-
gen, Verbesserung der Nahrungs-
mittel, Optimierung nachwach-
sender Rohstoffe. Wir werden das 
Gentechnikrecht innovations-
freundlich korrigieren. Das gilt 
vorrangig für die Praxis untaugli-
chen Regelungen für die Haftung 
und das unbeabsichtigte In-Ver-
kehr-Bringen von gentechnisch 
veränderten Pflanzen Die FDP 
setzt sich für die Verbesserung der 
Rahmenbedingungen für die Er-
forschung, Entwicklung und Nut-
zung nachwachsender Rohstoffe 
ein. Dabei ist eine enge Zusam-
menarbeit von Wissenschaft und 
Wirtschaft anzustreben. Zu einem 
Förderschwerpunkt muss die Ent-
wicklung von nachwachsenden 
Rohstoffen für industrielle An-
wendungen mit Hilfe der Grünen 
Gentechnik entwickelt werden. 
Die im Rahmen der Europäischen 
Union vereinbarten Zielvorgaben 
zum Anteil erneuerbarer Energien 
am Gesamtverbrauch von Kraft-
stoff müssen in Deutschland er-
füllt werden. 
 PRO 
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Greens Die Weltbevölkerung wächst und 
damit die Herausforderung der 
Ernährungssicherheit. Es wäre 
verantwortungslos, darauf mit 
Agro-Gentechnik statt mit einer 
neuen gentechnikfreien Agrarpoli-
tik zu reagieren, die auch den Inte-
ressen der Entwicklungsländer 
Rechnung trägt. Wir GRÜNE sind 
eine starke Stimme für Umwelt- 
und Naturschutz, für neue Land-
wirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz 
-- 
Schwarz-gelb will nicht mehr, son-
dern weniger Ökologie: Wieder-
einstieg in die Atomkraft und Ge-
fährdung von vielen Arbeitsplät-
zen im Bereich der Erneuerbaren 
Energien sowie Gentechnik in der 
Landwirtschaft und in Lebensmit-
teln. 
-- 
Gen-Food - Nein Danke! Die 
Lobby der Agro-Gentechnik fährt 
in einer großen Koalition mit 
Union, FDP, PDS und Teilen der 
SPD einen Generalangriff gegen 
die gentechnikfreie Landwirt-
schaft und die Mehrheit der Ver-
braucher. Agro-Gentechnik, Biopi-
raterie und Saatgutmonopole ge-
fährden weltweit die Vielfalt und 
Sicherheit unserer Nahrungs-
grundlage. Deshalb ist es richtig, 
dass sich die Mehrheit der Ver-
braucherinnen und Verbraucher 
Gentechnikfreie Ernährung oder kli-
mafreundliches Einkaufen wird zum 
Suchspiel für kritische Verbrauche-
rInnen. 
-- 
Gesunde Lebensmittel - Kein Gen-
food auf unsere Teller: Wie die Mehr-
heit der Verbraucherinnen und Ver-
braucher lehnen auch wir Grünen 
Gentechnik auf unserem Teller ab. 
Wir stehen Seite an Seite mit Bauern, 
ImkerInnen und VerbraucherInnen, 
die an vielen Orten Gentechnikfreie 
Regionen ausrufen und sich gegen 
den Anbau von gentechnisch verän-
derten Pflanzen wenden. Agro-Gen-
technik schafft Probleme und keine 
Lösungen. Sie befördert Monokultu-
ren, gefährdet die Umwelt, gentech-
nikfreie Produktion und Arbeits-
plätze. Sie bedroht die Wahlfreiheit 
der Verbraucher, sich für gentechnik-
freie und auch ökologische Lebens-
mittel entscheiden zu können. Gen-
technik macht Landwirte noch abhän-
giger von wenigen weltweit agieren-
den Konzernen. Monsanto darf nicht 
zum Microsoft der Landwirtschaft 
werden. Wir setzen uns deshalb für 
ein EU-weites Verbot von Gentech-
Pflanzen ein, die Menschen, Umwelt 
und die gentechnikfreie Produktion 
gefährden. Wir setzen uns für eine 
weltweite Ächtung der „Terminator-
technologie“ ein, die die Keimfähig-
keit von Samen abtötet. Wir wollen 
Wir brauchen eine Landwirtschaft ohne 
Gentechnik und ohne industrielle Tierpro-
duktion. Tiergerecht statt massenhaft – so 
schaffen wir Zukunft für Mensch, Tier und 
auch für das Klima. 
-- 
Dabei setzen wir auf das Leitbild des Öko-
landbaus und eine naturverträgliche bäu-
erliche Landwirtschaft, auf gentechnik-
freie Lebens- und Futtermittel, regionale 
Verarbeitung und Vermarktung und tier-
gerechte Tierhaltung sowie auf dezentrale 
Agrarstrukturen mit all ihren regionalen 
Unterschieden. 
-- 
Wir lehnen den Anbau und Import von 
gentechnisch veränderten Pflanzen ebenso 
ab wie gentechnisch veränderte oder ge-
klonte Tiere. Die Agrogentechnik hat kei-
nes ihrer Versprechen eingelöst. Statt Er-
träge zu steigern, hat sie den Einsatz von 
Pestiziden und die Gefahren für Umwelt, 
Menschen und Tiere erhöht. Agrogentech-
nik macht unsere Ernährung und unser 
Saatgut abhängig von einer kleinen Zahl 
von Großkonzernen und beendet die freie 
Landwirtschaft und den Ökolandbau. Ag-
rogentechnik reduziert die Vielfalt der 
Pflanzensorten, weil die Gentechnik-Kon-
zerne immer mehr Züchter aufkaufen. Die 
Weiterentwicklung konventioneller Sor-
ten wird vernachlässigt. Es gibt einen ho-
hen Forschungsbedarf für eine tier- und 
umweltverträgliche Landwirtschaft, die 
die Herausforderungen des Klimawandels 
berücksichtigt. Patente auf Pflanzen, Tiere 
Wir machen Schluss mit industrieller 
Massentierhaltung und landwirtschaft-
lichen Monokulturen. Mit uns gibt es 
gutes Essen ohne  Gift und Gentechnik. 
-- 
Die Zulassung neuer chemischer Wirk-
stoffe in der EU wollen wir einschrän-
ken und aus dem Einflussbereich der 
Hersteller herausholen. Nur was wirk-
lich unbedenklich ist, darf auf den 
Markt gelangen. Ein solcher Nachweis 
wird für gentechnisch veränderte Orga-
nismen jedoch bis heute nicht erbracht. 
Gen-Food braucht kein Mensch. Wir 
halten an unserem Standpunkt fest: 
Pflanzen aus den Laboren der Agroin-
dustrie haben auf unseren Äckern in 
Deutschland und Europa nichts verlo-
ren. Dabei ist es egal, ob sie mit Verfah-
ren der „alten“ oder der „neuen“ Gen-
technik geschaffen wurden. Wir wer-
den ein Gentechnikgesetz auflegen, das 
unsere Äcker und unsere Teller garan-
tiert gentechnikfrei macht. Und wir set-
zen uns dafür ein, dass die Verbrauche-
rinnen und Verbraucher dank einer 
umfassenden Kennzeichnung auch er-
kennen können, wenn ihr Fleisch, ihre 
Milch oder ihre Eier mit Hilfe von Gen-
Futtermittel produziert wurden. 
 CON 
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und Landwirtinnen und Land-
wirte gegen Gentechnik auf dem 
Teller und auf dem Acker wehren. 
Wir GRÜNEN nehmen die Men-
schen ernst. Wir GRÜNE wollen 
keine gentechnisch-veränderten 
Lebensmittel. Landwirtschaft und 
Gentechnik - das bedeutet Mono-
pole industrieller Großkonzerne, 
das bedroht gentechnikfreie Land-
wirtschaft und gefährdet Arbeits-
plätze im ökologischen Landbau, 
und das bedeutet massive Subven-
tionierung durch öffentliche Steu-
ergelder und leere Arbeitsplatz-
versprechungen. Wir nehmen An-
griffe auf die Wahlfreiheit der Ver-
braucherinnen und Verbraucher 
nicht hin und haben ein Gentech-
nikgesetz auf den Weg gebracht, 
das der schleichenden Einführung 
von Gen-Food auf unseren Feldern 
sowie in den Supermarktregalen 
Regeln setzt, Transparenz gewähr-
leistet, eine klare Verursacherhaf-
tung einführt und damit bislang 
erfolgreich Einhalt gebietet. 
 CON 
gentechnische Veränderungen klarer 
und deutlicher kennzeichnen. Jeder 
muss wissen, ob sein Fleisch, seine 
Milch oder sein Käse aus einer Pro-
duktion kommt, bei der gentechnisch 
veränderte Futtermittel eingesetzt 
werden. 
-- 
Wer Grün wählt, …stärkt die Ver-
braucherInnenrechte, … wählt Essen 
und Felder ohne Gentechnik… 
-- 
Traditionell ist der Osten geprägt 
durch einen überproportionalen An-
teil der Land- und Ernährungswirt-
schaft. Wir setzen auf eine ökono-
misch und ökologisch zukunftsfä-
hige, gentechnikfreie Produktion: kli-
maschonend, umweltschonend und 
beschäftigungsintensiv. 
 CON 
und Menschen lehnen wir strikt ab, weil 
sie BäuerInnen und VerbraucherInnen in 
eine Abhängigkeit von Agrarkonzernen 
führen. 
-- 
Wir wollen im Interesse der großen Mehr-
heit der Verbraucherinnen und Verbrau-
cher unsere gentechnikfreie Land- und Le-
bensmittelwirtschaft und die Imkerei vor 
gentechnischen Verunreinigungen wirk-
sam schützen. 
-- 
[…] 
 CON 
Left Wir lehnen die Patentierung von 
Lebewesen und Genen ab. Der 
verantwortungsbewusste Um-
gang mit den Möglichkeiten der 
Bio- und Gentechnologien muss 
gesichert werden. Wir unterstüt-
zen die Schaffung gentechnikfreier 
Zonen. Die 
Agro-Gentechnik verbieten; Kenn-
zeichnungspflicht von gentechni-
schen Bestandteilen in Nahrung und 
Futtermitteln bis zur Nachweisgrenze 
von 0,1 Prozent verschärfen; gentech-
nikfreie Regionen und auf sie hinfüh-
rende Initiativen unterstützen 
 CON 
Von der neuerdings vielfach geforderten 
Freihandelszone zwischen der EU und 
den USA erwarten wir keine positive Ent-
wicklung. Besonders im Bereich der Land-
wirtschaft ließe die unbeschränkte Einfuhr 
gentechnisch behandelter Produkte un-
überschaubare Konsequenzen befürchten. 
-- 
Wir wollen den Anbau und den Handel 
mit gentechnisch veränderten Pflanzen 
sowie das Klonen von Tieren verbieten. 
Den Import von gentechnisch verän-
derten Pflanzen wollen wir verbieten. 
Die heimische Produktion von Eiweiß-
futtermitteln wollen wir stärken. 
 CON 
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Kennzeichnungspflicht von gen-
technischen Bestandteilen ist bis 
auf die Nachweisbarkeitsgrenze 
durchzusetzen. 
 CON 
Agro-Gentechnik, Biopatente und Biopira-
terie wollen wir verbieten. Sofort müssen 
das Gentechnikgesetz, das EU-Zulas-
sungsverfahren und die Kennzeichnungs-
vorschriften verschärft werden. Wir halten 
an der Nulltoleranz bei Saatgut und Le-
bensmitteln fest und unterstützen die gen-
technikfreie Land- und Lebensmittelwirt-
schaft. 
-- 
Wir wollen das Recht auf freien Nachbau 
von Saatgut sichern und treten der Markt-
macht von Saatgut- und Gentech-Konzer-
nen entgegen. 
-- 
Wir wollen eine bienenfreundliche Land-
nutzung. Bienen und andere Insekten wol-
len wir vor Pestiziden und Gentech-Pflan-
zen schützen. 
 CON 
SPD In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten 
waren die Informationstechnolo-
gien der Motor für wirtschaftliches 
Wachstum. Wir wollen sie in Ver-
bindung mit der Nano- und Opto-
Technik sowie der Bio- und Gen-
technologie nutzen, um bei der 
ökologischen Modernisierung un-
sere weltweite Vorreiterrolle aus-
zubauen. 
 PRO 
Wahlfreiheit in Sachen Gentechnik. 
Die große Mehrheit der Verbrauche-
rinnen und Verbraucher lehnt Gen-
technik in Lebensmitteln ab. Um 
Transparenz im gesamten Europäi-
schen Binnenmarkt herzustellen, set-
zen wir uns für die Ausweitung der 
Kennzeichnung für gentechnisch ver-
änderte Futter- und Lebensmittel auf 
Erzeugnisse ein, die von mit gentech-
nisch veränderten Pflanzen gefütter-
ten Tieren stammen. Die von der SPD 
durchgesetzte „ohne Gentechnik“-
Kennzeichnung wollen wir mit einem 
einheitlichen Label vorantreiben. Wir 
werden auf eine Änderung des 
Wir lehnen – wie 80 Prozent der deutschen 
Bevölkerung – den Anbau von gentech-
nisch veränderten Pflanzen ab, denn die 
Grüne Gentechnik darf den Menschen 
nicht aufgezwungen werden. Damit sie 
wirklich die Wahl haben, fordern wir eine 
EU-Kennzeichnungspflicht für Produkte 
von Tieren, die mit genveränderten Pflan-
zen gefüttert wurden. An der Nulltoleranz 
gegenüber nicht zugelassenen gentech-
nisch veränderten Bestandteilen in Le-
bensmitteln halten wir fest – ebenso wie an 
der Saatgutreinheit. Das entspricht dem 
Vorsorgeprinzip und ist zudem Voraus-
setzung dafür, dass auch künftig Lebens-
mittel erzeugt werden können, die den 
Weiterhin setzen wir uns für gentech-
nikfreie Landwirtschaft und Lebens-
mittel ein. Wir werden sicherstellen, 
dass auch bei den sogenannten neuen 
Gentechnikverfahren das Vorsorge-
prinzip und die Wahlfreiheit gewähr-
leistet sind und damit erzeugte Pflan-
zen und Tiere nicht unreguliert in den 
Markt gelangen. 
-- 
Gentechnisch veränderte Organismen 
in der Landwirtschaft und Patente auf 
Leben lehnen wir ab. An der Saatgut-
reinheit und der Nulltoleranz für nicht 
zugelassene gentechnisch veränderte 
Organismen in Lebensmitteln halten 
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europäischen Rechts hinarbeiten, die 
die verbindliche Einrichtung gentech-
nikfreier Regionen ermöglicht. 
 CON 
Bedürfnissen der Verbraucherinnen und 
Verbraucher entsprechen: ohne Gentech-
nik. 
 CON 
wir fest. Tierische Produkte, die auf 
Fütterung mit gentechnisch veränder-
ten Pflanzen beruhen, müssen europa-
weit verpflichtend gekennzeichnet 
werden. 
 CON 
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Table A5. Coding Decisions Taken for the Thuringian Parties, 1990-2014 
 1990 1994 1999 
CDU  
 NST 
Neue Mikrotechnologien, die Informations-
technik, die Bio- und Gentechnologie sowie 
neue Materialwissenschaften orientieren sich 
an dieser neuen von Wachstum. Die CDU 
Thüringer befürwortet den verantwortlichen 
Umgang mit diesen neuen Technologien in 
Wissenschaft und Forschung. Die CDU Thü-
ringen setzt sich dafür ein, mit Wissenschaft 
und Wirtschaft die Voraussetzungen zu 
schaffen, die in Forschung lind Entwicklung 
erzielten Ergebnisse beschleunigt in marktfä-
hige Produkte umzusetzen. 
 PRO 
 
 NST 
FDP  
 NST 
Besondere Förderung moderner zukunfts-
trächtiger Technologien und Forschungsdis-
ziplinen, wie Biotechnologie, Gentechnolo-
gie, Kommunikationstechnologie und Mate-
rialforschung 
 PRO 
 
 NST 
Greens  
 NST 
Gentechnik: Gefährdungen und Risiken der 
Gentechnikforschung minimieren. Wir wol-
len den Rückzug aus gentechnischen For-
schungen in Thüringen. Die Nutzen-Risiko-
Analysen beschreiben komplexe Gefähr-
dungspotentiale, denen nur ein geringer 
Nutzen gegenübersteht. Der Verlust zahlrei-
cher Arbeitsplätze wird dabei noch außer 
Acht gelassen. Wir lehnen Forschungen zur 
Patentierung von Lebewesen und von gen-
technisch erzeugten Stoffen ab. Wir treten ein 
für eine Umstrukturierung gentechnisch ar-
beitender Institute in Richtung. einer 
Allumfassende Kennzeichnung gentech-
nisch veränderten Saatgutes und von Le-
bensmitteln, die selbst gentechnisch verän-
dert bzw. unter Zuhilfenahme gentechni-
scher Verfahren entstanden sind 
-- 
Verzicht auf gentechnische Verfahren in der 
Tier- und Pflanzenzucht 
-- 
Der Wert einer gesunden Ernährung ist un-
umstritten. Umstritten jedoch sind der Nut-
zen und die Gefährlichkeit gentechnisch ver-
änderter Lebensmittel beispielsweise in 
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ökologisch verträglichen Forschung (vgl. 
Abschnitt "Bildung und Kultur"). 
Die Anwendung gentechnisch erzeugter Me-
dikamente, Impfstoffe und Diagnostika, für 
die es bisher keine Alternativen gibt, wollen 
wir kritisch begleiten. Wir setzen uns gleich-
falls dafür ein, dass Alternativmethoden, die 
nicht auf Gentechnik basieren, vorrangig 
entwickelt werden. 
Wir lehnen jegliche Freilandversuche und 
andere Experimente mit gentechnisch verän-
derten Pflanzen und Tieren in Thüringen ab. 
-- 
Die Ergebnisse universitärer und außeruni-
versitärer Forschung wirken sich in Form 
neuer Technologien in immer kürzer wer-
denden Abständen auf den Alltag der Men-
schen, ihre Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen 
aus. Dass es sich dabei häufig um Risikotech-
nologien und Fehlentwicklungen handelt, 
die mit hohen Summen öffentlich finanziert 
werden, haben die Diskurse um Atomener-
gie, Gentechnologie und die Verkehrsent-
wicklung exemplarisch deutlich gemacht. 
Wir wollen deshalb eine offene und öffentli-
che Diskussion über die gesellschaftspoliti-
schen Dimensionen der Wissenschaft. 
-- 
Die Freiheit der Forschung endet da, wo sie 
ethisch nicht mehr zu vertreten ist. Das 
schließt die Durchführung von rüstungsrele-
vanter Forschung, auch auf dem Wege der 
Drittmittelfinanzierung, aus. Risikofor-
schung, wie etwa die Weiterentwicklung der 
Gentechnologie soll nicht länger gefördert 
werden. Neben dem Gefahrenaspekt halten 
Bezug auf Allergien. Eine Kennzeichnungs-
pflicht für gentechnisch veränderte Lebens-
mittel ist deshalb das Recht eines jeden Men-
schen. 
-- 
BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN treten für die 
Freiheit von Wissenschaft, Lehre und For-
schung ein. Die Forschungsfreiheit findet 
dort ihre Grenze, wo die Menschenwürde 
verletzt oder unüberschaubare Risiken ein-
gegangen werden. Insbesondere 
die gentechnische Forschung an den Thürin-
ger Hochschulen sowie die aus dem Landes-
haushalt geförderte gentechnische For-
schung soll in dieser Hinsicht stärker öffent-
lich diskutiert werden. 
-- 
Gentechnik - mögliche Risiken ernst nehmen 
Wir unterstützen alle technologischen Ent-
wicklungen, die zu einer in unserem Sinne 
zukunftsfähigen Entwicklung beitragen. Im 
Gegensatz zur Biotechnologie sehen wir in 
der durch die Gentechnik möglichen Mani-
pulation der Erbanlagen diese Zukunftsfä-
higkeit gefährdet. Auf kurzfristigen Gewinn 
ausgerichtete Unternehmensstrategien, un-
zureichende Sicherheits- und Begleitfor-
schung und eine sich im Sinne des Verbrau-
cherinnenschutzes immer weiter verschlech-
ternde Gesetzgebung lassen keinen anderen 
Schluss zu. 
In der Humanmedizin erkennen wir die Er-
folge der Gentechnologie an, warnen ange-
sichts der Aufweichung der Embryonen-
schutzgesetzgebung, den beginnenden routi-
nemäßigen Eingriffen in die menschliche 
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wir es auch aus Gründen der zu erwartenden 
Ergebnisse etwa im Bereich der Medizin und 
Landwirtschaft für sinnvoller, die zur Verfü-
gung stehenden Mittel in die Weiterentwick-
lung einer sich ganzheitlich verstehenden 
Medizin und der Entwicklung ökologischer 
Landwirtschaftsverfahren zu investieren. 
Wir treten daher für eine Umstrukturierung 
gentechnisch arbeitender Institute in Rich-
tung einer ökologisch verträglichen For-
schung und für eine Aufklärung über die Ge-
fahrenpotentiale der Gentechnik ein. 
 CON 
Keimbahn und der damit drohenden Zwei-
klassenmedizin und der Forcierung der Dis-
kriminierung "Andersfähiger" aber vor der 
gegenwärtigen Euphorie. Wir fordern in al-
len Bereichen für die gegenwärtig stark ver-
nachlässigten Alternativen mindestens eine 
Gleichstellung bei der Förderung durch 
Bund und Länder. Darüber hinaus ist der be-
sondere Schutz von Frauen vor gentechni-
schen "Experimenten" zu gewährleisten. 
Wir lehnen den Einsatz der Gentechnik in 
den Bereichen Landwirtschaft, Lebensmittel-
produktion und Umweltsanierung ab, weil 
die hohen Gewinnerwartungen für Einzelne 
in keinem Verhältnis zu den ungeklärten 
Langzeitauswirkungen auf die menschliche 
Gesundheit und die Umwelt stehen. 
Aus diesem Grund wenden wir uns gegen 
die aktuellen und geplanten Freisetzungs-
vorhaben im landwirtschaftlichen Bereich. 
Sollte es aufgrund der europäischen Gesetz-
gebung in Thüringen dennoch zu Freisetzun-
gen kommen, so dürfen keine Landesflächen 
zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Für die Ge-
nehmigungsphase ist die Bürgerinnenbeteili-
gung zu gewährleisten. Die Freisetzungen 
selbst müssen in weit stärkerem Maße von 
Sicherheitsforschungen vor allem über mög-
liche Langzeitwirkungen begleitet werden. 
-- 
Die Prüfkapazitäten des Landes Thüringen 
für Untersuchungen von Lebensmittel auf 
Bestandteile von gentechnisch veränderten 
Organismen sind zu erweitern und ständig 
den neuesten Analysemethoden anzupassen. 
Diese mit öffentlichen Geldern 
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ausgestatteten Labors müssen auch Privat-
personen kostenlos zur Verfügung stehen, 
wenn ein begründeter Verdacht auf das 
Nichteinhalten der Kennzeichnungsverord-
nung gegeben ist. Der 1994 gegründete und 
seit 1996 nicht mehr arbeitende Gentechni-
sche Beirat beim Thüringer Sozialministe-
rium ist 
angesichts der öffentlichen Diskussion nach 
einer ausgewogenen Neubesetzung zu reak-
tivieren. Das Regionalzeichen "Original Thü-
ringer Qualität" ist um das Kriterium "gen-
technikfrei hergestellt" zu erweitern. Der Ab-
satz von Produkten aus dem ökologischen 
Landbau, bei dem der Einsatz von Gentech-
nik untersagt ist, soll durch die öffentliche 
Hand stärker gefördert werden. 
-- 
Das Land Thüringen hat Einfluss darauf zu 
nehmen, dass das BioRegio-Zentrum Jena im 
Bereich der Forschung seinen Schwerpunkt 
auf biotechnologische Verfahren legt und 
gentechnologische Vorhaben auf ihre Ersetz-
barkeit durch biotechnische oder andere al-
ternative Möglichkeiten prüft. 
 CON 
Left  
 NST 
Für das Verbot gentechnologischer Manipu-
lationen in der Nahrungsmittelproduktion. 
 CON 
Gentechnische Forschung durch die Arbeit 
einer ständigen Ethikkommission begleiten 
und kontrollieren. 
 CON 
 
SPD  
 NST 
 
 NST 
Methoden der Bio- und Gentechnologie in 
der Landwirtschaft werden unter kritischer 
Abwägung ihrer Umweltverträglichkeit so-
wie ihrer ethischen Grenzen und 
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Konsequenzen angewendet sowie die For-
schung gefördert 
 PRO 
 2004 2009 2014 
CDU  
 NST 
 
 
 NST 
 
 NST 
FDP Die FDP Thüringen tritt für eine Nutzung 
der Chancen der "grünen Gentechnik" ein. 
Die grüne Gentechnik ist ein neuartiges 
Werkzeug für die Züchtung von Kultur-
pflanzen. Die Entwicklung von Biotechnolo-
gien schafft neue und sichert vorhandene in-
novative Arbeitsplätze. Hier gilt es wissen-
schaftlichen Vorlauf zu schaffen, um die 
Möglichkeiten und Risiken objektiv abwä-
gen zu können. 
 PRO 
 
-Für die Schaffung eines wirklich ausreichen-
den wissenschaftlichen Vorlaufes zur Fest-
stellung und Abwägung von Chancen und 
Risiken der Gentechnik. 
 MOD 
Innovationen und Agrarforschung fördern – 
Chancen und Risiken ideologiefrei abwägen! 
Eine moderne Landwirtschaft orientiert sich 
aus Sicht liberaler Agrarpolitik stets an 
neuen Entwicklungen der Produktionsme-
thodik sowie am technischen Fortschritt und 
wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen. Unter 
dem Grundsatz, dass für uns Liberale die Si-
cherheit für Mensch und Umwelt oberste Pri-
orität besitzt, befürwortet liberale Politik 
eine verantwortungsvolle Nutzung und eine 
weitere Erforschung der modernen Biotech-
nologie. Für die FDP Thüringen sind die An-
wendungen der Biotechnologie stets eine ob-
jektive Abwägung der Chancen und Risiken 
dieser Lebenswissenschaft. Für deren gesell-
schaftliche Akzeptanz und Entscheidung 
wollen Liberale den mündigen Verbraucher 
durch Informationstransparenz sensibilisie-
ren und stärken sowie das Forschungsklima 
technologiefreundlich gestalten. Die FDP 
Thüringen will:  die Forschungen in den Be-
reichen der Pharmazeutischen-, der Industri-
ellen- und der Agrar-Biotechnologie intensi-
vieren und die gesellschaftliche Debatte frei 
von Ideologie und Denkverboten führen. 
Einen verbesserten Wissenstransfer zur Ab-
wägung von Chancen und Risiken der 
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Grünen Gentechnik durch die Schaffung ei-
nes Netzwerkes zwischen Agrarforschung 
und Praxis. Fie vollständige und konse-
quente Prozesskennzeichnung für alle Le-
bensmittel und Konsumgüter bei deren Pro-
duktion an irgendeiner Wertschöpfungs-
stufe gentechnisch veränderte Organismen 
beteiligt waren. 
 MOD 
Greens Wir wollen, dass zum Beispiel Allergikerin-
nen und Allergiker erkennen können, wel-
che Nahrungsmittel sie unbedenklich essen 
und welche Produkte sie gefahrlos verwen-
den können. Das gilt ebenso für den Wunsch 
eines Großteils der VerbraucherInnen nach 
gentechnikfreien Lebensmitteln. 
-- 
Den Einsatz der Gentechnik in der Land-, 
Forst- und Lebensmittelwirtschaft lehnen 
wir auf Grund der ungeklärten Risiken für 
die menschliche Gesundheit und die Um-
welt ab. 
-- 
Gentechnik 
Wir lehnen den Einsatz der Gentechnologie 
in der Landwirtschaft und in der Lebensmit-
telverarbeitung ab, weil die möglichen Risi-
ken für Mensch und Natur nicht geklärt 
sind. Einmal in die Umwelt freigesetzt, wä-
ren negative Auswirkungen nicht rückhol-
bar und würden sich verselbstständigen. 
Angesichts der gegenwärtigen Entwicklun-
gen fordern wir geringst mögliche Grenz-
werte für gentechnische Verunreinigungen 
und eine verbraucherfreundliche Kenn-
zeichnung gentechnisch veränderter 
Wir stehen für direkte und repräsentative 
Demokratie auf Augenhöhe und damit dia-
metral zur Landesregierung. Wir engagieren 
uns in und mit BürgerInneninitiativen für 
mehr Demokratie, für den Erhalt der Kultur 
gegen die Zerschlagung durch die Landes-
politik, gegen die Werraversalzung und für 
eine gentechnikfreie Landwirtschaft. 
-- 
Dabei sind das Nachhaltigkeitsprinzip und 
der gentechnikfreie Anbau von Energie-
pflanzen Grundvoraussetzungen einer um-
weltfreundlichen Biomasseerzeugung 
-- 
Agrogentechnik Nein danke! Die Bilanz nach 
20 Jahren Agro-Gentechnik ist ernüchternd: 
Herbizidresistente Superunkräuter, Insekti-
zid-resistente Schädlinge, unfruchtbare Tier-
herden, hunderttausende Bauern mit Kne-
belverträgen und immer mehr Menschen auf 
der Erde, die Hunger leiden. Es zeigt sich 
ganz deutlich: Die Gentechnik in der Land-
wirtschaft hat keines der Probleme gelöst, sie 
hat diese noch verstärkt. Tierversuche zeigen 
darüber hinaus, dass gentechnisch verän-
derte Lebensmittel alles andere als harmlos 
sind und die lebensmittelrechtlichen 
Agro-Gentechnik braucht niemand Wir 
GRÜNE sagen ganz klar Nein zum Einsatz 
von gentechnisch veränderten Organismen 
in der Thüringer Landwirtschaft. Die Bilanz 
nach 25 Jahren Agro-Gentechnik ist ernüch-
ternd: herbizidresistente Superunkräuter, in-
sektizidresistente Schädlinge, unfruchtbare 
Tierherden hunderttausende Bäuerinnen 
und Bauern mit Knebelverträgen und immer 
mehr Menschen, die auf unserer Erde Hun-
ger leiden. Die Gentechnik hat in der Land-
wirtschaft keine Probleme gelöst, sie hat 
viele noch weiter verschärft. Dabei gibt es ge-
nug Möglichkeiten, die Menschheit zu er-
nähren – z. B. durch ökologische Landwirt-
schaft, Sortenzüchtung und vor allem eine 
gerechte Bodenpolitik. Wir wollen deshalb 
das „Aktionsbündnis für eine gentechnik-
freie Landwirtschaft in Thüringen“ ideell 
und finanziell unterstützen. Der Freistaat 
Thüringen hat die Gefahren der Agro-Gen-
technik erkannt und ist dem „Europäischen 
Netzwerk gentechnikfreier Regionen“ beige-
treten. Wir werden uns dementsprechend für 
eine umfassende Kennzeichnungspflicht 
auch für Produkte von Tieren, die mit gen-
technisch veränderten Stoff en gefüttert 
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Lebens- und Futtermittel. In der Humanme-
dizin leistet die Gentechnologie einen wich-
tigen Beitrag zur Entwicklung neuer Medi-
kamente und Therapien. Wir warnen jedoch 
vor unseriösen Versprechungen und dem 
Missbrauch von Gentests zum Beispiel 
durch Versicherungen und Arbeitgeber. Die 
Forschung an Embryonen lehnen wir ge-
nauso ab wie jede Form des Klonens sowie 
die Patentierung von Menschen, Pflanzen 
und Tieren. 
 CON 
 
Zulassungsverfahren angesichts der gesund-
heitlichen Risiken nicht ausreichen. Gentech-
nisch veränderte Organismen sind Konkur-
renten für die große Vielfalt an über Jahrhun-
derte entstandenen, optimal an verschiedene 
Standort- und Klimabedingungen ange-
passte Pflanzen und Tiere. Ihre Wechselwir-
kungen mit den Ökosystemen lassen sich 
nicht vorhersehen. Wir wollen, dass sich der 
Freistaat Thüringen nach dem Vorbild der 
Stadt Weimar und anderer gentechnikfreien 
Regionen zur gentechnikfreien Landwirt-
schaft bekennt. Im Gegensatz zu inzwischen 
verbotenen Giften wie DDT, FCKW und Di-
oxin, die allmählich aus der Umwelt ver-
schwinden, können wir uns einen Fehlver-
such bei der Gentechnik nicht leisten. Einmal 
in die freie Natur ausgebracht, können die 
gentechnisch veränderten Organismen nicht 
wieder eingefangen werden. Das Aktions-
bündnis für eine gentechnikfreie Landwirt-
schaft in Thüringen ist deshalb ideell und fi-
nanziell zu unterstützen. Thüringen soll dar-
über hinaus eine Initiative ergreifen, um die 
verbraucherfeindliche EU-Regelung aufzu-
heben, wonach Produkte von Tieren, die mit 
gentechnisch veränderten Stoffen gefüttert 
wurden, nicht gekennzeichnet werden müs-
sen. 
 CON 
wurden, und klare Haftungsregeln für Schä-
den durch den Anbau von gentechnisch ver-
änderten Organismen einsetzen. 
-- 
Wir wollen einen Schulgartenunterricht, der 
den biologischen, gentechnikfreien und 
nachhaltigen Anbau erfahrbar macht. 
 CON 
Left  
 NST 
Den Einsatz und die Verbreitung gentech-
nisch veränderter, transgener Organismen 
lehnen wir ab. 
 CON 
 
 NST 
SPD  
 NST 
Wir unterstützen Initiativen und Zusam-
menschlüsse für gentechnikfreien Anbau. 
Wir lehnen weiterhin den Anbau jeglicher 
gentechnisch veränderten Pflanzen in 
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Wir werden uns dafür einsetzen, dass den 
Regionen dabei Mitspracherechte einge-
räumt werden. 
 CON 
 
Thüringen strikt ab. Wir wollen eine 
deutschlandweite Kennzeichnungspflicht 
von Tierprodukten einführen, die mit gen-
veränderten Pflanzen gefüttert wurden. 
-- 
Lebensmittelskandale, unübersichtliche Fi-
nanzierungsmodelle oder die Diskussion 
über die Gefahren der Grünen Gentechnik: 
Diese Beispiele zeigen, dass Verbraucher-
schutz vielschichtig ist und Menschen be-
wegt 
-- 
Wir haben Thüringen als gentechnikfreie Re-
gion etabliert: Der Freistaat Thüringen ist 
dem Europäischen Netzwerk „Gentechnik-
freie Regionen“ beigetreten und auf landes-
eigenen bzw. vom Land verpachteten Flä-
chen dürfen keine gentechnisch veränderten 
Pflanzen angebaut werden. 
-- 
Wir lehnen den Anbau von gentechnisch ver-
änderten Pflanzen ab. Wir wollen Bürger 
und Natur im Freistaat vor den Gefahren der 
sogenannten grünen Gentechnik schützen. 
Die Nutzung gentechnisch veränderter 
Pflanzen im Freistaat schadet nicht nur dem 
Image „Thüringer Qualität“ sondern birgt 
auch unabschätzbare Risiken. Wir setzen da-
her unsere Mitarbeit im Europäischen Netz-
werk gentechnikfreier Regionen engagiert 
fort. Um das Thüringer Engagement weiter 
zu unterstreichen, streben wir in der kom-
menden Legislatur den Vorsitz im Netzwerk 
an. 
 CON 
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Table A6. Positions of the Regional CDU Branches on Agribiotech, 1990-2017 
CDU 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Western states 
Baden-Wuerttemberg   NST    PRO     NST     NST     CON     CON  
Bavaria NST    PRO    PRO     PRO     CON     CON     
Hesse  NST    PRO    PRO    PRO     NST NST     NST    
Lower Saxony NST    PRO    PRO     NST     MOD     NST    NST 
North Rhine-W. NST     NST     NST     PRO     PRO  NST     NST 
Rhineland-Palatine  NST     NST     NST     PRO     NST     NST  
Saarland NST    NST     PRO     NST     NST   NST     NST 
Schleswig-Holstein   NST    PRO    PRO     PRO    MOD   NST     NST 
Eastern states 
Brandenburg NST    NST     PRO     PRO     NST     NST    
Mecklenburg-West P. NST    NST    PRO    NST    PRO     PRO     NST  
Saxony NST    NST     PRO     NST     NST     NST    
Saxony-Anhalt NST    NST    PRO    NST    PRO     MOD     NST  
Thuringia NST    PRO     NST     NST     NST     NST    
City-states 
Berlin NST     NST    NST  NST     NST     NST     NST  
Bremen  NST    NST    PRO    NST    NST    NST    NST   
Hamburg  NST  NST    NST    NST   NST    NST   NST    NST   
Source: based on the coding of the parties’ election manifestos.  
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Table A7. Positions of the Regional SPD Branches on Agribiotech, 1990-2017 
Source: based on the coding of the parties’ election manifestos. 
 
SPD 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Western states 
Baden-Wuerttemberg   NST    NST     NST     CON     CON     CON  
Bavaria CON    NST    CON     PRO     CON     CON     
Hesse  CON    NST    PRO    NST     CON CON     CON    
Lower Saxony NST    NST    NST     NST     CON     CON    CON 
North Rhine-W. NST     PRO     NST     NST     CON  NST     CON 
Rhineland-Palatine  CON     CON     PRO     NST     MOD     CON  
Saarland NST    NST     NST     NST     CON   CON     CON 
Schleswig-Holstein   NST    CON    CON     CON    CON   CON     CON 
Eastern states 
Brandenburg NST    NST     PRO     NST     NST     CON    
Mecklenburg-West P. NST    NST    NST    NST    PRO     CON     NST  
Saxony NST    NST     NST     NST     NST     CON    
Saxony-Anhalt NST    NST    PRO    NST    NST     MOD     CON  
Thuringia NST    NST     MOD     NST     CON     CON    
City-states 
Berlin NST     PRO    NST  NST     NST     NST     NST  
Bremen  NST    CON    NST    NST    NST   NST    NST   
Hamburg  NST  NST    PRO    CON   NST    NST   NST    CON  
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Table A8. Positions of the Regional Greens Branches on Agribiotech, 1990-2017 
Source: based on the coding of the parties’ election manifestos. 
 
GREENS 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Western states 
Baden-Wuerttemberg   CON    CON     CON     CON     CON     CON  
Bavaria CON    CON    CON     CON     CON     CON     
Hesse  CON    CON    CON    CON     CON CON     CON    
Lower Saxony CON    CON    CON     CON     CON     CON    CON 
North Rhine-W. CON     CON     CON     CON     CON  CON     CON 
Rhineland-Palatine  CON     CON     CON     CON     CON     CON  
Saarland NST    NST     NST     CON     CON   CON     CON 
Schleswig-Holstein   CON    CON    CON     CON    CON   CON     CON 
Eastern states 
Brandenburg NST    NST     CON     CON     CON     CON    
Mecklenburg-West P. NST    NST    CON    CON    CON     CON     CON  
Saxony NST    NST     CON     CON     CON     CON    
Saxony-Anhalt CON    CON    CON    NST    CON     CON     CON  
Thuringia NST    CON     CON     CON     CON     CON    
City-states 
Berlin CON     CON    CON  NST     CON     CON     CON  
Bremen NST     NST    CON    CON    CON    CON    CON   
Hamburg  CON  NST    CON    CON   NST    CON   CON    CON   
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Table A9. Positions of the Regional FDP Branches on Agribiotech, 1990-2017 
FDP 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Western states 
Baden-Wuerttemberg   NST    NST     NST     PRO     NST     
CO
N 
 
Bavaria NST    NST    NST     PRO     
CO
N 
    CO
N 
    
Hesse  PRO    
PR
O 
   PR
O 
   PR
O 
    PR
O 
PR
O 
    PR
O 
   
Lower Saxony NST    NST    PRO     NST     
PR
O 
    PR
O 
   PRO 
North Rhine-W. PRO     
PR
O 
    NST     PRO 
    PR
O 
      PRO 
Rhineland-Palatine  PRO     
PR
O 
    PR
O 
    PR
O 
    PR
O 
    PR
O 
 
Saarland NST    NST     NST     NST     NST   PRO     NST 
Schleswig-Holstein   NST    PRO    
PR
O 
    PR
O 
   PR
O 
  NST     NST 
Eastern states 
Brandenburg NST    NST     NST     PRO     
PR
O 
    PR
O 
   
Mecklenburg-West P. NST    PRO    
PR
O 
   NST    PRO 
    PR
O 
    PR
O 
 
Saxony NST    NST     PRO     NST     
PR
O 
    PR
O 
   
Saxony-Anhalt NST    NST    PRO    
PR
O 
   PR
O 
    PR
O 
    NST  
Thuringia NST    PRO     NST     
PR
O 
    MO
D 
    MO
D 
   
City-states 
Berlin NST     NST    NST   NST    PRO     NST     NST  
Bremen  NST    NST    NST    NST    NST    PRO    NST   
Hamburg  NST  MOD    NST    NST   NST    
PR
O 
  PR
O 
   NST   
Source: based on the coding of the parties’ election manifestos.  
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Table A10. Positions of the Regional Left Branches on Agribiotech, 1990-2017 
LEFT 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Western states 
Baden-Wuerttemberg   NEM    NEM     NEM     NEM     CON     NST  
Bavaria NEM    NEM    NEM     NEM     CON     CON     
Hesse  NEM    NEM    NEM    NEM     CON CON     CON    
Lower Saxony NEM    NEM    NEM     NEM     CON     CON    CON 
North Rhine-W. NEM     NEM     NEM     NEM     NST  CON     CON 
Rhineland-Palatine  NEM     NEM     NEM     CON     NST     NEM  
Saarland NEM    NEM     NEM     NEM     CON   CON     CON 
Schleswig-Holstein   NEM    NEM    NEM     NST    NST   CON     NST 
Eastern states 
Brandenburg NST    NST     MOD     NST     CON     CON    
Mecklenburg-West P. NST    NST    NST    NST    CON     CON     CON  
Saxony NST    NST     NST     NST     CON     CON    
Saxony-Anhalt NST    NST    NST    NST    NST     CON     CON  
Thuringia NST    CON     NST     NST     CON     CON    
City-states 
Berlin NST     CON    CON  NST     NST     NST     NST  
Bremen  NEM    NEM    NEM    NEM    NST    CON    NST   
Hamburg  NEM  NEM    NEM    NEM   NEM    NST   CON    CON   
Source: based on the coding of the parties’ election manifestos. 
 
